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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Japanese postwar foreign policy, specifically regional policy, based 
on two hypotheses that are closely related:
(1) There has been a growing interest among Japanese policymakers in Japan 
taking greater initiative independent o f US policy, not only economically but 
increasingly in the political and even the security area.
(2) Japan has been quietly pursuing definite strategies for enhancing its national 
interests, and this style o f Japanese foreign policy has been effective for achieving 
its goals, given domestic, regional and international constraints imposed on it.
The thesis offers detailed analyses, within the framework of IR and 1PE, on what has 
changed in Japanese policy, what has caused the changes, what Japan has achieved 
throughout the postwar period and how and why Japan's policy exhibits such a style.
These themes arc examined by looking at Japan's regional policy in the postwar period in 
the historical context, as well as by studying three case studies, namely: (1) the ideological 
differences between the Japanese approach and the Washington and Post-Washington 
Consensus on economic development and sy stemic transition. (2) Japanese policy towards 
the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998 and (3) Japanese policy towards East 
Asian regionalism. Extensive interviews with Japanese policymakers, such as MOF and 
MOFA officials, and Japanese intellectuals arc used for investigating these case studies.
The thesis makes the following original contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it advances 
the discussions about the nature of Japanese foreign policy, which has been the subject of 
academic controversy over the last few' decades, by shedding light on two related questions, 
namely (1) whether Japanese foreign policy can be characterised as reactive or strategic, 
(2) whether Japan's US priority' in foreign policy has meant that its East Asia policy is 
decided according to US relations, or whether East Asia has occupied an important 
position in Japanese foreign policy. Secondly, the thesis also advances the discussions 
about the style of Japanese foreign policy. This is still an underdeveloped subject 
theoretically and empirically, but could potentially lead to more extensive arguments 
including the nature of leadership. Thirdly , detailed narrative analy ses of Japan's policies 
towards important events in the 1990s, which have not yet been subject to sufficient 
scholarly debate, despite their great potential to offer insight into Japanese foreign policy, 
make a significant empirical contribution to the study o f Japanese foreign policy. 
Furthermore, these empirical discussions, which arc concerned with significant regional 
development in East Asia, contribute to the study of regionalism as well, given Japan's 
great economic influence on the region
x
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The nature o f Japanese foreign policy has been the subject o f academic controversy 
over the last few decades. Some claim that Japan does not have any strategy in its 
foreign relations and has failed to play a role commensurate with its economic power. 
They argue that Japan is just reacting to outside pressures, specifically from the U S,1 
or simply coping with international situations.2 3Worse, it is argued that Japan is not a 
sovereign state, i.e. "a state with central organs o f government which can both 
recognise what is good for the country and bear ultimate responsibility for national 
decision-making.” ’ Additionally, Japanese leaders are thought to view the world 
through the prism o f US-Japan relations, and thus the relationship with the US (or US 
requests) is seen as decisive for Japan's other foreign relations, including its East 
Asian4 policy.
Others, however, hold quite opposite views, thinking Japanese foreign policy to be 
strategic, effective in achieving goals, and even aggressive, particularly in the area of 
foreign economic policy. While a large part o f the negative thesis attributes, to a great 
extent, the ineffectiveness o f  the Japanese state in its foreign relations to its domestic 
political structures, the positive thesis considers that the strong bureaucracy and its 
network o f political leadership and the private sector are the sources o f its successful 
foreign policy. They argue that this system o f 'Japan Inc.’, which Chalmers Johnson
1 Kent E. Calder. “Japanese Foreign Economic Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” 
World Politics 40, 4 (1988), pp.517-541.
2 Michael Blaker. "Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance," in Gerald L. Curtis, ed.. 
Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change. (Armonk, New York: M. E. 
Sharpe. 1993). pp 1-42.
3 Karel G van Wolferen. "The Japan Problem,” Foreign affairs 65, 1 (1986/1987). p.289.
4 In this thesis. East Asia refers to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
countries (Indonesia. Malaysia, the Philippines. Singapore. Thailand. Brunei, Vietnam. Laos. 
Cambodia and Burma). People's Republic of China (hereafter China) and the Republic of 
Korea (hereafter South Korea). Hong Kong, the Republic of China (hereafter Taiwan) and 
Japan are sometimes included, depending on the context.
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depicted, in a  more sophisticated formulation, as the capitalist 'developmental' state,5 
has enabled Japan to achieve a  number o f objectives, including remarkable economic 
development and higher international status. In this interpretation, Japan's economic 
power has been effectively used for establishing a regional economic order that is 
favourable for Japan’s national interests, which, in turn, has led to its greater influence 
and friendlier relations with regional countries.6 This leads to the view that Japanese 
policymaking agents pursue their own agenda in accordance with the national interests, 
and East Asian policy is not necessarily the extension o f  US relations, although most 
scholars accept the strong influence o f the US on Japanese foreign policy.
The wide divergence o f views on Japanese foreign policy is indeed puzzling, and 
raises the question o f how Japanese foreign policy can be best understood. Is this 
diversity o f interpretations a reflection o f variations in Japanese foreign policy across 
issue areas, such as trade or security, or time? Do these studies fail to explain Japanese 
foreign policy as a whole? This thesis has been driven by this problem in considering 
Japanese foreign policy.
The argument o f this thesis is at odds with the negative thesis, as discussed throughout 
the thesis. However, the positive thesis also appears to be increasingly insufficient for 
explaining more recent Japanese foreign policy in that Japan has gradually become 
more interested in independent initiatives beyond the area of foreign economic policy, 
and has shown more positive attitudes towards political and even security initiatives, 
which the existing literature about Japanese foreign policy has downplayed to a great
5 Chalmers Johnson. M1T1 and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: California: Stanford University 
Press, 1982).
6 Walter Hatch and Ko/.o Yamamura. Asia in Japan s Embrace: Building a Regional Production 
Alliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996). Alan Rix, "Japan and Region: 
Leading from Behind." in Richard Higgott. Richard Leaver and John Ravenhill. eds.. Pacific 
Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict? (St. Leonard. NSW: Allen & Unwia 
1993). and David Arasc. Buying Power: the Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid 
(Boulder: Lynne Ricnner. 1995).
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extent.7 It m ust be also noted that Japan has increasingly been trying to develop deeper 
relations w ith its neighbouring countries independent o f  the US, although this does not 
mean that Japan has been defying the US. To take a brief look at one example o f recent 
changes in Japanese foreign policy, Japan's positive policies towards the development 
of East Asian regionalism, which will be detailed in Chapter 5, arc quite political in the 
sense that they  represent an attempt to establish a new framework for cooperation in 
the region. They are also quite independent o f the interests or wishes o f  the US, and in 
a sense contradictory to them, although the US has not been overtly negative to such a 
development. It may also be argued that although its economic resources are still the 
main policy tool for Japan, it seems that Japan has shown its willingness to get out o f 
the traditional pattern o f 'chequebook diplomacy’. In short, while existing views on 
Japanese foreign policy are at considerable variance, few studies have been able to 
explain the significant changes that have appeared in the last few decades, namely 
more political initiatives beyond the economic sphere, independent o f  the US.
Furthermore, the existing literature, particularly the negative thesis, has overlooked an 
important characteristic o f Japanese foreign policy, namely how Japan has pursued its 
policy agendas. This thesis argues that Japan has carried out its policies in a different 
style from what the dominant international relations circles usually expect: Japan has 
preferred to  keep a low-profile while quietly and incrementally carrying out its policies, 
and the style o f Japanese foreign policy has been quite eifective in realising policy 
goals, given the domestic, regional and international constraints. The thesis considers 
that neglecting, or underestimating, this important characteristic o f  Japanese foreign 
policy has greatly contributed to misunderstandings over Japanese foreign policy.
In short, the thesis addresses the above inconsistent interpretations over Japanese
There are some scholars who have noted these changes. For instance, Michael J. Green. 
Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenge in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: 
Palgrave. 2001).
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foreign policy, by presenting two arguments: (1) there has been an important shift in 
Japanese policy in the postwar period, from political minimalism to more initiative­
taking politically, and even in the security area, independent o f the US, and (2) the 
quiet and incremental policy style is an important element in the interpretation of 
Japanese foreign policy. In the rest o f this chapter, the literature on Japanese foreign 
policy is reviewed first in more depth, along the lines presented above, and then the 
hypotheses o f the thesis are introduced. Subsequently the analytical framework that the 
thesis is based on is presented, followed by the outline o f the thesis, including research 
methods and original contributions.
The review of literature on Japanese foreign policy
As outlined above, it is highly debatable whether Japanese foreign policy has been 
reactive or strategic, and whether Japan’s US relations are decisive for the rest of 
Japan's foreign relations, including East Asian relations, or that East Asia has occupied 
a definite position in Japanese foreign policy. Accordingly, in the following the 
existing literature on Japanese foreign policy is reviewed from these two perspectives.
Japanese foreign policy as reactive or strategic
Viewing Japanese foreign policy as minimal or even non-existing is quite common not 
only among Japan specialists but also general readers. It is true that, for a couple of 
decades after the end o f  the Second World War, Japan put its diplomatic fate into the 
hands of the US so that it could focus on economic development. Its seikei bunri (the 
separation o f  politics from economics) policy was most conspicuous during that time, 
and Japan intentionally avoided becoming involved in complicated international 
diplomatic issues. However, a number o f scholars sec Japanese foreign policy as 
passive even after the 1970s, when Japan had risen as a great economic power.
Kent Caldcr presents Japan as a reactive state, arguing that this concept "merely
4
maintains that the impetus to  policy change is typically supplied by outside pressure, 
and that reaction prevails over strategy in the relatively narrow range o f  cases where 
the two come into conflict.” 8 He associates this reactive nature with the domestic 
political structure in Japan, including the fragmented character o f  its domestic 
policymaking process and strong interest-group pressures. Calder concludes that 
external factors determine Japanese foreign policy under such domestic circumstances 
of policy immobilism, regardless o f the interests o f Japanese policymakers.
One o f the problems w ith his discussion is that it is quite easy to find cases that 
contradict his claim. He stresses passivity in Japan's foreign economic policy, whereas 
a large literature notes the more positive and strategic nature o f  its policy compared 
with the political and security' areas, as argued below. In addition, some stress that 
even his evidence o f Japan as a reactive state is not very convincing; namely, gaiatsu 
(foreign pressure), which Calder argues is the determinant o f Japanese foreign 
economic policy, has not always worked effectively. Leonard Schoppa, in his analysis 
o f US-Japan trade talks, shows that US pressure on Japan to bring about policy change 
produced widely varying results in terms o f  the Japanese government’s willingness to 
go along with US demands. He observes that gaiatsu is effective when it works 
through domestic politics; namely when it has domestic support inside Japan; when it 
can be arguably characterised as in Japan's national interest; when there is a  domestic 
problem in search o f  a  solution; and when it is legitimate and ratifiable.9 In short, the 
point o f Schoppa’s discussion is that international factors, specifically gaiatsu, could 
influence Japanese policy through domestic politics, but it could not automatically 
determine it, which contradicts Calder's contention.
Like Calder. Michael Blakcr denies the importance o f strategic considerations in
8 Calder. "Japanese Foreign Economic Formation.” p.518
9 Leonard J. Schoppa. Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressures Can and Cannot Do. 
(New York: Columbia University Press. 1997).
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Japanese foreign policy when he describes this policy as minimalist or coping (he 
actually argues that Japan is try ing to cope but unsuccessfully).10 By ‘coping’ he means 
that Japan is carefully assessing the international situation, methodically weighing and 
sorting out each alternative, waiting for the dust to settle on contentious issues, making 
domestic consensus and adapting to the existing situation with the fewest risks. In 
short, he sees Japanese foreign policy as being highly opportunistic. He is right in that 
Japan’s diplomacy was minimalist until recently, particularly in the security area. It 
seems also true that Japan's diplomacy was not (perhaps still is not) very sophisticated 
tactically, which can be attributed to its deferring to the US in many political and 
security issues, thus sometimes failing to achieve sufficient objectives or missing 
opportunities to enhance national interests in some individual cases, as his two case 
studies on Japan's policies towards the third United Nation Law o f the Sea Conference 
in the 1970s and the G ulf War in the early 1990s show. However, many would disagree 
that this tactical inability' o f  Japan’s diplomacy suggests a lack of strategy in Japanese 
foreign policy as a whole.
Donald Hellmann points out the contrast in policy across issue areas, arguing that 
Japan's record on political-strategic decision is as bad as its record on international 
economic policy is good, and "decision-making institutions have produced reactive, 
not active policies, regarding major political issues in foreign affairs.”11 To him Japan 
is "more a trading company than a nation-state, a nation without a foreign policy in the 
usual sense of the word,”12 and he attributes this limitation largely to Japan's party 
politics, characterised by factional struggles, which gives Japanese prime ministers 
only limited power, together with relatively weak domestic institutions, like the 
National Defence Council (now the National Security Council) and Japan Defence
10 Blaker. "Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance.”
11 Donald C. Hcllmann. "Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy within an 
American Greenhouse." in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto. eds.. The Political 
Economy of Japan: Volume 2 the Changing International Context (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 1988). p.369.
12 Ibid., p.358.
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Agency. Although Hellmann accepts the successful record o f Japanese policy in the 
economic area, he does not entirely agree with analyses that credit that record 
exclusively to Japan's domestic political economy, stressing the importance of the US- 
made international 'greenhouse' that allowed Japan to pursue its 'neo-mercantilist' 
policy. By arguing this, he, to a degree, downplays the strategic orientation o f Japanese 
foreign policy even in the economic area.
On the other hand, there is a literature that emphasises the strategic character o f 
Japanese foreign policy, particularly in the economic area. T.J. Pempel holds that for 
several decades following the Second World War Japanese foreign economic policy 
followed clearly defined and quite consistently executed objectives.13 He argues that 
"the definition and implementation of foreign economic policy in Japan rests 
essentially on the domestic political structures o f the country, particularly the strength 
o f the state and its network of conservative support ” 14 He docs not neglect 
international forces, but considers that they are less important than domestic political 
factors in the shaping o f  Japanese foreign economic policy, and in some cases 
domestic forces "proved capable of explicitly resisting unwanted international 
pressures or o f at least creatively manipulating such pressures.”15
Likewise, Alan Rix, focusing on Japan's trade policy, maintains the significance o f  its 
policy objectives in trade policymaking, arguing that Japan’s accommodating foreign 
pressures is not the automatic acceptance o f them .16 He states that "international 
pressures arc one (albeit highly significant) input to the domestic Japanese policy 
process,” and the "more important parameters o f decision making are domestic: the 
long-term indicative objectives o f government; the diversity o f  internal processes and
13 T. J. Pcmpel. "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: the Domestic Bases for International 
Behavior." International Organization 31, 4 (1977).
14 Ibid., p.726.
15 Ibid., p.759.
16 Alan Rix, "Dynamism. Foreign Policy and Trade Policy,” in J. A. A. Stockwin et al. Dynamic 
and Immobilist Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988).
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the influence o f  the bureaucratic process itself on policy; and definitions o f the 
national interest.”17
William Nester recognises the more aggressive nature o f Japanese foreign economic 
policy. He is convinced o f  that Japan is skilfully, successfully and single-mindedly 
securing its economic and political interests, and notes four Japanese foreign policy 
goals, namely economic and military security, rapid modernisation, acquiring great 
power status and world recognition of its accomplishments. These were pursued 
through state-led industrialisation and imperialism before the war and neo­
mercantilism after the w ar.18 To him, Japanese foreign policy, particularly foreign 
economic policy, has been purposeful and shrewd, not passive.
Dennis Yasutomo also opposes the idea that the Japanese government is paralysed by 
policy immobilism and only reacts to external pressures purposelessly, neglecting its 
national interest.19 20He accepts that Japanese policy is in a sense as reactive as other 
governments are. and “so much of Japan's foreign policy is tailored to responding, 
either in anticipation or after-the-fact, to the expectations, hopes, and fears o f foreign 
actors, both nation-state and non-nation-state.” 2<1 However, he argues that his case 
studies about Japan's multilateral bank policies and aid policies do not show that Japan 
is like a billiard ball, bouncing off the movement o f  others, and that Japan’s behaviour 
reveals a Japanese agenda, often pursued against the wishes o f  others In short, what 
he stresses is that external stimuli provide the initial push, but "Japan then incorporates 
the stimuli into its own policy objectives and fashions a  policy that may or may not
17 Ibid., p.314.
18 William Nestcr. "The Third World Japanese Foreign Policy," in Kathleen Newland. ed.. The 
International Relations of Japan (London: Macmillan, 1990).
19 Dennis T. Yasutomo. The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy (London: 
Macmillan, 1995).
20 Ibid., p. 188,
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respond directly to the intent or wishes o f that stimuli.”21 2
Furthermore, some scholars note that Japan has successfully advanced its agendas for 
its national interests but in a low-profile way. They point out that Japan's economic 
power has successfully created its long-term influence in East Asia; a  combination o f 
private and public Japanese capital (trade, investment and aid) has gradually moulded 
a regional economic order favourable to Japan.2-As discussed in the next chapter, the 
economic ties o f  Japan with East Asian countries have considerably strengthened since 
the 1980s. Such a development has been basically driven by the private sector, 
particularly through FDI. but government policy has also played a crucial role through 
aid or other measures to encourage private activity. Arasc argues that the institutional 
structure o f  Japan’s overseas development assistance (ODA) policy reflects the role o f 
the postwar Japanese state in guiding the private sector towards national 
developmental goals, and, while the private sector is not passive and has greatly 
benefited from the government’s ODA policy, “it is the state bureaucracy that holds the 
balance o f  power.”23 Thus, according to them. Japanese foreign policy, specifically 
foreign economic policy, is very purposeful and skilful. The increased inflow o f 
Japanese private and public capital has had a great effect on the region's economy, 
which naturally has raised Japan's profile in East Asia and has created the conditions 
that have led to a gradual, albeit limited, acceptance of Japan’s larger role in the region. 
Alan Rix calls this Japan's ’leadership from behind’.24 Hatch and Yamamura put it as 
follows: “ [the rapid rise in Japan's standing in East A sia| is the product o f  a deliberate, 
largely successful strategy to embrace the region in a  complex web o f personal, 
governmental, and cooperate ties - all united under the ubiquitous banner o f keizai
21 Ibid., p. 188.
22 Hatch and Yamamura. Asia in Japan's Embrace. Rix, "Japan and the Region." and Arase. 
Buying Power.
23 Arase, Buying Power, p.247.
24 Alan Rix, ’’Japan and the Region."
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kyoryoku. or economic cooperation. >.25
In short, there is quite a large literature that sees Japan’s foreign policy as strategic and 
successful, which presents various arguments that counter the view o f  Japanese foreign 
policy as reactive or minimalist. Admittedly, these arguments are limited to the 
economic sphere.
Although it is debatable to what extent Japanese foreign policy has been reactive or 
strategic, as discussed so far, few' would probably disagree that Japan has formulated 
and implemented its foreign policy within given international orders centring on the 
US; it has positively participated rather less in forging and transforming such 
frameworks. Yoichi Funabashi writes: "Japan has seldom tried to  present itself as a 
rule-maker in the world community. The rules were already there. Japan simply tried 
to adapt to them and, if  possible, excel at playing the game. W hen faced with difficulty, 
however, it tended simply to ignore or reject those rules altogether.” 26 Takakazu 
Kuriyama, a  former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, accepts this, and argues that 
Japan did not have to act positively because Japan could reap considerable benefits 
from the existing international orders.27
Japanese foreign policy - dependent on the US or independent?
Because o f  this dependence of Japan on the US-centred international order, as well as 
on the bilateral relations with the US, it is unquestionable that Japan's foreign policy 
has been greatly constrained, if not determined, by its US relations, and that this 
unbalanced relationship has made it quite difficult for Japan to adopt independent 
policies. Makoto Iokibe claims that this policy towards the US has been the basis o f 
Japan's postwar diplomacy, from which no governments have deviated, and within that
25 Hatch and Yamamura. Asia in Japan's Embrace, p. 115.
26 Yoichi Funabashi. “Japan and the New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 70-5 (1991/1992), p.60.
27 Takakazu Kuriyama. "Taikcnteki nihon gaikoron |a view on Japanese diplomacy from 
experience).” Chuo Koron (November 1991), p. 113.
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framework Japan has cultivated other foreign relations.28 In fact, he notes, policies that 
were contradictory with the US’s wishes did not go well, like Prime M inister Tanaka’s 
attempt to deal independently with the oil crises against US policy lines in the 1970s.29 
Hellmann holds that ""[o]ne international relationship, the U S alliance, has totally 
overshadowed all others since World War II.”30
Robert Orr demonstrates the crucial role o f the US with respect to  Japan's aid 
policymaking.31 He argues that the US has been able to exercise its influence on 
Japan’s aid policy process principally through the Ministry' o f Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 
whose officials acknowledge that the US-Japan relationship is the bedrock o f Japan's 
foreign policy, although he notes the US has not always been successful in pressuring 
Japan. His study is significant in that he actually shows how US pressures have 
penetrated into Japan’s domestic policymaking processes by taking advantage o f 
bureaucratic conflicts so that they may affect foreign policy outcomes. However, his 
analysis gives too much weight to the role o f US pressures. As some scholars observe, 
Japan’s aid policy has greatly reflected its own motivations,32 which O rr refers to only 
briefly.
Few scholars in fact deny the strong influence o f the US on Japanese foreign policy, 
which is also taken by many as the appropriate context for analysing Japan’s regional 
relations. They argue that most Japanese postwar policies towards East Asia were 
taken with a view to their effects on the US-Japan relationship. Kazuo Ogura, former 
director-general responsible for economic negotiations in the Foreign Ministry,
28 Makoto Iokibc. 'Kokusai kankyo to nihon no sentaku |the international situation and the 
choice of Japan].'' in Tadashi Aruga et al. cds.. Koza Kokusai Seiji 4: Nihon no Gaiko llectures 
on international politics 4: Japanese diplomacy! (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1989), pp. 19- 
52.
29 Ibid., pp.38-40.
30 Hellmann. "Japanese Politics.” p.356.
31 Robert M. Orr. The Emergence of Japan's Aid Power (New York: Columbian University 
Press, 1990).
32 Dennis T. Yasutomo. The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy 
(Lexington. Massachusetts: Lexington Books. 1986). Alan Rix, Japan's Foreign Aid Challenge: 
Policy Reform and Aid Leadership (London: Routledge. 1993).
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commented that "Japan’s strategy for Asia is to co-operate with America’s Asia 
strategy. . .This means that Japan's policy towards Asia has really been its policy with 
respect to the Untied States.”33 Although East Asian relations have been considerably 
important to Japan throughout the prewar and postwar periods, it is probably true that 
US relations sometimes have taken precedence over East Asian issues. What matters 
for Japan has been how to pursue regional policy under the constraints o f US relations, 
and this was particularly true for a couple of decades after the Second World War, 
when Japan was thoroughly embedded in Cold War bipolarity and Japanese 
policymakers' minds were occupied by the country's economic development while the 
economic importance o f  East Asia was not very high.
On the other hand, some emphasise the more strategic nature o f Japan’s regional policy, 
opposing the idea that Japan's East Asian policy is merely the extension of its US 
policy. It was argued above that the combination o f  Japanese public and private 
capitals has created a regional economic order Chalmers Johnson holds that “when it 
comes to Japan’s movement towards a  new Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, I 
believe that Japan may know exactly what it is doing, that its bureaucrats are quite 
capable o f guiding the nation in this direction, and that its seeming indecision merely 
reflects a delicate sense o f  timing and excellent camouflage for its long-range 
intentions.”34 In an analysis on Japanese policy towards Southeast Asia, Yasuhiro 
Takeda argues that since the Fukuda doctrine Japan has repeatedly shown careful 
consideration towards ASEAN, and has given the positions o f ASEAN its serious 
concern.35 In fact, the discussion in the next chapter also shows that Japan's East Asian
33 Cited in Richard L. Grant. "Japan and Northeast Asia." in Richard L. Grant, ed.. The Process 
of Japanese Foreign Policy: Focus on Asia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
1997). p. 108.
34 Chalmers Johnson. "History Restated: Japancsc-American Relations at the End of the 
Century.” in Higgott et a l . eds . Pacific Economic Relations, p.55.
35 Yasuhiro Takeda. "Tonan ajia gaiko no tenkai |tlic development of Japan's Southeast Asia 
diplomacy].” in Atsushi Kusano and Tetsuya Umemoto. eds.. Gendai Nihon Gaiko no Bunseki 
Ithe analysis of contemporary Japanese diplomacy! (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1995), 
pp.63-88.
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policy has not been an automatic reaction to US policy, and Japanese policymakers 
have given serious consideration to Japan's regional relations.
In short, the thesis is confronted with two questions, which arc closely related to each 
other, namely (1) whether Japanese foreign policy can be characterised as reactive and 
opportunistic, or strategic and effective in achieving goals, and (2) whether its US 
priority in foreign policy has meant that its East Asia policy is decided according to 
US relations, or that East Asia has occupied a  definite position in Japanese foreign 
policy. They are the problems that the thesis deals with.
Hypotheses
The thesis grapples with these problems about the nature o f  Japanese foreign policy by 
putting them in the context o f gradual but highly significant shifts in Japanese foreign 
policy throughout the postwar period, namely (1) from minimalist to more initiative 
taking, and (2) from US-centred to more independent East Asian policy. In other words, 
Japan has become increasingly more interested in taking initiative; while in the past 
this occurred mainly in the economic sphere, recently Japan has developed more and 
more initiatives in political matters These initiatives are most conspicuous in its East 
Asian relations because o f historical, geographical and economic reasons. Accordingly, 
East Asia has an ever greater diplomatic importance to Japan, although the absolute 
importance o f the US to Japanese policy has not been altered.
As mentioned above, until the early 1970s, Japan, economically devastated by the war 
and thoroughly embedded in the Cold War bipolarity, tried to avoid taking diplomatic 
initiative as much as it could so that it could focus on its own economic development. 
Its foreign policy interests were quite limited to narrowly defined economic benefits, 
and relied on US hegemony economically, politically and in security matters for their 
realisation. This gave the US huge leverage, which quite often made Japan determine
13
its policy in deference to US wishes. Additionally. East Asia was too undeveloped 
economically to be a serious economic partner for Japan, and there was a very uneasy 
atmosphere in the region, where East Asian countries disliked Japan's initiatives. As a 
result, relatively little attention was paid to  regional matters. Although East Asia was 
not completely neglected, its aid policy was easily Japan's most important regional 
policy at that time.
However, since the 1970s. Japan has gradually become more active diplomatically due 
to several factors, including the impact o f some critical international incidents, such as 
the oil crises and the collapse o f the Bretton Woods system, and some significant 
distributional changes, like Japan's economic rise, the relative decline o f  US power 
and the increasing interdependence o f the East Asian economy. While Japan was no 
longer allowed to continue its minimalist policy, for economic as well as political 
reasons East Asia has become increasingly more important to  Japanese policy. Japan 
began to consider utilising its economic resources for political purposes, showing its 
willingness to take some political initiatives in the region, as shown in the Fukuda 
doctrine, although on the whole its policy was quite closely related to US policy.
In the 1980s and 1990s, there took place further shifts in Japanese foreign policy. 
Japan has been more concerned with political and even security initiatives beyond the 
economic area, for instance, the direct involvement in Cambodian peace from the late 
1980s. Also, Japan has tried to take more initiatives independently of the US. as seen 
in the positive policies addressing the East Asian financial crisis and those advancing 
East Asian regionalism, although this docs not mean that the importance o f  the US has 
decreased, nor that Japan has begun to defy US wishes. In fact, there has been overall 
compatibility o f  Japanese policy with US stances. Furthermore, it is noticeable that 
Japan has been participating more positively in debates about how international 
regimes should be, which contrasts with the previous acceptance o f existing
international systems.
In short, the picture o f  contemporary Japanese foreign policy is quite different from 
that o f half a  century ago. This thesis considers that it is crucial to analyse carefully 
these changes in Japanese policy in order to characterize effectively the nature o f 
Japanese foreign policy. Furthermore, as explained below, this attention to the changes 
in Japanese foreign policy has great significance for the studs’ o f  International relations 
(1R) and International Political Economy (IPE). Because Japan's weight in the world 
political economy, not to mention East Asia, is now enormous, it is essential to take 
into account these changes in Japan so as to arrive at the right picture o f what has been 
happening in East Asia and internationally.
The important point to note here is that, although the thesis accepts that the minimalist 
and perhaps reactive nature of Japanese policy sometimes overwhelmed the 
independent aspects in Japanese foreign policy, particularly in the early postwar period, 
it does not follow that Japan has merely been passive in international affairs and bereft 
o f its own strategies or policy goals. It is true that Japan had to, and has to even now, 
compromise with US requests quite often. However, it is not correct to interpret this 
attitude o f  Japan as merely knee-jerk policies, automatically responding to  US requests 
without any consideration o f its own national interests. As discussed later, national 
interests matter to the same extent that they do in any other country, and Japan has 
strategics for enhancing its national interests. This thesis actually considers that such 
seeming reactivity has been a sort o f a strategy for Japan to achieve its long-term 
policy goals and to create situations favourable for its national interests To put it 
differently, Japan’s frequent reactivity can be regarded as the result o f its deliberate 
manipulation of domestic affairs and international circumstances in order to defend its 
national interests, as discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 6.
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This consideration leads to  the other argument o f the thesis concerning the style o f 
Japanese foreign policy. The view that Japan's economic power has gradually created a 
sphere o f influence in the region was discussed above. This thesis considers that this 
idea can be extended to the style o f Japanese foreign policy in general. This is apparent 
in Japan's low-profile and incremental approach to advancing its agendas without 
taking an overt, or dominant, leadership role particularly in East Asia, as recognised in 
some preceding w orks.'6
Based on these observations, the hypotheses o f  the thesis are as follows.
(1) There has been a growing interest among Japanese policymakers in Japan 
taking greater initiative independent o f US policy, not only economically but 
increasingly in the political and even the security area, and this is particularly 
conspicuous in its East Asian relations. Accordingly, the position of East Asian 
countries in Japanese foreign policy-making has become significantly more 
important
(2) Japan has been quietly and incrementally pursuing definite strategies for its 
national interests, and this style o f Japanese foreign policy has been highly 
effective in realising its policy goals, given the domestic, regional and 
international constraints imposed on it.
These two points have great significance for the study o f IR and IPE Neglecting them 
can make it difficult to  analyse correctly important events in the world political 
economy. While the rise o f  Japan as an economic power in the postwar period itself 
has already influenced the world economy to a great extent, how Japan has used and 
will use its economic power politically will have an immense effect on the 
international society as a  whole. For instance, as seen in the later chapters o f the thesis.
36 Sec, Glenn D. Hook. Julie Gilson. Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson. Japan's 
International Relations: Politics. Economics and Security. (London: Routledgc. 2001).
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an analysis o f the East Asian regionalism since the late 1990s is not possible without 
noting the above points. Neither is it possible to understand the political economy of 
the East Asian financial crisis. This thesis argues that a correct understanding of 
Japanese foreign policy is an essential part o f the development o f the study o f IR and 
IPE
These changes in Japanese foreign policy as well as the way in which Japan pursues its 
agenda will be analysed following the framework o f IR and IPE, which will be 
discussed next. In other words, while this thesis will empirically examine the above 
two hypotheses, it will also offer accounts, in the framework o f IR and IPE, o f what 
has caused these changes and why Japan has preferred such a low-profile approach 
The following discussion on the analytical framework is also concerned with the 
research method of the thesis.
Analytical fram ew ork
This thesis combines the international and domestic levels o f analysis. While noting 
the influence o f the international structure and its changes on foreign policy outcomes, 
it is argued that it is crucial to open the 'black box’ o f the policymaking process o f the 
state. Understanding the views and intentions of individual key policymakers is a 
fundamental part in analysing a country's foreign policy. Non-governmental actors, 
such as private firms, interest groups or business organisations, sometimes exert a 
significant influence on policymaking processes. However, they, like international 
forces, influence foreign policy only to the extent that they have access to 
policymaking processes. Accordingly, while the thesis draws on the insights and 
strengths o f several IR and IPE approaches, analysing domestic policymaking 
processes is given significant weight.
International level analysis
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Because postwar Japan has been highly vulnerable to international forces due to its 
heavy dependence on the US, it is particularly essential to incorporate them into the 
analysis o f  Japanese foreign policy. In the following, various international approaches 
are discussed in order to establish the analytical framew ork o f the thesis.
Both realists and neo-realists assume that the state is a rational unitary actor. They 
personify the state as a single actor at the top making foreign policy on behalf o f the 
national interest. Their picture o f identical states interacting in the anarchic system is 
often likened to the movement o f  billiard balls. Unlike neo-realists, the traditional 
realist school, specifically Morgcnthau. attributes political outcomes to the actions and 
interactions o f  the constituent units (states) in the system. The principles o f human 
nature, the idea o f  interest defined in terms o f  power and the behaviour o f statesmen 
are all important explanatory variables, but this approach tends to ignore the internal 
characteristics o f the units 17 The neo-realist school, led by Kenneth Waltz, stresses 
even more the structural-biased explanation, arguing that the international system 
conditions the behaviour o f states, not vice versa .37 8 Neo-realists reject the above claim 
of the traditional realists by asserting that the attributes o f units are irrelevant in 
analysing international politics, hence leaving less room for internal politics. Thus, 
despite the primacy o f  the state in the realist and neo-realist paradigms, they analyse 
the world outside the state without giving due attention to  domestic policymaking 
process.
This thesis considers that neither realists nor neo-realists can fully explain the foreign 
policy o f a single country, and it is fundamental to analyse domestic politics. Even 
neo-realist scholars, such as Stephen Krasncr, recognise that it is necessary' to examine
37 Scotl Burchill, ''Realism and Neo-realism." in Scott Burchill et al Theories of International 
Relations (London: Macmillan. 1996). p. 78.
’K Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics (Reading. Massachusetts: Addison-Weslcy.
1979).
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policy making processes within a country when dealing with foreign policy.”  Waltz 
also admits that structural causes are not determining, but are influences, and that both 
unit-level and structural-level analyses are needed to understand international 
relations.4,1
However, this does not discount the importance of international approaches for foreign 
policy analy ses. International structures without doubt constrain, if  not determine, state 
policy, and various works o f realist and neo-realist scholars provide some important 
insights into the understanding o f Japanese foreign policy.
Firstly, it can be argued that one o f  the realist and neo-realist core assumptions, that 
states pursue their national interests through rational strategics, has some important 
implications for foreign policy analyses. This does not mean that the thesis accepts the 
picture o f the state as a unified and autonomous actor, interacting with others pursuing 
similar goals in the anarchic international system. Nor does it assume that super 
capable officials, with access to full information, calculate all the related values in 
society and all possible policy outcomes and determine the policies that would 
maximise such values.41 What should be stressed instead is that the considerations o f 
the policymakers about the national interest matter a great deal. Policymakers may not 
always adopt the right policy, but policy outcomes more or less reflect their 
assessments o f the national interest.
It is important here to make clear how this thesis incorporates the concept o f  the 
national interest, as this concept has been the subject o f great controversy. James
39 Stephen D. Krasner. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U. S. 
Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1978), p. 13. He stresses the distinction 
between the studies of foreign policy and international politics, arguing that foreign policy 
cannot simply be the study of the way in which individual countries, treated as unified wholes, 
interact in the international system.
Argued in Marlin Hollis and Steve Smith. Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1990), p. 117.
41 Charles E. Lindblom. “The Science of “Muddling Through”." Public Administration Review 
19, 2 (1959), pp. 79-88.
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Rosenau distinguishes two types o f scholars who analyse this concept, namely 
objectivists and subjectivists. The former considers that the national interest is an 
objective reality that is discoverable through systematic enquiry. For Morgenthau, the 
national interest is determined by considerations o f  relative power The latter group of 
scholars adopt a more pluralistic approach, arguing that the national interest reflects 
various social values, based on which high officials formulate policies.42 The position 
of this thesis is closer to the subjectivists in the sense that it argues that the national 
interest is what policymakers consider to be desirable for their society. However, it 
differs from the subjectivist position in that it uses the term 'the national interest' 
separately from social demands, although it does not mean to argue that social 
demands are irrelevant for foreign policy analyses. In short, in this thesis the national 
interest is defined as policy objectives sought by policymakers based on their rational 
considerations o f  what is best for a state.43
Secondly, foreign policy-making certainly involves some element o f the realist power- 
politics model, namely the view that international politics is a  struggle for power 
between states in the anarchical system, although this is only one dimension o f 
international politics. Power is as controversial and difficult a  subject as the national 
interest, and there is great disagreement among scholars about what it means 
Traditional realists define it in terms o f military strength, but it is obvious that this 
narrow definition has been increasingly inadequate in the present international 
situation. In this thesis, power is understood as ‘influence’, namely a state’s ability to 
influence other states in order to achieve its own policy objectives. One could argue 
that influence is closely related to the capacity o f  a state, which is based on various 
factors:44 material, such as geography, resource endowment and economic as well as
42 James N Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy - reviewed and enlarged edition 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1980), pp.283-293.
"  Krasncr defines the national interest in the similar way.
"  The capability of states also has been subject to intense discussion. See. Hitoshi Hanai. Shin 
Gaiko Scisakuron Ithouehts on new foreign policvl (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai, 1998), pp 226-230.
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military capability, and non-material, such as status in the world political economy. In 
turn, the non-material capacity could be derived from various factors, for instance 
position in international or regional organisations, and it is probably related to what 
Susan Strange calls structural power.45 It can be argued that it is an important aspect o f 
international politics that states arc eager to improve these capacities in order to 
acquire greater influence in international society, so that they can create circumstances 
favourable to the pursuit o f their own national interests. In fact, some recent Japanese 
foreign policies are in part motivated by the desire to secure a voice internationally and 
to maintain and improve its status regionally and internationally in the uncertain period 
after the end o f the Cold War. as argued in detail in the subsequent chapters.
Thirdly, and related to the second point, geopolitical circumstances and their changes
have constrained and affected the foreign policy o f most countries, specifically Japan
In particular, the bipolar structure during the Cold War greatly narrowed the policy
options o f many countries, and in turn the end o f the Cold War has significantly altered
the conditions under which they decided and implemented foreign policy. As discussed
in Chapter 2, the impact o f the end o f the Cold War on Japanese foreign policy is
immense, and in fact it has greatly contributed to the changes in Japanese foreign
policy identified above. Furthermore, the neo-realists’ claim that the distribution of
power across the international system and the place o f a state in that distribution
constrain the country's foreign policy has a great deal o f explanatory power. It is hard
to measure the actual amount o f power or capability o f  states. However, probably few
would dispute that the US exerts the prominent influence in the world political
economy, which is derived from its overwhelming economic and military' strength as
well as structural power. Accordingly, the US stance on various issues has significantly
affected the foreign policy o f other states. Furthermore, Japan’s rise as an economic
45 Structural power is "the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political 
economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and 
(not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate.” (Susan Strange. States 
and Markets (London: Pinter. 1988). pp.24-25.)
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power itself has obviously changed its position in the world, and this was reflected in 
some of the changes in its foreign policy, as touched on above.
In addition to the realist paradigm, liberalism also has great significance for foreign 
policy analysis in general and the analysis o f Japanese foreign policy in particular. 
There are considerable divergences within the liberal tradition, and different variants 
o f liberalism arc at odds with each other."16 Among them, neo-liberal institutionalism is 
particularly relevant as an international explanation o f foreign policy. Neo-liberal 
institutionalism, unlike other kinds o f liberalism, claims that states are the most 
significant actors in the anarchic international system. In this sense, it shares certain 
ideas with the realist tradition. However, it has more benign views about the 
international system and state behaviour than realism, which is due to the fact that, 
while realists (neo-realists) emphasise relative gains, nco-libcral institutionalists give 
importance to absolute gains. Specifically, neo-liberal institutionalism stresses that 
deepening economic interdependence has affected the foreign policy o f countries. It 
leads states to engage in increasing levels o f international cooperation and to construct 
regional and international institutions, and such regimes mitigate the anarchic 
condition o f the international system.
This neo-libcral institutionalist argument has particular relevance for analysing Japan's 
stance on regionalism as well as its changing relations with East Asian countries. It can 
be argued that cvcr-incrcasing economic interdependence, or régionalisation, has 
significantly affected East Asian relations, and in turn, Japan's regional policy. In fact, 
closer regional economic relations since the 19X0s have been one o f  the important 
driving forces for heightening interest in regional cooperation in Asia Pacific as well 
as East Asia, as shown in more detail in Chapters 2 and 6. This is not seen as a 46
46 Timothy Dunne. "Liberalism." in John Baylis and Steve Smith, cds.. The Globalization of 
World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
1997), pp. 147-163.
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functional process o f  spillover from economic integration to more political issues. Nor 
does the thesis necessarily see this as a state rational response, as many scholars in this 
tradition do. Instead, it is recognised here that deepening economic interdependence 
has greatly influenced the minds o f East Asian and Japanese policymakers, which has 
significantly altered regional relations, and in turn Japanese foreign policy.
To sum up. international realist and liberal approaches constitute a significant part in 
the analysis o f foreign policy, and Japanese foreign policy in particular. External 
factors influence foreign policy by constraining policy options, while providing some 
opportunities. However, the thesis does not take the view that there is some universal 
international force that drives countries in any particular direction. In other words, it 
does not adopt the positivist approach, on which both realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism are based, namely the approach based on the assumption usually 
applied to natural phenomena, that the (social) world has regularities that theories can 
discover.47 Instead it is argued that international factors only indirectly affect foreign 
policy through domestic policymaking processes. For this reason, the thesis considers 
that it is essential to analyse domestic policy-making processes, to understand what 
policymakers actually think, and to combine international and domestic approaches 
particularly when analysing the foreign policy of a single country.
Domestic level analysis
Although few' scholars engaging in foreign policy analysis disagree about the need to 
open the ‘black box’ o f the state, there is no comprehensive theory or explanation of 
domestic politics. However, it is possible to broadly divide arguments into society- 
centred and state-centred approaches.
47 Steve Smith. "New Approaches to International Theory,” in Baylis and Smith, eds.. The 
Globali7ation of World Politics, pp.165-171.
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Society-centred approaches, which could be labelled as pluralism and considered as 
one o f  the strands o f liberalism, refute the state centric view of international politics. 
Robert Keohanc and Joseph Nye, in Transnational Relations and World Politics, one o f 
the central texts o f this genre, stressed the centrality o f other actors, such as interest 
groups, transnational corporations and non-governmental organisations.48 In society- 
centred approaches, these social forces are seen to have a significant influence on 
foreign policy. For instance, the interest group approach, which is one variant of 
society-centred explanations, views state policy as the outcome of a competition 
among organised interest groups for influence over particular policy decisions 41 
Krasner notes that the state is not regarded as an independent entity, but seen as a 
referee among competing social groups, at worst as a cipher.8"
The applicability o f these approaches to foreign policy analysis depends on which 
issue area is at stake. It can be considered that foreign economic policy, where policy 
benefits arc unevenly distributed across sectors, is generally more affected b y  social 
pressures than diplomatic and security issues. It seems not to be difficult to  find 
evidence o f social influence when analysing trade and investment policies. A s far as 
Japan’s foreign policy is concerned, it is widely known, for instance, that the pressures 
of Japanese agricultural producers, through their cooperatives, have greatly affected 
Japan's policy towards the agricultural trade. The role o f business in Japanese ODA 
policy is probably more debatable, but many agree that there has been some degree of 
influence o f the private sector on ODA policy making.51 Also, Inoguchi and  Iwai
18 Discussed in Dunne. '"Liberalism." p. 154.
49 John G Ikenberry. David A Lake, and Michael Mastanduno. "Introduction: Approaches to 
Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy.” International Organization 42,1 (1988). p.7.
5" Krasner. Defending the National Interest, p i.
51 For instance, see Arase, Buying Power, and Marie Sodcrbcrg. "Japanese ODA -  the Business 
Perspectiv e." in Marie Soderbcrg ed.. The Business of Japanese Foreign Aid: Five Case Studies 
from Asia (London: Routledge. 1996). pp 72-88. Inada. on the other hand, has a more reserved 
view in this respect, pointing out that, although it is true that the Japanese private sector has 
some impact on ODA. its influence has become limited; for instance. Japan’s decision to 
promote the general unty ing of Japanese yen loans in 1978 was made despite strong opposition 
from business circles and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). (Juichi Inada.
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observe that interest groups are involved in Japanese policymaking process, side by 
side with bureaucrats and politicians known as zoku giin (meaning politicians in 
tribes).52
This thesis considers that society-centred approaches explain an important part of 
foreign policy making, to the same extent that international approaches do, but that 
states matter much more than the proponents o f these approaches generally assume It 
can be argued that society-centred approaches, together with international approaches, 
supplement state-centred approaches in the way they take into account the fact that 
private interests affect the considerations o f policymakers, as argued below: However, 
the thesis opposes the idea that social forces can overwhelm state power and that state 
institutions merely provide an arena where these interests can compete with each other.
Finally, turning to state-centric approaches, here again, there is no single universal 
theory, but probably it is useful to start from Graham Allison’s classic work,53 as it still 
provides a  number of important insights into foreign policy analysis. Indeed, Margot 
Light states that "many o f Allison's original insights have become the truisms of FPA 
[foreign policy analysis], terms which he coined have entered the IR vocabulary, and 
his work continues to provoke discussion”.54 Allison formulated three models, namely 
the rational actor, organisational process and governmental politics models, labelled 
Model I, II and III, for explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. He argues that most 
analysts explain the behaviour o f national governments based on the rational actor 
model, where foreign affairs are understood as "the more or less purposive acts of 
unified national governments.” 55 However, this simplification, according to him,
"Taigai enejo [foreign aid]." in Tadashi Aruga et al. cds.. Koza Kokusai Seiji 4. pp. 196-201.)
52 Takashi Inoguchi and Tomoaki Iwai. Zoku Giin no Kcnkvu Research on zoku giinl (Tokyo: 
Nihon Kei/ai Shinbunsha. 1987).
53 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
54 Margot Light. “Foreign Policy Analysis,” in A. J. R. Groom & Margot Light, eds.. 
Contemporary International Relations: a Guide to Theory (London: Pinter. 1994). p.95.
Allison. Essence of Decision, p.4-5.
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obscured the fact that “the "maker’ o f government policy is not one calculating 
decision-maker but is rather a conglomerate o f large organizations and political 
actors.”56 Allison’s second model is one o f the alternative approaches to this rational 
actor model, and sees government behaviour as the output o f large organisations 
functioning in accordance with pre-established routines or standard operating 
procedures. Then, his third model takes particular notice o f  individuals within the 
government. According to this model, government behaviour is understood as the 
result o f bargaining, or pulling and hauling, among individual policymakers, who act 
in terms o f no consistent set o f strategic objectives but rather according to various 
conceptions o f national, organisational, domestic and personal goals
It could be argued that each of these three models has its own significance, and in a 
way all o f  them are correct in their own right, but actual behaviours can be best 
explained through a combination o f the three. Model III suggests that foreign policy is 
not always decided by monolithic groups It is probably rare that policymakers 
concerned with an issue completely agree with each other down to the last detail. 
Model III appreciates that it is essential to grasp what actors are involved in a decision 
making process and how decisions are made through bargaining among those actors. 
However, assuming that decision making is a process o f bargaining does not 
necessarily lead to the idea that policies arc subject to the parochial considerations o f 
policymakers. Rational considerations discussed in Model I are also involved in 
decision making, although, as argued above, it does not mean that policymakers can 
always make correct judgements or that there is one universal truth about the national 
interest. Meanwhile. Model II is probably more helpful for understanding the process 
o f implementing a decision, rather than decision making itself.57
From this viewpoint, it could be argued that foreign policy is the product o f a mixture 
56 Ibid., p.3.
5 Hollis and Smith. Explaining and Understanding, p. 148.
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of the various interests o f  several policymakers. As Allison notes, people involved in a 
policymaking process have a range of interests, which are to do with their background, 
position, personality and so on, and policy reflects this plurality o f interests o f the 
numerous policymakers. This means that explaining why a particular policy is adopted 
is a complex exercise, as there could be a number of reasons for a policy, rather than a 
single one Building on Allison's analysis, this thesis divides these interests into four 
categories, namely national, organisational, domestic and personal interests. As argued 
above, this thesis considers that national interests are the policymakers' considerations 
about what is best for their country. Policymakers, particularly bureaucrats, can also be 
considered to be interested in ‘the health o f their organisation'. More specifically they 
are eager to maintain and increase the influence of the organisation they belong to, as 
‘where you stand depends on where you sit’.58 With respect to domestic interests in 
particular, politicians tend to be very concerned about the domestic consequences of 
their decisions about foreign affairs. In the terms of the theory o f Public Choice, the 
greatest interest o f politicians is to win the next election. Finally, personal interests 
could involve anything. For instance, they can be concerned with ideology, whether 
dovish or hawkish. They also greatly overlap with organisational interests and 
domestic interests, and. in a broader sense, with national interests, and perhaps 
sometimes it is difficult to distinguish private interests from others. It can be argued 
that several policymakers, each of whom has a different configuration o f interests, are 
involved in a policymaking process, and that what is needed in the analysis o f  a policy 
is to distinguish who are involved and what views and interests they have. This 
procedure is certainly applicable to the analysis o f Japanese foreign policy, and that is 
why this thesis considers that interviewing key policymakers for the cases that it deals 
with is important, as explained more fully below.
This argument docs not deny the significance o f international and society-centred 
58 Allison. Essence of Decision, p.176.
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approaches, as stressed before. International, as well as social, factors influence the 
interests and calculations o f policymakers to a great extent. It may be argued that 
international factors affect policymakers' thinking about national interests, in particular, 
while organisational, domestic and personal interests are closely related to social 
pressures. In short, international and social factors can be integrated into state-centred 
approaches by taking into account the ways in which these factors affect the 
policymakers' thinking, and this thesis adopts this combined approach
Research m ethods
Based on this analytical framework, this thesis addresses the research questions 
outlined above through a careful analysis o f empirical evidence; after giving an 
historical overview o f Japanese regional policy in the next chapter, it focuses chiefly 
on some important cases in the 1990s. These cases arc analysed based on materials 
from elite interviews and documentary research.
Case studies
Three case studies are discussed in subsequent chapters, namely Japan's development 
philosophy (Chapter 3), its policies towards the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 
1998 (Chapter 4) and its policies towards East Asian regionalism in the late 1990s 
(Chapter 5). The thesis places significant weight on the period since 1990 up to the 
present, and all o f  the three case studies are located in that period This emphasis is a 
response to the relatively small literature about Japan’s policy in the 1990s 
(particularly the late 1990s), despite considerable changes during that period. In 
particular, Japan's policies towards the East Asian financial crisis and East Asian 
regionalism have not been discussed sufficiently in the scholarly literature. 59
59 There arc several scholarly studies about this subject, which were helpful for this research. 
They include: Akira Suchiro and Susumu Yamakage. eds.. Aiia Seinkei/airon ¡discussions on 
Asian political economy! (Tokyo: NTT Shuppan. 2001). and Green. Japan's Reluctant Realism.
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Nevertheless, these policies are significant because they reflect important changes in 
Japanese foreign policy, and pose intriguing questions, which none of the traditional 
approaches to Japanese foreign policy reviewed earlier can fully explain. In addition, 
these case studies have implications for the character of Japanese policy, specifically in 
terms o f  the style o f foreign policy implementation, which is another core argument o f 
the thesis.
Japan’s stance on development philosophy has been discussed more in the existing 
literature than the other two cases. In particular, the end o f  the Cold War provoked a 
considerable amount o f  debate about ‘competing capitalisms’. However, Japan’s 
stance on that matter has not been discussed comprehensively yet. Also, throughout the 
1990s, Japan’s economy declined, and during the East Asian financial crisis its 
economic systems were criticised as a cause of the crisis. Considering these 
circumstances, it is useful to re-examine now Japan's stance on this subject and 
consider how and why it has or has not changed. Moreover, the discussion in Chapter 
3 offers some clue to the understanding o f  Japan’s policy concerning the other two 
cases. Those three case studies, however, must be analysed within the historical 
context o f  Japanese foreign policy throughout the postwar period, and thus Chapter 2 
discusses that context, based mainly on the existing literature“’
Elite interviews and documentary research
The analysis o f these case studies, along with the historical overview of Japanese 
regional policy during the postwar period, employ elite interviews and documentary 
research, which are complementary to each other.
60 This thesis deals only with Ihc postwar period The neglect of the prewar period is partly 
because of lack of space It is also because the thesis is interested in gradual changes in 
Japanese foreign policy’ under the particular domestic, regional and international circumstances 
of the postwar period, which are completely different from the prewar era. Although interesting, 
(he comparative analysis of Japan's activism in these Iwo periods, and the understanding of 
Japanese foreign policy in the longer historical framework, going back to the prewar period, 
remain topics for another occasion.
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Elite interviews were used in several ways. Firstly, they were useful to obtain accurate 
information about events. There was a great deal o f inconsistent information across 
various newspapers, journals and other articles, about some very basic facts, such as 
which countrv proposed what and when, or which countries opposed a proposal. There 
was further confusion about more specific details, like what ministers actually said. 
Secondly, elite interviews provided some behind the scenes information, like internal 
discussions within a ministry', or involvement and interference of other ministries. This 
was. unsurprisingly, the hardest part o f the interviews, but nevertheless quite a lot o f 
useful information was obtained. Thirdly, it was very worthwhile to  ask key decision 
makers (for instance, Eisukc Sakakibara with respect to the East Asian financial crisis) 
what motivated them and what was intended in deciding particular policies. This is 
consistent with the theoretical approach adopted in this thesis, namely that the 
considerations of key decision makers with respect to their national, organisational, 
domestic and personal interests are an essential part o f  understanding state foreign 
policy. While interviews with bureaucrats were used in these ways, interviews with 
others, like academics and journalists, were used differently. It was helpful to ask for 
their subjective and objective views about the events o f the period in order to 
reconstruct the perspectives o f the Japanese intellectuals concerned with Japan's 
contemporary' foreign policy.
A total o f 27 interviews were conducted in Japan over two periods (May 10 -  June 1, 
2000 and March 27 - April 4, 2001). Among the interviewees were 12 bureaucrats, 1 
politician, 2 academics and 2 journalists in 2000, and 4 bureaucrats, 4 academics and 1 
employee o f the World Bank in 2001.61 In addition, an interview with Eisuke 
Sakakibara. w ho is one o f the key policymakers, was conducted in September 2001 in 
London. Some of the names of the interviewees, mostly bureaucrats, are not disclosed 
because they requested anonymity.
61 The detailed list is attached at the back of the thesis.
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17 interviews out o f 27 were conducted with bureaucrats a t various levels mainly in 
the Ministry o f  Finance (MOF) and the MOFA. This selection of interviewees was 
justified by the fact that these bureaucrats were considered to be the key decision 
makers in the cases covered in this thesis. In a general sense, politicians and private 
actors have also played an important role in Japanese foreign policy depending on the 
issue, as argued before, but as far as the cases analysed here are concerned, bureaucrats 
were the major players However, it does not follow that the voices o f politicians and 
private actors were unimportant to this research, as domestic opposition could make it 
difficult for bureaucrats to advance their agendas. Therefore, the stances o f political 
and private actors, such as business organisations, will be referred to as much as 
possible, by using secondary sources like newspaper archives or their internet 
homepages. In fact, this approach is more effective than interviewing politicians and 
business people extensively, considering the fact that it is difficult to identify the 
political and private figures involved; unlike in the case o f  some trade policies, it is not 
clear that identifiable business interests pushed for certain foreign policy outcomes. 
Also, even if  it could be possible to name some figures, given the usual reticence of 
business people about declaring their interests, it w ould be difficult to obtain more 
information than had been officially announced concerning how they were involved in 
or influenced policymaking processes.
On the other hand, documentary' research was vital to the writing of the narrative o f the 
thesis. Important sources include official announcements and explanations by the 
government, 62 white papers, official agreements, joint statements o f  several 
international and regional meetings, journals in general and government-related 
periodicals in particular,63 government councils’ records, newspaper archives64 and the
62 Most of these materials could be obtained from ministries' homepage through the internet.
63 Government related journals include Fainansu by the MOF and Gaiko Foramu by the MOFA.
64 The following papers were mainly referenced: Japanese dailies (Nikkei. Asahi. Yomiuri. 
Mainichi and Sankei). East Asian papers (Korea Herald. Straits Times. New Straits Times. 
Bangkok Post. South China Morning Post. Jakarta Post) and Financial Times.
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scholarly literature. Sakakibara's memoir"' published in April 2000 is worth special 
reference. It provided an essential account o f Japan’s policies towards the East Asian 
financial crisis.
Chapter outline
As mentioned above, the next chapter (Chapter 2) looks thematically and 
chronologically at Japan's postwar regional policy. By examining what Japan has done 
in its regional relations, it shows how Japanese foreign policy has shifted throughout 
the postwar period. Specifically, it is discussed how and why Japan has increasingly 
become more willing to take independent initiatives in the region, economically as 
well as politically. Also, analysing Japan’s regional policy naturally leads to the 
consideration o f  its US relations as well The chapter also gives some thought to the 
issue o f how Japan has been quietly and incrementally pursing its policy agendas 
under international, regional and domestic constraints.
Chapter 3 demonstrates the ideological contrast between the Japanese approach to 
economic development and systemic transition and the Washington and the Post- 
Washington Consensus. It is explained why Japan has become increasingly vocal in its 
policies since the late 1980s, and how arguments between Japan and the institutions 
promoting the Washington Consensus, particularly the World Bank, developed 
throughout the 1990s. The chapter also argues that these were at the root o f the 
differences between their positions on the causes o f the East Asian financial crisis. 
Thus, this chapter not only offers evidence o f Japan's increasing assertiveness in its 
foreign policy, but it also provides some important background for the understanding 
o f Japan’s positive policies towards the East Asian financial crisis as well as its 
growing interest in regional frameworks discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Furthermore,
65 Eisukc Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai ea Fuructalii Ithe day when Japan and the world shookl 
(Tokyo: Chuokoronshinsha. 2(X)0).
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the discussion of this chapter suggests that the changes in Japanese foreign policy 
identified before are based on ideological factors to a  certain extent.
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss Japanese policies towards two specific cases, the East Asian 
financial crisis and the development o f East Asian regionalism. They give detailed 
narratives o f  Japan's policies towards these issues, and consider the contexts o f their 
adoption and implementation by the Japanese government. These chapters again 
contribute to the argument about Japan's increasing willingness to take the initiative in 
the region, and introduce the arguments about Japan’s style o f  foreign policy in 
Chapter 6.
Chapter 6 recapitulates and examines more critically the previous discussions on the 
style o f Japanese foreign policy. Then, the concluding chapter recapitulates the 
arguments o f  the thesis, and reconsiders the implications o f these arguments for the 
present and future Japanese foreign policy.
Ori2 inal contributions
This thesis makes the following contributions to knowledge. Firstly, the thesis 
advances the discussions about Japanese foreign policy reviewed in this chapter It 
looks at the subject from the point o f two gradual changes in Japan's policy throughout 
the postwar period, namely more initiative taking in the political and security areas, 
and a more independent East Asian policy, neither o f which have been systematically 
discussed yet. This argument o f the thesis can also contribute significantly to  the 
literature on Japan-US relations as well as Japan-East Asia relations in that, without 
this new understanding o f Japanese foreign policy, it is impossible to grasp the correct 
nature o f those relations.
Secondly, the thesis also advances the discussion about the style o f  Japanese foreign
policy. This is still an underdeveloped subject theoretically and empirically, discussed
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by only a few scholars so far. However, this subject can potentially lead to  more 
extensive arguments on the nature of leadership, as it suggests a completely different 
concept on leadership from what is traditionally assumed in 1R. While the thesis 
contributes to the development o f that discussion empirically, it is believed that the 
empirical evidence provided in the thesis will provoke more discussion on this theme.
Thirdly, detailed narrative analyses o f Japan's policies towards the important events in 
the 1990s, which have not been subject to sufficient scholarly scrutiny despite their 
great potential for offering insight into Japanese foreign policy, make a significant 
empirical contribution to the study o f  Japanese foreign policy. Furthermore, these 
empirical discussions, which arc concerned with significant regional developments in 
East Asia, contribute to the study o f  regionalism as well. Because o f its dominant 
economic status in the region, Japan's stance on regionalism has greatly affected the 
development o f regional frameworks, and, in fact, its ambiguous attitude towards an 
East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG later EAEC) in the early 1990s was one o f the 
causes that the idea was not realised at that time, as discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, 
analysing Japan’s policy with respect to regionalism can have great implications for 
the research o f  East Asian regionalism. This is particularly significant because there is 
a relatively small literature about regionalism in Asia and Asia Pacific, compared with 
Europe and the Americas, and even less about regionalism in East Asia. In addition, 
analyses about East Asian regionalism could provide a new conception o f ‘monetary' 
regionalism' for the study o f regionalism, where so far the focus has been mainly on 
trade, investment and security. The thesis focuses on the analysis o f this area in 
Chapter 5.
In the next chapter, the discussion moves on to the historical background o f  Japanese
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CHAPTER 2
Historical Review of Japan's East Asian Policy in the Postwar Period
This chapter looks at Japan's East Asian policy in the postwar period historically and 
thematically. It is, o f course, not a  comprehensive account o f  Japanese foreign policy, 
as such a  task would require more than a whole book. The aim of the chapter is to set 
the background for the arguments o f  the thesis introduced in the previous chapter, 
namely how1 the nature o f Japanese foreign policy has been changing throughout the 
postwar period and how Japan has been quietly pursuing its policy agendas By 
looking at what Japan has actually done in its relations w ith East Asian countries, it 
considers how and why Japan has increasingly become more willing to take the 
initiative in  the region and how it has pursued its policy objectives under the domestic, 
regional and international constraints imposed on it. Equally, this chapter shows that 
Japan has expanded the range o f its initiatives, from the economic to the political area. 
This examination, in turn, will lead to an evaluation of how independent Japan's East 
Asian policy has been, particularly in connection with its US relations, the 
considerations Japanese policy making agents have taken into account in deciding the 
country’s foreign policy and how much the importance o f  East Asian countries in 
Japanese foreign policy making has risen during the postwar period.
The chapter is divided into three sections corresponding to three periods: (1) 1945 to 
the 1960s, (2) the 1970s, and (3) from the 1980s up to the present. Although, o f course, 
some o f  the issues run throughout two or more of these periods, this division is 
necessary particularly because the 1970s can be regarded as a turning point in 
Japanese foreign policy due to some sea changes in international affairs. The 1990s 
also saw significant changes in Japanese policy, but are discussed together with the 
1980s, as some changes in the 1990s originated in the 1980s.
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1945 to the 1960s
Japanese foreign policy during this period was basically characterised by the pursuit o f 
economic development whilst maintaining a political low profile and staying within 
the limits set by the dependence on US hegemony. This Japanese diplomatic principle 
was first advocated by the Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and was then entrenched by 
his two disciples, Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato. As discussed in the following, this 
policy was a skilfully conceived strategy to pursue the national interest given the 
situation Japan faced at the time, namely a totally devastated economy due to the war 
and the strengthened bipolarity o f  the Cold War. However, while this policy enabled 
Japan to devote itself to its economic development, the heavy dependence of Japan on 
the US gave the US great leverage over Japanese foreign policy. Accordingly, Japan's 
East Asian policy, which was conducted mainly through economic means, tended to be 
closely linked with US Cold War strategies.
The Yoshida Doctrine
Yoshida assumed the second term in the office o f  Prime Minister in 1948 (until 1954), 
and the policy lines that he worked out during this time greatly influenced postwar 
Japanese foreign policy. His main tenets, which later became known as the Yoshida 
Doctrine, were concentration on economic development with very' limited spending on 
defence. Japan was under the US security umbrella and had generous access to US 
markets, both o f  which Japan was able to obtain in exchange for its support for US 
foreign policy in the Cold War. This strong dependence on the US has long constrained 
Japanese foreign policy and it still docs, although some o f the tenets have been greatly 
modified and diluted since the 1970s.
It should be noted that the Yoshida's tenets were not what the US imposed On the 
contrary, they can be regarded as Yoshida's skilful and clever strategy based on his
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ideas about Japan's national interest under the constraints at work on Japan Kenneth 
Pyle points out that Japan's political passivity in the postwar era was “the product o f  a 
carefully constructed and brilliantly implemented foreign policy |that Yoshida set 
forth].”1 In fact, the US urged Japan's rearmament during the Korean War, and John 
Foster Dulles, special em issary of the Secretary o f  State, firmly demanded Japan to 
establish a large military force. However, Yoshida, who saw the Cold War reality as 
Japan's opportunity and tried to take advantage o f  it, adamantly resisted Japan's 
rearmament for the following reasons: the possibility that a  militarist could seize 
power, limited economic capability to spend on rearmament, the fear that the resulting 
economic plight might lead to social unrest (as the Communists wished), and expected 
opposition from the neighbouring countries.2
In the end, the US-Japan Security Treaty, which allowed Japan to stick to a  minimalist 
defence policy, was concluded on the same day as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in 
September 1951. The treaty grants to the US the right to use Japanese bases and 
provides for a US military' presence in Japan. The original treaty, in effect, merely 
stated that US forces m ay be utilised to defend Japan, and thus it was not a clear US 
commitment to guarantee Japan’s security. However, Kazuya Sakamoto argues that 
regardless o f this provision the treaty enabled Japan to depend on the US for its 
security, because it was almost certain that the US would defend Japan in case of 
emergency given the US strategic interests in the Cold War. Also, the existence o f  US 
bases in Japan itself could act as a deterrent.1 Although Yoshida had to compromise to 
some extent, for instance by allowing some rearmament in the form o f the Self- 
Defence Forces (SDF), “Yoshida"s firmness spared Japan military' involvement in the
1 Kenneth B Pyle. "Japan, the World, and the Twenty-first Century,” in Takashi Inoguchi and 
Daniel I Okimoto. eds.. The Politlical Economy of Japan: Volume 2. the Changing 
International Context (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1988). p.452.
2 Takeshi Igarashi. Nichibei Kankei to Higashiaiia IJapan-US relations and East Asial (Tokyo: 
Tokyo University Press. 1999), pp. 96-97.
3 Kazuya Sakamoto. "Dokuritsukoku no joken [the conditions of an independent c o u n t r y i n  
Makoto lokibc. cd . Sen go Nihon Gaikoshi Ithe diplomatic history of postwar Japanl (Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku Aroma. 1999), p.72.
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war and allowed it instead to profit enormously from procurement orders |during the 
Korean W arl” 1 *4 *
At the same time, the Security Treaty, which was revised in I960 by the Kishi cabinet,' 
has framed and constrained postwar Japanese foreign policy. By signing the treaty, 
Japan was thoroughly embedded into the Cold War framework on the side o f  the West 
Furthermore, the treaty has made Japan highly vulnerable to US pressures, and it has 
shaped not only security relations between the two countries, but also their overall 
relations in the postwar period That is to say, the 1960 Security Treaty is a highly 
unequal one in the sense that it sets out only the US contribution to Japan 's defence, 
and not the other way round. It recognises as the area for common defence only the 
territories under the administration o f Japan (Article five), and does not include the US 
territories in the Asia Pacific region, let alone the US mainland. O f course, there arc 
some reasons why the US has accepted this unequal relationship Japan has provided 
bases for the US and since 1978 has paid the substantial financial cost0 for the 
stationing of US troops in Japan Importantly, the bases Japan has provided are o f 
considerable significance to the US strategically. Based on the security treaty (Article 
six)' and its interpretations, the US can actually use these bases with great flexibility; 
their use is not confined to the defence o f Japan but can be extended to wider global 
strategic operations, which is a significant benefit that the US reaps from the treaty.” 
Another benefit o f the security treaty for the US is that it can expect Japan to take
1 Pyle. "Japan, the World, and the Twenty-first Century,” p.454.
'  The revised treaty stipulated the obligation of the US to defend Japan, and eliminated the 
article that had permitted the use of US forces to pul down large-scale internal riots and 
disturbances in Japan, which had been highly controversial and antagonised many Japanese in 
the 1950s.
’ This amounts to around 10 percent of Japan’s annual defence budget (Hook cl al. Japan’s
International Relations, p. 144.)
It reads: for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of
international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use 
by its land. air. and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan
* Akio Walanabc, "Nichibci domci 50 nen no kiseki to 21 seiki cno tenbo |thc path of the US-
Japan Security Treaty during the last 50 years and a prospect for (he twenty first ccntury|.” 
Kokusai Mondai 490 (2001), pp 30-31.
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collaborative actions in ease o f emergency. This was taken further when the two 
governments signed the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation in 1978. which 
provided for researching concrete military cooperation between the two countries. 
Nevertheless, despite these benefits to the US flowing from the security treaty, under 
this system, Japan is, after all, a junior partner. It is the US that controls the security 
fate o f  Japan Japan puts the matter o f its own security in the hands of the US and 
cannot affect decision-making even about critical defence issues. Such an unbalanced 
relationship inevitably has made Japan support US policy and has made it vulnerable 
to US requests.
Japan's Asian policy in the 1950s
Meanwhile, Asian policies gradually began to  come into Japan's diplomatic agenda in 
the mid-1950s, although they were not very substantial during the 1950s. It is 
noteworthy that the first edition of the MOFA’s bluebook, published in 1957, stated the 
association with Asia as one of the three basic principles o f Japanese international 
relations, together with United Nations (UN) centrism and the association with the 
West .9 Watanabe points out that the two principles o f the association w ith Asia and the
9 What constitutes the Asian region is a highly debatable issue. Regions arc cognitively 
constructed, and so is the Asian region. It may include Australia and even Russia. Alternatively, 
the term Asia Pacific is sometimes used. Even within the Japanese government, the term has 
been used differently depending on the time and the issue. More recently, it has been used 
interchangeably with East Asia.
What the term Asia’ stood for in the first blucbook was not clearly stated, but the Japanese 
government generally thought of a more expansive area in the early postwar period than now. 
namely it was inclusive of South Asian countries like India. Also, when Japan referred to 
economic cooperation to Asia or Asian diplomacy in those days. China, the Korean Peninsula 
and Communist Indochina were left out. That is to say. Japan had to give up links with 
Communist countries in the region due to the Cold War reality. Also. Japan's relationship with 
South Korea, in spite of the fact that South Korea was part of the non-Communist world, was a 
thorny one because of deep animosity on both sides. The two countries' relationship was not 
normalised until 1965, when they signed the Treaty on Basic Relations. (Mie Ohba. 
"Chiikishugi to nihon no sentaku |rcgiona)ism and Japan’s choice],” in Suchiro and Yamakagc. 
cds . Aiia Sciiikei/airon. p.262. and Akio Watanabc, Aiia Taiheivo no Kokusai Kankci to Nihon 
I International relations in Asia Pacific and Japanl (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. 1992), 
P-89.)
This thesis uses the term 'East Asia’ instead of Asia, since East Asia, as defined in the 
Introduction, is the region with which the postwar Japanese foreign policy has been deeply 
concerned. However, in this section the term 'Asia' is used in recognition of the realities of the
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association with the West came out as a result o f serious discussions about Asia’s 
position in Japan's diplomatic policy, namely about how the relationships with the 
West, particularly the US, and those with Asia could be balanced.10 Since then this has 
been the key issue o f Japanese foreign policy. Pempel puts it as follows: “Japan's 
relationship w ith Asia has o f  course been complicated, but Japan's simultaneous 
relationship with the West has added further to the complexity. This duality has been 
an essential feature o f Japanese foreign policy for the last century and more.”11
Japan's Asian relations have been, to a significant extent, dominated by its economic 
interests throughout the postwar period, as will be shown in this chapter, and this 
applies particularly to Japan in the 1950s, when the focus was on economic 
rehabilitation The resumption o f economic relations w ith Asian countries became a 
rather urgent and important issue for Japan, as they had provided the majority o f 
natural resources and important markets before the war, even though their economies 
were very small and less attractive than the rich Western markets. Japan's interest in 
restoring Asian relations is evidenced in the first diplomatic bluebook mentioned 
above, which acknowledged that there was a close complementary relationship 
between the Japanese and the Asian economies, and without Asia's prosperity and 
peace Japan would not be prosperous.12
In addition, the US, which was concerned about Japan's isolation in the region, was 
supportive o f  Japan’s closer links w ith non-Communist Asian countries. For the US, 
who wished to  keep Japan in the Western camp, to increase the importance o f Japan’s 
role as an ally, and to make Japan ‘the workshop o f Asia’, Japan’s economic 
rehabilitation was an urgent issue. In this context, the Truman administration took
period analysed.
" Walanabe. Aiia Taiheivo. pp.84-85.
11 T. J. Pempel, "Transpacific Torii: Japan and the Emerging Asian Regionalism,” in Peter J. 
Kat/.enstein and Takashi Shiraishi, cds.. Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), p.50.
12 Cited in Watanabe, Aiia Taiheivo. p.86-87.
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seriously the consolidation o f Japan's economic relations w ith Asian countries, which 
would ensure Japan's economic recovery and would prevent Japan from moving 
towards Communism.13
Against this background, Japan resumed its Asian policies. Prime Minister Yoshida, 
who was more interested in Western relations,14 but recognised that developing the 
Asian economies would contribute to the Japanese economy,15 proposed some Asian 
policies concerning economic assistance for Southeast A sia. Most importantly, Japan 
started the negotiations for reparations payments with Southeast Asian countries as 
part o f its economic assistance programme in 1954. Also, it provided technical 
assistance through participating in the British Colombo Plan implemented in 1954. 
The restoration of Japan's ties w ith the region was not easy however. The negotiations 
for reparations payments with the Southeast Asian countries were not smooth, and 
took until the end o f  the 1950s to complete.16
Although Japan did not tty to re-establish a significant relationship with China, which 
had been a vital trading partner before the war as a  provider o f natural resources and 
markets, the two countries did maintain some trading relations. Japan was not able to 
seek diplomatic relations with China and instead had to acknowledge the Taiwan 
government, following the US policy. However, it resum ed trading ties with China in 
1950 through private channels, based on the principle o f  seikei bunri that Yoshida 
pursued then. Nester stresses that this policy of Yoshida was greatly motivated by 
Japan's economic interests, citing Yoshida's remark: "I do n 't care whether China is red
1' Igarashi. Nichibei Kankci. pp 116-121.
l4Takashi Shiraishi. "Japan and Southeast Asia." in Kat/cnstein and Shiraishi. eds.. Network 
Power, p.177.
15 Suco Sudo. "Nihongaiko ni okeru ASEAN no ichi [ASEAN’s position in Japanese 
diplomacy],” Kokusai Seiii 116 (1997), pp.150-151.
16 The negotiations for reparations reached an agreement with Burma in 1954, with the 
Philippines in 1955. with Indonesia in 1958 and with South Vietnam in 1959. Japan also made 
agreements for economic cooperation with Laos (1958), Cambodia (1959) and Thailand (1962). 
(Chihiro Hosoya. Nihon Gaiko no Kiseki Ithe track of Japanese diplomacy! (Tokyo: NHK 
Books, 1993), pp. 163-165)
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or green. China is a national market and it has become necessary for Japan to think 
about m a r k e t s 7 Yet, this relationship was disrupted in 1958, mainly because the then 
Prime Minister Nobusuke K ishi’s pro-Taiwan policies angered China.18
Prime Minister Kishi (1957-1960) adopted a more positive approach to Asia than 
Yoshida and his other predecessors. Kishi chose Southeast Asia, rather than the US, as 
the destination o f  his first official overseas visit in 1957; this was the first visit to that 
region by a  Japanese Prime Minister after the Second World War, and he made another 
trip to Southeast Asia in the same year. Also, he proposed a Southeast Asia 
Development Fund in 1957, which was an attempt to develop the Southeast Asian 
economy by relying on US financial resources. This proposal was not realised because 
the US did not support the fund.
This relatively assertive Asian policy o f Kishi was motivated by Japan’s economic 
interests and its interests in relation to the US. He understood both the short-term and 
the long-term importance o f the region to the Japanese economy.19 In fact, during his 
visit the reparations negotiations with Indonesia were concluded and the Japanese 
businesses began to turn their eyes to that country. In addition, his positive stance on 
Southeast Asia fits his style o f  simultaneously being an ‘Asianist’ and a ‘pro- 
Americanist’. In other words, he found a positive Southeast Asian policy to be the area 
where those two norms could coexist.211 On the one hand, Japan could play a certain 
leadership role, particularly in South East Asia, which satisfied his Asianist position, 
though within the international framework set by the US. On the other hand, Japan's 
contribution to the development o f  non-Communist Southeast Asian countries was not 
inconsistent with US global strategies.
1 Ncster, ''The Third World Japanese Foreign Policy,” p.78.
18 Later the relationship between Japan and China was broadly based on the seikei hunri policy, 
whose implementation was occasionally disrupted, until they normalised their relations in 1972. 
1 ‘ Shiraishi, "Japan and Southeast Asia," p. 177.
20 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
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On the whole, Japan's Asian policy during this period was a limited success at most. 
Japan began to re-establish relations with Asian countries through reparations 
payments and economic assistance, but they were modest in size and political aspects 
were muted. Although the economic importance o f Asia was widely recognised among 
Japanese policymaking agents, relations with rich Western countries were given 
priority over relations with the undeveloped Asian countries. Also, Japan’s Asian 
policies at that time were to a  large extent associated with US interests, and even the 
policies o f Kishi. who is remembered as an Asianist, were quite concerned with US 
strategies.
It must be also noted here that, although Japan normalised its relations with the 
Southeast Asian countries through the agreements about reparations payments, the 
memories o f  Japan's occupation o f  the region were not easily erased. Indeed this has 
been a continuing constraint on Japanese foreign policy throughout the postwar period. 
Anti-Japanese feelings were, and still are, most conspicuous in China and the Korean 
Peninsula. In Southeast Asia, the degree of hostility against Japan seems to have varied 
among countries: it was largest in the Philippines and Singapore, where there was a 
great deal o f suffering during the Japanese colonial rule, while in Thailand and 
Malaysia, where Japan's aggressions were targeted not on the whole society, but a part 
o f it, specifically the Chinese, the tension was relatively low compared with others.21 
However, in general there was a very hostile atmosphere against Japan in Southeast 
Asia.
The 1960s -  Solidifying the Yoshida Doctrine
During the 1960s, the Yoshida Doctrine, which recommended a low political profile 
with the highest priority given to economic development, became institutionalised in
Suco Sudo. Tonan Aiia Kokusai Kankei no Ko/.u llhe framework of international relations in 
Southeast Asia I (Tokyo: Keisho Shobo, 1996), pp. 187-188.
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the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as hoshu honryu , or the conservative policy 
line, by two prime ministers, Ikcda and Sato, both protégés o f  Yoshida. A broad 
national consensus on economic growth was also formed at the same time. Kishi's 
administration took up the political issues o f  Japan's rearmament and constitutional 
change, and this ended with a political crisis in 1960, when he forced a Diet vote on a 
revised security treaty. Ikeda, Kishi’s successor, returned to Yoshida’s lines, but 
emphasised economic issues more than Yoshida had done. He set forth and 
implemented the famous Income Doubling Plan, which w as aimed at doubling Japan's 
national income in a decade and resulted in its postwar miracle. Subsequently, Sato, 
who was Prime Minister from 1964 to 1972, further developed the Yoshida Doctrine. 
Under the concept o f  the ‘peace nation’, he formulated tw o  sets o f principles: (1) the 
three non-nuclear principles, which provided that Japan would not produce, possess, or 
introduce nuclear weapons onto its territory, and (2) the Three Arms Export Principles, 
an effective ban on the export o f weapons. Muramatsu and Krauss note that there was 
no consensus about the Yoshida Doctrine in the 1950s even among the political elite, 
much less in the public, and that “ [it| was not until at least the mid-1960s that the 
policy line came to be fully developed and institutionalised among the conservative 
elite and to enjoy widespread public support.”22
W hile economic growth was undoubtedly the highest priority, which explains many o f 
the Japanese foreign policies o f that time, there was another important agenda as well, 
namely enhancing Japan's international status and restoring its self-respect. 23 
Accordingly, the government put its energy into strengthening economic relations with 
Western countries and rejoining the international community, by obtaining
22 Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss. "The Conservative Policy Line and the Development 
of Patterned Pluralism.” in Ko/.o Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuda, cds.. The Political 
Economy of Japan: Volume 1 the Domestic Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1987), p.525.
' Dennis T. Yasutomo, Japan and the Asian Development Bank (New York: Praeger. 1983). 
p.25, and Masavuki Tadokoro, "Kci/ai taikoku no gaiko no genkei (the prototype of diplomacy 
as economic power],” in lokibc. ed., Seneo Nihon Gaikoshi. p. 114.
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membership o f the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as equals with Western countries. Whilst marching towards 
economic success. Japan had achieved many of its diplomatic aims by 1964. It became 
an Article 8 member o f  the IMF, joined the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and 
participated in the Kennedy round o f  GATT as well as the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In addition to achieving these objectives o f  
economic development and more prominent international status. Prime Minister Sato 
had another specific agenda, namely realising the return o f Okinawa to Japan.24 and he 
devoted great energies to this issue.
Considering these goals o f  Japanese foreign policy, the importance of US support for 
realising them, and Japan's security dependence on the US, it was not surprising that 
Japan’s policy was influenced by US wishes to a  great extent, and its US relations 
constrained significantly Japanese foreign policy. Accordingly, Japan’s approaches 
towards Asia were closely linked with US strategies, as demonstrated below.
Regional policies in the 1960s
(!) the beginning o f  economic assistance
While making an effort to expand Western relations, Asia was by no means ignored by 
Japan.25 Most prominently, Japan began to expand economic assistance to the region. 
Subsequent to reparations payments, Japan started to gradually increase both the 
absolute amount o f  overseas development assistance (ODA), through yen loans in the 
mid-1960s, and the proportion o f  it that was given to  Asia. Some of the institutions 
needed to implement these policies, such as the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
24 Okinawa was relumed to Japan finally during Sato's premiership in 1972.
From around the mid-1960s. South Asia became excluded from Japan's focus with respect to 
its Asian policy, and Japan's interest turned more exclusively to non-Communist Southeast Asia 
(Ohba, "Chiikishugi.” p.264).
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(OECF) and the Overseas Technical cooperation Agency (later Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, o r J1CA), were created during Ikeda's stay in office. Also, in 
1965 Japan normalised its relationship with South Korea and began to provide grant 
aid and yen loans.
Pressures from other developed countries, particularly the US, to make Japan take on a 
greater economic burden in international society were an important reason for 
Japanese policymakers' interest in regional matters at that time. The basic Asian 
strategy of the US w as to ensure the political stability o f the non-Communist Asian 
countries as part o f its containment policy against Communism. The Johnson Cabinet 
began to recognise that military assistance alone could not achieve stability and to 
emphasise the need for economic assistance. 2tl Accordingly, along with the 
intensification o f the Vietnam War and the deterioration o f its balance of payments, the 
US began to expect Japan to play a larger role in Southeast Asia. In particular, unlike 
Australia and South Korea, Japan could not dispatch its military forces for 
Constitutional reasons, while it benefited from the Vietnam War economically. It was 
no wonder that the US strongly wished Japan to support US policy from the economic 
side, and pressed Japan to share more in the economic burden to keep regional 
stability.27 In addition, for the Sato Cabinet, whose priority was the return o f Okinawa, 
“proving that Japan w as a loyal and reliable ally [to the US] was crucial to achieving 
this goal.”28
However, Japan was also greatly motivated by the importance o f the region to its own 
national interest. M any studies show that Japanese assistance to the region was linked 
directly to Japan's economic benefit. MITI's economic cooperation report in 1958 
stressed the necessity to promote economic assistance to Southeast Asia given the
26 Susumu Yamakage. "Shoki ASEAN saiko [reconsideration on early ASEAN]," Kokusai Seiji 
116(1997), pp. 19-20.
2 Tadokoro, “Keizai taikoku," pp 132-133, and Hosoya, Nihon Gaiko, p.167.
28 Shiraishi. “Japan and Southeast Asia,” p. 180.
complementary nature of their economics. The report spelled out two objectives of the 
economic assistance, namely trade promotion and resource acquisition for Japan. In 
fact, the reparations were paid in the form o f products and services provided by 
Japanese firms instead o f cash,29 which increased the export opportunities o f Japanese 
firms. Also, a large part o f the economic assistance (most o f  it consisted o f  yen credits) 
was tied to Japanese business, specifically the purchase o f Japanese goods and services, 
thereby opening Asian markets to Japanese companies and creating ever more 
important bilateral economic links between Asia and Japan.30 Hosoya argues that by 
the early 1970s Japan became the largest trading partner for most Southeast Asian 
countries, and its role in direct investments and economic assistance increased 
dramatically, w hich led to its playing a  leading role in the region in the economic 
sphere together with the U S.31 Shiraishi points out that this was "the beginning o f 
Japan's postwar penetration into Southeast Asia", and that “[the | close cooperation 
between government and the private financial and commercial sectors was the 
hallmark o f  economic cooperation."3'
In addition to these direct economic benefits, there were also political considerations 
in Japanese aid policy. The Japanese government began to associate Japan’s security 
with political stability and economic prosperity in neighbouring countries. Watanabe 
points out that Japanese leaders had recognised the poor economic situation and the 
political instability in Southeast Asia, and they had become increasingly concerned 
that the plight in the region might lead to a crisis.33
Furthermore, Japan's positive approach to economic assistance was linked to the 
objective o f  enhancing its international status as well. In other words, by contributing
' 1 The Japanese government paid Japanese firms in yens for what Asian countries bought from 
them.
311 Pcmpel. "Transpacific Torii”, p.56.
3^  Hosoya. Nihon Gaiko, pp. 172-173.
3‘ Shiraishi. "Japan and Southeast Asia,” p. 179.
33 Watanabe, Aiia Taiheivo. p.91.
48
to the development o f Asia by deploying the economic resources that it had achieved 
by that time, Japanese leaders wished to  obtain some respect and status in international 
society.34 Prime Minister Ikcda realised that Japan was able to assist the region's 
economic development given its pre-eminent economic position in Asia and its 
experience o f the postwar development.35 Southeast Asia in particular was the region 
where Japan could pursue such a positive policy, because relations there were easier 
compared w ith the hostile relationship with South Korea and the limitation o f China 
policy under the Cold War framework.
Therefore, it can be argued that the growth o f Japan's economic assistance to Asia in 
this period was not only a reaction to  US requests, but was also closely related to 
Japan's economic as well as political interests.
(2) Japan's multilateral approach in Asia in the 1960s
In addition to the expansion of economic assistance, Japan took some initiatives in 
establishing regional frameworks. Japan's motivations for these policies largely 
overlapped with those for economic assistance, namely Japan's national interests, 
particularly the belief o f the Japanese policymakers that contributing to regional 
matters could enhance Japan's national status, as well as US wishes.
Significantly, Japan attempted to play an important role in the establishment o f the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) The project to found the bank in the early 1960s 
appealed to Prime Minister Sato, who wanted to show the US Japan's commitment to 
Asia, as argued above, and thus to be seen to be taking a more positive approach in the 
region.1'' However, Japan's approach to the ADB was not enthusiastic at the outset,
34 Susumu Yamakagc, "Ajia taihciyo to nihon |Asia Pacific and Japan].” in Akio Watanabe. ed.. 
Semio Nihon no Taieaiseisaku ¡Japanese foreign policy in the postwar pcriodl (Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku, 1985), pp. 141-142.
15 Yasutomo. Japan and the Asian Development Bank, pp 26-27.
’' The following argument about the ADB draws largely on Yasutomo, Japan and the Asian
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despite the then Prime Minister Ikeda's great interest in it. This was mainly because of 
the concern o f MOF officials, who were mainly in charge of this matter, that the 
activities o f the World Bank would be reduced and instead Japan would have to 
assume too many economic responsibilities for the region. Consequently they strongly 
insisted on the participation of the US and other developed countries. This position of 
the MOF officials reflected Japan's basic regional approach at that time, namely 
promoting the collaboration o f Pacific developed countries for the development of 
Asia. It was not until the US decided to participate”  and the fear that Japan would be 
the main contributor had lessened that Japan no longer hesitated to become involved. 
Japan eventually agreed to be the largest contributor together with the US, to have the 
bank located in Tokyo and to have a  Japanese president, and began to participate 
positively in every process to found the bank
However, it turned out that this relatively high-profile initiative o f  Japan was not 
welcomed by Asian countries. Japanese policymakers' strong hope to have the bank's 
headquarters in Tokyo was not realised as Asian countries chose Manila, although 
Japan obtained the presidency.38 The Asian countries were quite sceptical about 
Japan's leadership and dominance in the region. This negative response o f the Asian 
countries to Japan's initiative was a reaction against Japan's way o f  giving aid. which 
greatly benefited Japanese firms, as discussed above. But, more importantly, it was a 
reflection o f the anti-Japanese sentim ent prevalent among the Asian people, a  legacy 
o f the war, as well as the Asian governm ents’ rejection o f Japanese leadership itself. 3 ' 
Indeed, this sentiment o f the Asian countries has long constrained Japanese initiatives 
in the region throughout the postwar period, and has forced Japan to keep re-assuring 
its Asian neighbours that it is not trying to dominate the region.
Development Bank.
The turning point of US policy cainc with Johnson’s address at tile Johns Hopkins University 
in April 1965. Since then the US supported Asian institutions by Asian initiatives. (Yasutoino, 
Japan and the Asian Development Bank, p.67, Yamakagc, "Shoki ASEAN,” p. 19)
8 Since the establishment of the ADB. the Japanese liavc occupied the post of president 
”  Yamakagc. “Ajia Taiheiyo,” pp.147-151.
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In addition to this active role in the creation o f  the ADB, Japan convened the 
Ministerial Conference for Economic Development o f  Southeast Asia (MEDSEA) in 
1966. It was the first postwar international conference that Japan organised, and was 
seen as an institution potentially dedicated to facilitating Japanese economic assistance 
to the region.40 Japanese officials, shocked by the defeat in the ADB headquarters 
contest, intended to utilise the conference, which they thought was less controversial 
than the ADB, to create a better relationship with Southeast Asian countries.41 Also, by 
taking the initiative for this conference, Japan tried to  display its positive stance on 
Asia to international society.42 However, Japan was again not very successful. The 
conference met once a  year until 1974, but disappeared later on. There were quite 
frequent disagreements with respect to the projects that Japan tried to advance,43 and 
the Southeast Asian leaders rather preferred their own institution, ASEAN.44
Moreover, Japan participated positively in the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC), which 
was established in the same year as MEDSEA through the initiative o f South Korean 
President. ASPAC had a strong anti-communist, or anti-China, and pro-South Vietnam 
bias, given the fact that all the participating countries were American allies except 
Malaysia, and was in fact to complement and back up US foreign policies, specifically 
its strategies on the Vietnam War. 45 46 Whilst it tried to dilute these military- 
characteristics, Japan attempted to use ASPAC as a  body of economic cooperation.4” 
However, this organisation was also suspended by the mid-1970s mainly due to the 
rapprochement between the US and China and the US w ithdrawal from Vietnam.
40 Yoichi Funabashi. Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC (Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 1995), p.228.
41 Susumu Yamakage. "Will Japan Seek Regionalism?” in Michael S. Steinberg, ed.. The 
Technical Challenges and Opportunities of a United Europe (London: Pinter, 1990). pp 152-153.
' Tadokoro, “Keizai taikoku," p. 132.
43 Yamakage, “Shoki ASEAN,” p.23.
44 Yamakage. "Will Japan Seek.” pp. 152-153. ASEAN was founded in 1967 and was originally 
composed of Indonesia. Malaysia, the Philippines. Singapore and Thailand.
45 Yamakage, "Shoki ASEAN,” p.21.
46 Ibid., p.21.
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These early Japanese regional initiatives and their negative consequences are 
noteworthy, as they had a great impact on Japan's regional policies later on. Japanese 
leaders understood that Japan's high-profile initiatives were not welcomed in Asia, and 
learned to adopt a low-profile approach.47 Japan accepted that it had to reassure its 
Asian neighbours that it was not seeking to dominate the region otherwise it would 
have to  face difficult opposition to its policies. It gave up trying to form a  regional 
framework by its own initiatives until recently, and instead ASEAN, which Japanese 
policymakers had originally disliked because they feared that it would conflict with 
Japan's interests,48 became the main focus of Japan's Southeast Asian policy.49 Since 
then, Japan's regional approach has been very cautious and it has not tried to take overt 
initiatives.
(3) Early development o f  Asia Pacific cooperation
Japan became interested in another approach to regional issues during this period, 
namely Asia Pacific cooperation This approach began to  penetrate into Japanese 
policymaking and intellectual circles and to be seen as the basis o f  regional 
cooperation from around this time, and eventually developed into the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), which will be discussed in a  subsequent section in 
this chapter
However, the concept o f  Asia Pacific cooperation was not developed at the official 
level initially. It was based primarily on a series o f academic studies since the early 
1960s, where two leading Japanese economists, Saburo Okita and Kiyoshi Kojima, 
were central contributors. The establishment o f the Japan Economic Research Centre 4
4 Yamakagc. "Will Japan Seek." p. 15.3.
48 The MOFA was concerned about ASEAN's possible clash with the US bilateral security 
system in the region, while the MITI was worried about the possibility that ASEAN would turn 
itself into an economic block that could exclude Japan and the US. Also, they had a concern 
that the formation of ASEAN would have a negative effect on bilateral relations between Japan 
and the ASEAN countries. (Hook ct al. Japan’s International Relations, pp. 186-187)
49 Yainakagc. "Ajia Taihciyo.” p. 158.
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(JERC) in the early 1960s provided an institutional vehicle for these stud ies/" Kojima 
proposed to create a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) in 1965, which would have 
comprised the five developed Pacific countries o f the US, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and Japan. This was largely a response to the development o f the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and it was designed to supplement and strengthen the 
international trading system.
The concept o f  Asia Pacific was, for the first time, espoused at the official level by the 
then Foreign Minister Takeo Miki in the Sato cabinet in May 1967. He recognised the 
need to address the economic development problems o f  the Asian developing nations, 
and considered that these problems were to be tackled through the concerted efforts o f 
the Pacific developed countries.50 1 *53Miki hoped that the creation o f a free-trade area in 
the region would lead to increased trade among Asian developing countries, which in 
turn would help economic development in Asia " Based on M iki's strong interest in 
the idea o f  Asia Pacific cooperation, the MOFA tried to pursue this policy, but, with 
little enthusiasm from other countries, government level interest in PAFTA became 
dormant, and instead the idea o f Asia Pacific cooperation lived on mainly in academic 
circles until the end o f  the 1970s.55
The Pacific Trade and Development Conferences (PAFTAD) was started in 1968 under 
the auspices o f JERC with the support o f Miki and brought together economists from 
the five developed Pacific nations and Britain. The participants were top-ranked 
scholars, who often had important roles as advisors to their governments, and thus the
50 Hadi Soesastro, "Pacific Economic Cooperation: the History of an Idea.” in Ross Gamaut 
and Peter Drysdalc. eds.. Asia Pacific Regionalism: Reading International Economic Relations 
(Sydney: Harper Educational. 1994). p.79.
'' Ibid., p.8<). and Watanabe. Aiia Taiheivo. p. 108.
Takashi Tcrada. "The Origins of Japan's APEC Policy: Foreign Minister Takeo Miki's Asia 
Pacific Policy and Current Implications,” The Pacific Review 11, 3 (1998), p.342.
53 Pckka Korhoncn, Japan and Asia Pacific Integration: Pacific Romances 1968-1996 (London: 
Routledge. 1998), p.27.
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conferences were never ordinary academic gatherings/4 Likewise, the Pacific Basin 
Economic Council (PBEC) was established in the same year as a private organisation 
of Pacific business executives, who were interested in the idea of creating new 
business opportunities through regional cooperation. Its objectives were to promote the 
study o f  regional trade and investment and to  advance greater cooperation between 
public and private interests."
It must be noted that these private organisations became an important vehicle for the 
later development o f the idea o f Asia Pacific cooperation (or Pacific cooperation) in 
the way that they provoked serious discussions about the way towards, and 
significance of, regional cooperation, which hitherto lacked in the region 54 6 Also, they 
helped to  promote regional solidarity' and reinforced shared norms, which were the 
intellectual background o f cooperation movements in the area.57 In this sense, it could 
be argued that, although Miki's policy to advance a formal regional cooperation 
framework was unsuccessful in the short term, in the longer perspective it laid the 
foundation o f  the future development o f Asia Pacific regionalism. In fact, Terada 
shows that Miki was aware o f the necessity o f  a long-term policy perspective for that 
idea, noting Miki's statement: "we should have a gradual approach to the Asia-Pacific 
policy by starting with programmes which can be implemented. This would help create 
a 'm ood' for producing solidarity among nations in the end.”58
It is important to bear in mind why Japanese policymaking agents, specifically Miki, 
came to favour the concept o f Asia Pacific, and Asia Pacific cooperation. For one thing, 
as seen in the case o f  the ADB. Japan was not ready to take regional responsibility
54 Ibid., p.2.
55 Soesastro. "Pacific Economic Cooperation," p.80.
56 Tsutomu Kikuchi, APEC: Aiia Taiheivo Shin Chitsuio no Mosaku IAPEC: the pursuit of a 
new Asia Pacific orderl (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs. 1995), p.73.
5 Richard Higgott, "Economic Cooperation: Theoretical Opportunities and Practical 
Constraints,” The Pacific Review 6. 2 (1993), pp. 112-113.
58 Terada. "The Origins,” p.357.
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alone at that time, although Japan recognised the importance o f  the development and 
stability in its Asian neighbours to its national interests. As shown above, the Japanese 
government initially conceived o f Asia Pacific cooperation as a  form o f collaboration 
among the Pacific developed countries to assist the developing countries in the region, 
rather than regional economic cooperation among developed and developing countries 
on equal footing. Japan could not afford to assist Asian developing countries alone and 
had to rely on other developed countries.59
In addition, given the rejection by the other Asian countries o f Japan’s initiatives in 
regional matters, Asia Pacific cooperation looked less controversial to Japanese 
officials, as it could avoid giving the impression that Japan was looking for 
prominence in the region.60 In other words, they thought that the US’s involvement in 
Asian frameworks could ease the concern o f regional countries about the growing 
influence o f Japan. This would enable Japan, it was thought, to advance regional 
policies more easily, although, as will be discussed later in this chapter, even the idea 
o f Asian Pacific cooperation was not readily accepted by regional countries.
Furthermore, what must be stressed is that the idea o f Asia Pacific cooperation has 
appealed to Japanese policymakers at a deeper level as well. As mentioned before, 
how to balance the relationship with the US and that with Asia has been a key issue for 
Japan's international relations throughout the postwar period. The concept o f Asia 
Pacific looks quite attractive to Japan in this context in the sense that, while 
maintaining and improving its ties with Asian countries, it had a good chance o f 
finding a way to accommodate the US. In other words, it could be argued that Japanese 
policymakers' interest in Asia Pacific cooperation has reflected the motivation to co­
ordinate these two important relationships. Ohba argues that since Miki the concept o f 
Asia Pacific has been established in Japan as a  convenient phrase to combine these two
59 Ibid., p.344.
Yainakage. "Will Japan Seek.” pp. 153.
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potentially contradictory relationships.61 This is why Japan has stuck to Asia Pacific as 
the means for regional cooperation rather than others, as discussed later.
To sum up, Japanese foreign policy during this early postwar period was characterised 
by the principles set out in the Yoshida Doctrine, namely the concentration on its own 
economic development, a low political profile, and the priority o f and dependence on 
US relations. Japan's regional policy was pursued under this framework, and it is fair 
to argue that the Western, particularly the US, relations were the primary pillar o f 
Japanese policy. Although this situation put its stamp on Japan's regional policy, which 
tended to be greatly influenced by its US relations, this policy was also motivated by 
Japan’s own political and economic interests separate from US wishes. Japan’s aid to 
Asia, which started as reparation payments, was extended partly in response to strong 
US requests, and partly in consideration o f Japan's economic and political benefit. 
Japan became interested in a multilateral approach, illustrated by the ADB initiative, as 
well as Asia Pacific cooperation. It is true that Japan’s multilateral initiatives 
eventually came within the scope o f  US interests, and Japan's attempt to take on an 
independent regional leadership role failed. However, overall, it is important to 
appreciate that Japan’s multilateral policies reflected its own political and economic 
considerations, based on the international and regional conditions at that time.
The 1970s
This decade saw an important, albeit limited, shift in the nature o f Japanese foreign 
policy, w hich can be characterised as a loosening of the framework o f  the Yoshida 
Doctrine. Because o f the significant transformation of the international political 
economy, which will be discussed below, Japan was no longer allowed to pursue the
61 Ohba, “Chiikishugi.” p.267.
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same line as in the previous decades. Japan gradually began to promote more 
independent policies rather than keeping to political and diplomatic minimalism and 
responding to US requests, even though those policies basically did not deviate from 
US policy. In other words, the substantial transformation o f the international political 
economy began to force Japan to search for a new diplomatic identity and to expand 
the scope o f  its diplomacy within the framework o f the US-centred relations. In this 
respect. Southeast Asia was Japan's renewed focus, and Japan began to show its 
willingness to take some political initiatives there, though only through economic 
means. These initiatives were not entirely successful at that time. Nevertheless, it is 
important to  note that Japan began to consider utilising its economic resources for 
political purposes, and throughout the 1970s the relationship with East Asian countries, 
particularly Southeast Asian countries, became increasingly more important to 
Japanese foreign policy.
The impact o f the transformation o f the international political economy on Japanese 
policy
These changes in Japanese foreign policy can be, to a large extent, attributed to the 
fundamental changes in the structure o f the international system, caused by significant 
events since the end of the 1960s. Such a sea change at the international level forced 
Japan to reconsider its previous strategy epitomised in the Yoshida Doctrine and to 
pursue more independent policies, which was particularly evident in its Southeast 
Asian relations.
One o f the dramatic events o f the early 1970s was the US recognition o f China. 
President Nixon announced in July 1971 that he would visit China, and in the 
following year the Shanghai communiqué was agreed between the two countries. The 
impact o f this event on international politics was immense. With respect to Japanese
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policy, it led to the normalisation o f diplomatic relations between China and Japan in 
1972, and the conclusion o f  the Japan and China Treaty o f Peace and Friendship in 
1978. Since then, economic as well as political relations between the two countries 
strengthened markedly. More generally, this gesture on the part o f  Nixon changed 
significantly the international structure. It undermined the structure o f  bipolarity, as it 
was finally revealed that the Communist bloc was no longer unified.
These altered relationships between the US and China as well as between Japan and 
China, coupled with the advent o f detente between the US and the Soviet Union, and 
the US withdrawal from the Vietnam War, gave the US sufficient reason for the 
gradual retreat o f its forces from East Asia, which left, to some extent, a  power 
vacuum there. This made Japanese policymakers increasingly concerned about 
stability in the region. In particular, the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, which stated that the US 
would not intervene in internal insurgencies in Asia, was seen as a clear call on Japan 
to contribute to the security and stability o f  East A sia.6" It became more or less 
inevitable for Japan to make up for the declining US presence. Under the 
circumstances, Japanese policymakers began to recognise the need for the increased 
political use o f Japanese economic resources so as to contribute to the maintenance of 
stability in the region. At the same time, the Southeast Asian countries, which were 
probably more concerned about the security situation in the region than Japan, began 
to view Japan as a potentially greater source o f political support.6'
In addition to these geopolitical shifts, there were other factors that influenced the 
change in Japanese foreign policy. As argued before, the US began to demand that 
Japan made a larger contribution particularly to East Asian issues in the 1960s, and 
such pressures were further strengthened in the 1970s, when Japan's economic rise and
62 Michael J. Green. Annina Japan: Defence Production. Alliance Politics, and the Postwar 
Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press. 1995), p.54.
63 Charles E. Morrison, "Japan and the ASEAN Countries: the Evolution of Japan’s Regional 
Role." in Inoguchi and Okimoto. cds.. The Political Economy of Japan, p.419.
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the US’s relative decline (partly due to the cost o f the Vietnam War) became evident. 
Another Nixon shock in 1971, which was the end o f gold standard and effectively 
meant the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, revealed that the US was no 
longer an absolute hegemon. In particular, Japan's massive surplus o f trade and current 
balances not only made the US frustrated and led to intensified trade friction between 
the two countries, but also attracted the criticism o f  many western developed nations, 
who accused Japan of pursuing nco-mercantilistic policies. Japan’s more positive 
policy and the increased use o f  its economic resources for regional matters can be 
regarded, in a sense, as a way to placate the US and other Western countries by 
showing its willingness to shoulder the costs o f maintaining the international order.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Japanese economy began to be more 
closely connected with the East Asian economy, which not only greatly increased the 
economic importance o f the region in Japanese strategies, but also made Japanese 
policymakers more concerned with the region's political stability, which by then could 
affect Japanese businesses directly. Japan had gradually re-established its economic 
ties to the region during the 1950s and 1960s, but the regional interdependence was 
further increased and deepened in the 1970s. The demise o f the Bretton Woods system 
was a watershed in this process. The resulting appreciation o f the yen64 pressured 
Japanese firms to go abroad because o f the weakening competitiveness o f  their exports. 
At the same time, the Japanese government lifted its controls on foreign direct 
investment (FD1) in the same year, which resulted in a surge o f Japanese investment in 
the region (Table 2-1). This expansion of investment continued steadily throughout the 
1970s, with manufacturing companies moving into the four Newly Industrialising 
Countries (NICs) and raw material extraction companies moving primarily to
64 Yen appreciated against the dollar, from 360 yen per dollar to less than 300 yen after it was 
floated in 1973.
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Indonesia.65 The increase o f Japan's FDI, which involved the rise o f trade as well 
(Table 2-2, 2-3), ushered in greater regional economic integration, which was furthered 
in the 1980s, as discussed in more detail in the next section, although at this time it 
was still based on Japan-centred bilateral linkages rather than regional multilateral 
integration, as Pempel points out.66
Based on these changes in the international structure, Japan needed to modify' its 
previous stance o f  minimalist diplomacy. Accordingly, while Japan consistently and 
dramatically increased the size o f  ODA throughout the 1970s (Table 2-4), and 
eventually replaced the US as the largest donor in the region in the late 1970s, it began 
to use its economic resources for diplomatic purposes, particularly in Southeast Asia, 
as discussed below.67
66 Richard Stubbs. "The Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific Region.” in Richard Stubbs and 
Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, eds.. Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (London: 
Macmillan, 1994), p.371.
66 Pctnpel. "Transpacific Torii,” p.51.
6 The diplomatic use of its economic resources was not limited to East Asian policy. The 
substantial increase of aid to the Middle East is a case in point. The Arab oil embargo in 1973 
had a huge impact on the thinking of Japanese policymakers, as Japan depended on the Middle 
East for a large part of its oil imports, which were the lubricant of the postwar Japanese 
development. That incident reminded them of the vulnerability of the Japanese economy in 
terms of natural resources, and forced them to reconsider the postwar strategy of Japanese 
foreign policy. In fact. Japan immediately acted to establish closer ties with oil-producing 
countries in the Middle East by using economic assistance as a means. Consequently, Japan’s 
aid to this region increased significantly (the share of Middle Eastern countries in Japanese 
ODA increased from 3,6 percent in 1970 to 10.4 percent in 1980). and since then Japan has 
given special attention to this region specifically with respect to aid. It is noteworthy that this 
pro-Arab attitude of Japan was at odds with the US’s pro-Israel stance.
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Table 2-1: Japanese Outward FDI by regions (1965-1995)
(M illion U S  $)
To: 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1990 1995
World 159 904 3280 4693 12217 22320 33364 47022 56911 50694
US 33 94 846 1484 5395 10165 14704 21701 26128 22193
East Asia
20 8% 
32
10.4%
165
25.8%
1077
31.6%
1176
44.2%
1414
455%
2310
44.1%
4386
46 2% 
5526
45 9% 
6946
43 8% 
11763
20.1% 18.3% 32.8% 25.1% 11.6% 10 3% 13.1% 11.8% 12.2% 23.2%
China 0 0 0 12 100 226 1226 296 349 4473
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.8% 1.0% 3.7% 0.6% 0.6% 88%
NICs 5 60 277 378 718 1531 2580 3264 3355 3179
3.14% 6.64% 845% 8.05% 5.88% 686% 7.73% 694% 590% 627%
A S E A N  4 27 105 800 786 596 553 1030 1966 3242 4111
17.0% 11.6% 24.4% 16.7% 4.9% 2.5% 3.1% 4.2% 5.7% 8.1%
(Sources: Com p iled  from  Hook e t al. Japan 's  In ternationa l re la tions , pp.450-457.)
East A s ia  co n s is ts  o f China. N ICs and A S E A N  4.
NICs c o n s is ts  o f Sou th  Korea, Taiwan. Hong Kong and Singapore. 
A S E A N  4 co n s is ts  o f Tha iland, Malaysia, th e  Ph ilipp ines and Indonesia.
Table 2-2: Japanese Exports by regions (1965-1995)
(Million US $)
To: 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
World 8,452 19,318 55,753 129.807 175,638 286,948 442,937
US 2,479 5.940 11.149 31,367 65,278 90.322 120.859
29.3% 30 7% 20.0% 24.2% 37.2% 31.5% 27 3%
East A s ia 1.794 4.595 13.632 33.383 42.275 87.978 186.546
21.2% 23.8% 24.5% 25.7% 241% 30.7% 42.1%
China 245 569 2.259 5,078 12.477 6,130 21.931
2.9% 2.9% 4.1% 3.9% 7.1% 2.1% 5.0%
NICs 810 2,641 6.972 19.186 22,491 59.667 111,036
9.6% 13.7% 12.5% 14 8% 12.8% 208% 25.1%
ASEA N  4 739 1.385 4.401 9.119 7,307 22.181 53.579
8.7% 7.2% 7.9% 7.0% 4.2% 7.7% 12.1%
(Sources: Compiled Hook et al. Japan 's International re la tions, pp.442-449.)
East A s ia  cons ists  o f China, NICs and A S E A N  4.
NICs cons ists  of South Korea, Taiwan. Hong Kong and Singapore. 
A SEA N  4 cons ists  o f Thailand, Malaysia, the Philipp ines and Indonesia.
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Table 2-3: Japanese Imports by regions (1965-1995)
(M illion  U S  $)
From: 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
World 8,169 18,881 57,863 140,528 129,539 234,799 336,094
U S 2,366 5.560 11,608 24,408 25,793 52,369 75,408
29 0% 294% 20.1% 17 4% 19.9% 22 3% 224%
E a s t  A s ia 1.288 2,692 10.261 31,396 33.041 62,428 115.519
15 8% 14.3% 17 7% 22.3% 25.5% 26.6% 34 4%
Ch ina 225 254 1.531 4,323 6.483 12.054 35.922
2.8% 1.3% 2.6% 3.1% 5.0% 5.1% 10 7%
N IC s 266 659 2,764 7,365 9.839 25.947 41.218
3.3% 3.5% 4.8% 5.2% 7.6% 11.1% 12.3%
A S E A N  4 797 1,779 5,966 19,708 16.719 24,427 38,379
9.8% 9.4% 10.3% 14.0% 12.9% 10.4% 11.4%
(Sources: C om p iled  H ook  e t  al. J a p a n 's  In te rnationa l re la t io n s , pp .442 -449 .)
E a s t A s ia  c o n s is ts  o f C h in a . N IC s  and A S E A N  4.
N ICs c o n s is ts  o f  S o u th  Ko rea . Taiwan. Hong Kong  and S ingapore. 
A S E A N  4 c o n s is ts  o f  T h a ilan d . M a laysia , the  P h ilip p in e s  and Indonesia.
Table 2-4: The total amounts of Japanese ODA (1956-1997)
Billion USS
1956 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 Year
(Sources: Makoto Iokibe, ed., Sengo Nihon Gaikoshi. p.213.)
Institutionalising ASEAN relations
Although these changes in the international structure laid the foundation for Japan's 
more independent foreign policy, particularly in Southeast Asia, they were also a
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reflection o f  the regional situation at that time. Throughout the 1970s, high political 
tension grew in many parts o f Southeast Asia, as illustrated by the coup in Thailand in 
1971 and the declaration o f martial law in the Philippines in 1972. Under such 
precarious regional conditions, Japan's economic dominance in the region led to 
incidents in which Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was faced with riots in Jakarta and 
Bangkok in January 1974 during his official trip to Southeast Asia. Although the 
political tension in the region played a major role in the riots,'’8 these incidents shocked 
Japanese policymakers, and made them realise not only the political instability in the 
region but also Japan's alienation from the region and the necessity to make more 
efforts to  consolidate ties with the region. The incidents also challenged one o f  Japan's 
postwar beliefs that the separation o f economics from politics was a successful 
formula for avoiding political conflicts with its neighbours,68 9 forcing Japanese 
policymakers, particularly the MOFA, to take a more positive approach towards the 
region.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Japanese policymaking agents were taking a 
growing interest in East Asia. In the MOFA, the so-called ‘Asianists’ were gradually 
gaining influence, and they found opportunities for a more active diplomacy in 
Southeast Asia, at a time when more politicians were also becoming interested in this 
region.70 This was probably a reflection o f the importance o f  East Asia, particularly 
due to Japan's closer economic ties there, together with the impact on the Japanese 
policymakers o f the incidents that took place during Tanaka's Southeast Asian visit.
Against this international and regional background, Japan began to establish closer ties 
with ASEAN. Japanese policymakers came to recognise that the past policy of 
bilateral economic assistance needed to be reconsidered, but Japan did not have any
68 Morrison. "Japan and the ASEAN countries.” p.419.
69 Ibid., p.420.
Sudo. “Nihongaiko,” p. 153.
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particular alternative means. Regional organisations that Japan had tried to promote, 
namely MEDSEA and ASPAC, had not functioned as expected and had disappeared in 
the mid-1970s. Although, as mentioned earlier, Japanese officials initially did not have 
a positive stance on ASEAN, under these changed circumstances they began to regard 
ASEAN as the new cornerstone o f Japan's regional policy.71 *
The MOFA played a central role in institutionalising ASEAN relations. Prime Minister 
Takeo Fukuda, during his visit to Southeast Asia in 1977, attended the Second ASEAN 
Summit Meeting by ASEAN’s invitation. Fie made an important speech about Japan’s 
basic philosophy on Southeast Asian policy, known as the Fukuda Doctrine, which 
became a trigger for the subsequent development o f Japan-ASEAN relations. It 
comprised the following three points.
(1) Japan will not become a military power, and will contribute to the peace and 
prosperity o f the world.
(2) Japan will seek to develop equal partnerships with Southeast Asian countries 
in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres based on genuine 
understanding.
(3) Japan will support the increase in the solidarity and strength o f the ASEAN 
countries; it will contribute to the strengthening o f mutual understanding 
between the ASEAN members and the Indochina nations, and it will help 
establish peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia .7"
The Fukuda Doctrine expressed the willingness o f the Japanese policymaking agents 
to build up a new relationship with Southeast Asia in collaboration with ASEAN as an 
equal partner. Most Japanese prime ministers have made an official trip to ASEAN 
countries since, and each time they have pledged some new commitments for
’’ Takcda. " Tonan ajia gaiko.” p.65.
" Ibid., p.66. (author’s translation)
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ASEAN’s development in accordance with ASEAN’s expectations.73 Rix argues that 
there is no doubt that ASEAN has enjoyed a special status in Japanese foreign policy 
since the Fukuda Doctrine.74 By the time o f the Fukuda Doctrine, ASEAN countries 
had come to occupy predominant positions in Japan’s ODA list, and bilateral 
relationships between Japan and each ASEAN country' remained important. As Rix 
notes, “there are undoubtedly ‘ASEAN’ features that are increasingly setting the broad 
parameters for bilateral aid tics with Japan, and into which some aspects o f bilateral 
programmes are fitted."’75
More importantly, the Fukuda Doctrine displayed Japan’s intent to play a larger role in 
the region by stepping into the political area Morrison argues that it is "regarded as a 
major turning point in that it provided what Japan regarded as a  statement o f its 
political interests in the Southeast Asian region.”76 Specifically Japan volunteered to 
be a  mediator between the ASEAN and other Indochina countries, for the sake o f 
casing tensions in Southeast Asia. Japan tried to advance this agenda not through 
military' but economic means, namely the provision of ODA to the Indochina countries. 
For instance, the MOFA requested Vietnam to use Japanese ODA for importing 
ASEAN products, which MOFA officials expected would foster a  new relationship 
between ASEAN and the Indochina countries.77 This policy to bridge between ASEAN 
and the Indochina countries ended in failure at that time, and it was interrupted until 
Japan began to be involved in Cambodian peace directly in the late 1980s. Japan had 
to sever aid to Vietnam in 1979 due to Vietnam’s invasion o f Cambodia in December 
1978. Flowever, in spite o f  this temporary reversal, it is noteworthy that Japan began to 
show its willingness to utilise economic resources for assuming a political role in the 
region, and indeed Japan became positively involved in the Cambodian issue later, as
’ Sudo, Tonan aiia. pp.205-207.
Rix. Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge, p. 148.
75 Ibid , p.148.
6 Morrison. "Japan and the ASEAN countries." p.422.
Sudo, “Nihongaiko,” p.154
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discussed in the next section.
This new stance o f Japan was not contradictory to US interests. The US was expecting 
Japan's larger contribution in Southeast Asia, as argued above, and was positive about 
its attempt to bridge the gap between ASEAN and Indochina until the Soviet invasion 
o f Afghanistan in December 1979.78 Watanabe notes that the MOFA planned very 
carefully the Fukuda Doctrine by creating a domestic and international consensus for it, 
and its officials had considered that it would not provoke serious external opposition ”
Since the announcement o f the Fukuda Doctrine, the relationship between Japan and 
ASEAN has become institutionalised. The first Japan-ASEAN Foreign Minister's 
Meeting was organised in 1978, and they still meet regularly. This first meeting 
developed into the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) in the following year, 
which originally included the US, New Zealand, Australia and the European 
Community (EC) but expanded to others later. Furthermore, an economic ministers 
meeting between Japan and ASEAN was proposed by the Japanese Foreign Minister; 
they met for the first time in 1979, and since 1992 they have met on a regular basis.
Since the 1980s
The changes in Japanese foreign policy discussed in the previous section have 
continued since the 1980s. Japan's minimalist stance on international affairs based on 
the Yoshida Doctrine has been further diluted. While its foreign economic policy, 
together with Japanese private capital, have had a  significant impact on the regional 
economic order as well as the economy o f individual countries, Japan has became 
more interested in taking political initiative in regional matters. W hile policies based 
on the Fukuda Doctrine in the previous decade represented basically the use o f 
economic resources for political purposes, and in fact economic resources will remain 8
8 Takeda'Tonan ajia gaiko,” p.67.
' Watanabc. Aiia Taiheivo. pp. 113-114.
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Japan's main foreign policy tool, Japan has become more active diplomatically and has 
participated in creating new regional frameworks. Furthermore, even security issues 
have ceased to be a political taboo among Japanese policymaking agents, particularly 
since the G ulf War, which, as argued below, greatly influenced the thinking of 
Japanese policymakers and the public, although these issues are still dealt with very 
cautiously. Few policymakers would dispute that US relations are still most important. 
In fact Japan is always careful to take into account the US stance, and never wishes to 
defy US policies. However, it should be noted that Japan's interest in conducting more 
independent policies that are not merely the extension of, or a derivation of, US 
policies has begun to be observed. In addition, the position that East Asian countries, 
not only Southeast Asian countries, but also the NICs and China, occupy in Japanese 
foreign policy has undoubtedly risen considerably.
The continued changes in the external environment since the 1970s, such as the rise o f 
Japan’s economic power and the deepening economic interdependence in the region, 
have laid the foundation for these further shifts in Japanese foreign policy during this 
period. However, what has to be particularly noticed is the sea change in the 
international system triggered by the end o f  the Cold War. As Funabashi argues, “ |t]he 
1990s and the end of the Cold War have brought Japan's Asia policy to a new stage. 
Increasingly, politics and a greater spirit o f interdependence have been infused in 
Japan's approach to the region.”80 Accordingly, this section will first look at the impact 
o f the end o f the Cold War on Japanese foreign policy, follow ed by the examination of 
Japanese policies in three subject areas: (1) Japan's economic relations with the region, 
(2) its policies towards regional cooperation and (3) its political and security initiatives.
The end o f the Cold War and its impact on Japanese foreign policy
80 Funabashi. Asia Pacific Fusion, p.230.
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Despite several years o f  the renewed heightening o f  Cold War tensions in the early 
1980s, by the end of the decade it became apparent that the Cold War was coming to  
an end. Although some may argue that the impact o f the end o f  the Cold War in East 
Asia has not been as great as in Europe, it has greatly changed Japan's diplomatic 
environment, and has significantly influenced Japanese foreign policy.
One o f the significant impacts that the end of the Cold War has had on Japanese 
foreign policy is that it has made Japan's status in world politics more uncertain W hile 
the Cold War order strictly constrained the scope o f its foreign policy, Japan in turn 
had a secure position in such a framework, which it sought to safeguard by indirectly 
contributing to the Western camp and supporting US policy through mainly economic 
means The end of the Cold War has completely altered these coordinates o f Japanese 
postwar foreign policy, and has forced Japanese policymakers to think anew what sort 
of role the country should play in order to maintain and enhance its political status. 
The following remark o f  Former Foreign Minister Yohei Kono indicates the shift in 
Japanese foreign policy: since the end o f  the Cold War the concept o f Japan as a 
member o f the West, which was the basis for deciding Japan's political and security 
policy, has had no significance, and this has brought a significant change to Japanese 
foreign policy.81 *
Furthermore, the changing world order in the post Cold War era does no longer 
guarantee the conditions in which Japan has pursued its national interests, namely its 
stability and prosperity. As discussed before, Japan was, to a great extent, a beneficiary 
of the existing international order during the Cold War, and was able to achieve these 
objectives, but such a favourable environment is not guaranteed any more. As a 
consequence, the Japanese policymakers have increasingly recognised that Japan has 
to be more involved politically in the architecture o f a new international order to avoid
81 Yohei Kono. “Nihon gaiko no shinro [the path of Japanese diplomacy|." Gaiko Foramu
(1995, 1), p.13.
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being left out and to secure a voice to defend its national interests. Takakazu Kurivama, 
former Vice M inister for foreign affairs, writes:
For small or middle countries, the fundamental diplomatic task is to make 
good use of an existing international order for securing national interests. In 
this sense, Japan's postwar diplomacy was successful. However, now' that the 
international order and Japan's position in it has changed greatly, Japan cannot 
defend its national interests through the diplomacy o f  small or middle 
countries. Japan has to positively participate in re-establishing the 
international order that has been changing fundamentally.82
This orientation of the Japanese policymakers is particularly evident in the security 
area. During the Cold War, the US was strongly committed to  the security o f its allies 
within its broad security framework based on the containment o f  the Soviet Union. 
The end o f the Cold War has inevitably forced it to change its long-term policy stance. 
The reduction o f  the US defence budget and the gradual w ithdrawal o f the US forces 
from East A sia from a long-term perspective is unavoidable to some extent and so is 
its limited political presence there, although for the time being the security relationship 
between Japan and the US has been strengthened particularly since the issuance of the 
‘Nye Report’ in February' 1995,83 and the US has shown its determination to maintain 
around 100,000 troops in East Asia for at least the next twenty years. In fact, the US 
has declared that it has ceased to be the world policeman, and it has requested greater 
burden sharing from its allies.84 It looks like the rather distant US stance towards the 
East Asian financial crisis confirmed this tendency, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Japanese and East Asian officials have recognised that East Asia has to prepare for a
8‘ Takaka/.u Kuriyama. "Taikcntcki nihon gaikoroa” p. 113. (Author's translation)
K' The report, issued by the Department of Defense, confirmed the continued US commitment 
to the US -  Japan Security Treaty as the basis of the US security policy.
84 Shuichiro Iwata, “Beikoku no gunji senryaku to nichibei anpo taisei [the US’s military 
strategy and the US-Japan security,” Hokusai Seiji 115 (1997), pp. 110-111.
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gradual US withdrawal from the region Under the circumstances. Japan's political 
role in the region has definitely become more important than before It is not that they 
wish a diminution o f the US presence in East Asia, and in fact some regional 
frameworks, such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). are in a sense 
intended to keep the US involved. However, in the long-term the US cannot be 
expected to maintain the same policy towards East Asia as it did during the Cold War. 
which Japanese and East Asian officials have to accept
The G ulf War actually revealed to Japanese policy makers that the old formula did not 
work well any more, and had a considerable impact on the Japanese security thinking. 
Japan's huge economic contribution did not satisfy the US policy -making circles and 
the US public, and generated international criticism, lokibe argues that what the G ulf 
War asked the Japanese was to consider w hether their fundamental belief concerning 
the country 's security was wrong, namely the belief that all Japan has to do to be 
accepted by the international society is not to instigate or to be involved in a war in 
any way
Thus, the end o f the Cold War and subsequent changes in the international 
environment, the G ulf War in particular, have significantly influenced Japanese 
domestic society, and have prov oked huge debates in Japan Although a new consensus 
on this issue has not emerged yet, many people seem to have come to be aware that 
some change is necessary It is noteworthy that there have been increasingly positive 
view s on a more extensive, albeit still limited, role o f  the SDF When the government 
submitted a United Nation Peace Force Co-operation Bill to the Diet in 1990, when a 
war in the G ulf seemed likely, public opinion was very negative about the overseas 
dispatch of military personnel and the Bill.85 6 However, a decade later, a  poll showed
85 Makoto lokibe. "Reisengo no nihon gaiko ¡Japanese diplomacy after the Cold War)." in 
lokibe. ed . Seneo Nihon, pp. 228-229.
M' I A A Stockwin, Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy (Oxford:
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that 70 percent o f people backed the SDF's logistical and non-combat involvement in 
the operations o f  the US and other states that followed the attacks in New York and 
Washington on September 11, 2001 87 This has been a highly controversial issue as it 
could lead to a shift in Japan’s fundamental security policy, bu t an increasing number 
of voices not only among policymakers but also the Japanese public have asked that 
Japan should cease to be a junior partner to the US. In fact, there have been 
discussions about the revision o f the constitution, specifically the revision o f Article 
9,88 which provides the basis o f state pacifism and on which much o f the discussions 
has revolved, and still revolves.89 Debates are still going on,9" but one thing to be noted 
is that the number o f  people who accept the revision o f the constitution has, without 
doubt, increased in the last decade, although most advocates o f the revision do not 
wish to get rid o f Article 9, or to push for independent remilitarisation.91
In short, the end o f  the Cold War has created various conditions under which Japan has 
to be more positively involved in international affairs politically, and even in the 
security area It is believed, increasingly, that the past minimalist policy is no longer 
beneficial for Japan.
Blackwell, 1999), pp.73-74.
8 Nihon Kei/ai Shinbun. September 27. 2001.
88 Article 9 declares: (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
lhc Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right o f the nation and the threat or 
use of force as means of settling international dispute; (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph, land. sea. and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised (Glenn D. Hook and 
Ga\an McCormack. Japan’s Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis (London: 
Routledge, 2001), p. 191)
89 Ibid., p.4.
There arc a number of arguments involved. For instance, the Yoiniuri Shinbun. the 
conservative right, most widely read newspaper in Japan, holds that several changes of the 
constitution arc necessary, while the Asahi Shinbun. the liberal left, second most widely read 
daily, opposes the idea. Also. Ichiro Ozawa, a conservative politician, favours revision and 
advocates the idea of Japan as a normal country '. On the other hand. Yoichi Funabashi of the 
Asahi Shinbun proposes a vision of Japan as a 'global civilian power’. (See. for the detail of 
the debates on the Constitution. Hook and McCormack. Japan's Contested Constitution, and 
Richard B. Finn, "Japan’s Search for a Global Role: Politics and Security,” in Warren S. 
Hunsbcrger. cd.. Japan’s Quest: the Search for International Role. Recognition, and Respect 
(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), pp 115-129.)
” Hook and McCormack. Japan's Contested Constitution, pp.31-34, Green. Japan's Reluctant 
Realism, pp.25-26. and Stockwin. Governing Japan, pp 168-172.
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At the same time, the end of the Cold War has influenced Japan's East Asian relations 
in the sense that the East Asian countries have come to hold an ever more important 
position in Japanese foreign policy. For one thing, East Asia is naturally the place 
where Japan's political initiatives are more likely to be directed for historical, 
geographical and economic reasons. Japan has to consolidate the basis that allows its 
more positive roles there. Accordingly, the region has attracted more attention from 
Japanese policymaking agents.
Furthermore, Japan's interest in East Asia is more or less the reverse side o f  its 
increasingly difficult relations with the US. The end o f the Cold War has affected 
Japan’s relations with the US in the sense that the conflict o f  economic interests 
between the two countries, which had been mitigated by the presence of a common 
enemy during the Cold War, became more exposed and straightforward. This was 
particularly seen in the high tension in the bilateral trade negotiations between the two 
countries from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Takayuki Kimura, a high-ranking 
MOFA official, argues that during the Cold War, even though economic negotiations 
had their moments o f  heated discussion, they could reach a last-minute compromise 
because the US “considered the overall relationship with Japan more important in the 
face o f communist adversaries than minor economic gains in negotiations. "9'  However, 
the end o f  the Cold War made such considerations unnecessary for the US, and made it 
pursue direct economic benefits particularly during the term o f the Clinton 
administration.92 3 These aggressive US attitudes made not only Japanese policymakers, 
but also a large part o f the Japanese public, the media and academics, feel sick o f the 
overall relationship with the US, although few dispute the significance o f US relations.
While these changes attributed to the end of the Cold War have provided the
92 Takayuki Kimura. "Japan-US Relations in the Asian-Pacific Region.” In Grant, ed.. The 
Process of Japanese Foreign Policy, pp.57-58.
The current Bush administration, which puts more importance on the security relationship 
with Japan, has not taken as hard an approach as the Clinton administration.
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background for Japan's greater political initiatives in the region, Japan's policy in the 
economic sphere has also continued to affect the region. In the following, Japan’s 
economic role in this period will be discussed first before moving on to  examine 
Japan’s initiatives in the political and security areas.
Japan's economic relations with the region
Japan's economic power has greatly influenced the fate o f the regional economy 
throughout the postwar period, and it has been particularly significant since the mid- 
1980s, when a combination o f  Japanese private and public capital began to  flow into 
East Asian countries. This has resulted in a much greater integration o f the regional 
economy and a new regional economic order. While this development has contributed 
to the rising importance o f East Asian countries in Japanese foreign policymaking, it 
has created in turn a more favourable regional environment that allows a  greater role 
for Japan. This section will discuss this development and show how Japan has quietly 
and successfully pursued regional policies by deploying its economic resources.
It must be noted that, while the economic policies o f  the Japanese government have 
played a significant role, as discussed below, Japanese private capital has been an 
essential driving force in integrating the East Asian economy. Japanese FDI in the 
region had grown continuously since the 1970s, as argued before, but this growth was 
accelerated dramatically in the mid-1980s, particularly after the Plaza Accord in 1985. 
The value o f the Yen almost doubled between 1985 and 1988, which forced Japanese 
firms to go abroad. Japanese FDI in East Asia tripled from 1985 to 1987, and increased 
five times by 1990 (Table 2-1). Although the US is still by far the largest investment 
destination, this rise o f Japanese FDI to East Asia has had a great impact on the region 
In fact, in many East Asian countries Japan has become the largest investor nation, 
replacing the US, and the share o f Japanese FDI in the total investment in East Asia
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was 27.5 percent (1990) and 16.5 percent (1995), while the share o f  US FDI was 18.8 
percent (1990) and 12.2 percent (1995).94 The surge in Japanese FDI in absolute terms 
was accompanied by the rapid increase of Japanese trade with the region. Both 
Japanese exports to and imports from East Asia almost doubled from 1985 to 1990 
(Table 2-2, 2-3). Also, Pempel notes that, while about one-half o f  US investment in 
East Asia is concerned with natural resource extraction, Japan’s investments in 
manufacturing have become more conspicuous, which has made the East Asian 
economy highly dependent on Japan.95
Japanese FDI has not only strengthened the economic relationship between Japan and 
other East Asian countries, but has also altered the region's trade and investment 
pattern as a  whole The pattern o f East Asian development has been discussed as the 
"flying geese model o f development' According to this explanation, Japanese FDI first 
went to N ICs, contributing to their development, and then began to invest massively in 
ASEAN and China. The latter were also the destination o f  significant investment from 
the multinational companies o f NICs. Also, according to the model, these countries 
were then able to move up the technological ladder through this investment process by 
following the example o f  countries that had already been successful. For instance, as 
Japan moved out o f textiles, Korea and others took over. W hat this discussion suggests 
is that such an investment process has encouraged further regional development, being 
accompanied by a great expansion o f multilateral intra-regional trade, which has 
further integrated the East Asian economies in a web o f relations not only bilaterally 
with Japan but also with each other.96 This process has been deepened by the 9
99 JETRO White Paper, 1997.
" Pempcl. "Transpacific Torii,” p.62.
The flying geese model has not been unchallenged. For instance. Bernard and Ravcnhill 
criticise the model, arguing that the pattern of industrialisation in East Asian countries has been 
dramatically different from that of Japan, as they remain highly dependent on Japanese capital 
goods and technologies. The model also fails to capture the complexity of rcgionalised 
production networks, and focuses on the flow of specific products in isolation from others. 
(Mitchell Bernard and John Ravcnhill. “Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: 
Regionalization. Hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia." World Politics 47 (1995),
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emergence of the Chinese FDI network, where overseas Chinese investors in 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan move into China.97 In fact, the amount o f exports 
within East Asia (including Japan) increased from US$123.2 billion in 1985 to 
US$628.6 billion in 1995.98
While the economic integration between Japan and other East Asian countries, or 
among regional countries, has been basically market-driven, the role o f Japanese 
government policies in that process cannot be underestimated. In particular, the 
extension of substantial amounts o f Japanese aid to the region has made Japanese 
investment in the ASEAN and China easier, underpinning the regional investment 
linkage.9“
Japan has steadily increased the volume o f aid, having become the largest aid donor in 
the world in 1989 for the first time,"10 and East Asian countries have always been in a 
special position as recipients o f Japanese aid Although the percentage o f total 
Japanese aid to East Asia has declined due to the diversification o f Japanese aid, the 
sum that East Asia received has substantially increased in absolute terms (Table 2-5). 
In addition. East Asian countries have always dominated the top-ten list o f aid 
recipients (Table 2-6). A particular notice is due to  China's emergence as a major 
recipient after the two governments signed the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty. At 
the end o f  the Cold War Vietnam has joined China as a  main target o f  Japan’s ODA in 
accordance w ith Japanese policy o f promoting the development o f  both socialist and 
capitalist economies o f the region.101
pp. 171-209.
Pcinpcl. "Transpacific Torii,” p.64.
98 JETRO White paper, 1997
99 Stubbs, "The Political Economy,” pp.372-373.
100 Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1999, p.215.
"" Glenn Hook, “Japan and the Construction of Asia Pacific,” in Andrew Gamble and Anthony 
Payne, eds., Regionalism and World Order (London; Macmillan, 1996), p. 176.
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Note: Northeast Asia includes China. Hong Kong. South Korea and Mongolia. 
Southeast Asia means ASEAN countries.
Tab le  2 -6 : J a p a n 's  b ila te ra l O D A  by R e c ip ie n ts  o f  L a rg e s t  A m o u n ts  (1 970 -1998 ) 
____________________________________________________________________________ (M illion U S  $)
1970 1980 1988 1998
Rank Coun try A m o u n t Coun try Am ount C o un try Am ount Coun try Am ount
1 Indonesia 125.84 Indonesia 350.30 Indonesia 984.91 Ch ina 1,158.16
2 South Korea 86 .76  Bang ladesh 215.14 Ch ina 673.70 Indonesia 828.47
3 Pak istan 39.55 Tha iland 189.55 Ph ilip p ine s 534.72 Thailand 558.42
4 India 32.73 Burma 152.46 Tha iland 360.62 India 504.95
5 Ph ilipp ines 19.23 Egypt 122.97 Bang ladesh 341.96 Pak istan 491.54
6 Thailand 16.91 Pak is tan 112.42 Pak is tan 302.17 V ie tnam 388.61
7 Iran 11.96 Ph ilipp ines 94.40 M yanm ar 259.55 Ph ilipp ines 297.55
8 Burma 11.94 South Ko rea 76.30 S ri Lanka 199 83 Sri Lanka 19785
9 China 9.53 M alaysia 65.63 India 179.46 Bang ladesh 189.05
10 Singapore 5.75 Sri Lanka 44.78 Egypt 172.9 M alaysia 179.10
(Sources: Orr, The Em e rgen ce  o f Jap a n 's  Foreign A id  P o w e r, pp .70-71,
and Japan 's  P D A  Annua l R e po rt 1999, www .m ofa.go.jp/policy/oda/sum m ary/1999/d_g2_02.htm l#c_2_3)
For many East Asian countries, Japanese aid has been o f considerable importance to 
their economics, although it may be debatable to what extent it has actually affected 
their economic growth. As mentioned in the preceding section, Japan has been the 
largest donor in the region since 1977, and in most o f the ODA recipient countries in 
East Asian, Japan is the largest donor.102 Furthermore, Japan is the second largest 
contributor to most multilateral banks, and the largest to the ADB, together with the 
US, which also affects the economic fate o f many East Asian developing countries.
"’2 Japan was the largest donor in 1997 in the following East Asian countries: Indonesia 
Vietnam. Cambodia. Thailand. China, the Philippines. Myanmar, and Laos. (Japan's ODA 
Annual Renort 1999, p.160)
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Rix stresses the importance of Japanese aid, arguing the aid has "been able to  affect the 
economic future o f most o f the countries o f  Asia, and come to be the greatest single 
influence in the economic decision-making o f many governments within the region,” 
and aid "speaks loudly o f Japan's importance to the region.” 103 Japan’s economic 
assistance has become more important particularly after the end o f the Cold War, as the 
US, under Congressional pressure, has become a less generous donor.
Furthermore, it could be argued that what the Japanese government has done is more 
than merely giving aid. It has adopted various measures to encourage private capital 
flow to the region. For instance, it gave Japanese firms financial incentives, such as 
low-interest loans for foreign investment, foreign investment insurance, as well as 
information.104 Also, there is evidence that the government was. through its associated 
agencies, engaged in various activities, like technical training o f  engineers, to enhance 
the quality o f human resources in the region In 1987, the MITI announced the New 
Asian Industrial Development (AID) Plan, which was the attempt o f  the MITI to 
combine state resources such as aid and technical cooperation with private capital and 
technology. It seems that this plan did not actually achieve significant results and 
ceased to be part o f  the ministry's cohesive policy in the early 1990s. Shiraishi 
explains this disappointing end o f the plan as follows. When the M ITI presented the 
plan, "regional economic integration was (and still is) happening anyway, Japanese 
firms were (and still are) moving production offshore to remain competitive and to 
avoid protectionism and rising cost at home.” 105 Nevertheless, Doner argues that 
"many o f the mixed institutional arrangements that the AID plan both drew on and 
encouraged have continued to function”, and it reinforced the Japanese private sector's 
own initiatives toward internationalisation.106 Hatch and Yamamura regard what has
1113 Alan Rix, Japan's Foreign Aid Challenge, p. 159.
104 See in more detail Hatch and Yamamura, Asia in Japan's Embrace, pp.115-129.
"5 Shiraishi, "Japan and Southeast Asia," pp. 189-190.
106 Richard F. Doner, “Japan in East Asia: Institutions and Regional Leadership," in Katzcnstein 
and Shiraishi. Network Power, p.224-225.
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been happening in East Asia as the attempt o f  the Japanese government to expand the 
Japanese political economy, namely it is "regionalizing the developmental policies and 
practices.”107 Likewise, Shiraishi argues that the basic point about the current formal 
policy line in Japan is “the encouragement and promotion o f  an Asian economy 
dvnamism with Japanese direct investment, Japanese aid for structural adjustment, 
infrastructural and human resources development, and Japanese imports from Asian 
NICs and the ASEAN countries,” namely "extension o f its politics o f productivity 
beyond Japanese borders onto Asia.”108
To sum up, these Japanese economic policies, accompanied by the huge inflow o f 
Japanese private capitals into the region, have had a considerable impact on the 
regional economy, which has led to a closer economic integration in East Asia. 
Accordingly, the East Asian economy has become more incorporated in Japan’s overall 
economic strategy, while the importance o f  Japan’s economic power in the region 
continues. Despite the current prolonged stagnation o f the Japanese economy, Japan is 
still o f  great significance for East Asian countries economically and has still a  great 
influence on the regional economy, as the discussions on the East Asian financial crisis 
in Chapter 4 will show, although the gradual withdraw o f Japanese business, 
particularly financial institutions, from East Asia may be a sign of the changing picture 
of the East Asian economy.
What has to be noticed here is that the deepening economic interdependence in the 
region has greatly influenced Japan's emphasis on East Asia in its foreign policy 
making Closer economic ties with East Asian countries have increased Japan’s 
economic stakes in the region considerably; the regional development and stability 
have been directly linked to the interests o f Japanese business. This has made 
policymakers adopt a more positive policy to secure such stakes, as discussed below.
1 Hatch and Yamamura, Asia in Japan's Embrace, p 55.
Shiraishi. "Japan and Southeast Asia," pp. 187.
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Furthermore, the increasing importance o f the East Asian economy, together with the 
more difficult relations with the US after the end o f the Cold War, have triggered 
vigorous debates in Japanese intellectual and policymaking circles concerning the 
‘new Asianism’ or ‘Japan’s Asianisation’. A number o f  leaders o f opinion have begun 
to stress that Japan should put more importance on its East Asian policy.'09 At the same 
time, this development has also contributed to a greater interest in East Asia among the 
Japanese public. This awareness of the importance o f East Asia by the vast range of 
the Japanese people could affect Japan's growing interest in becoming more involved 
in regional matters politically.
Another point to note is that these concerted activities o f Japanese public and private 
sectors have not only influenced East Asia economically, but have also contributed to 
consolidating Japan's political position in the region, particularly Southeast Asia Arase 
argues that "Japanese ODA creates considerable leverage over recipient governments,” 
while consolidating Japan's political relations with East Asia.109 10 In other words, while 
Japan's low-profile economic diplomacy, involving a combination of private and 
public capitals, has moulded a regional economic order that is essential for Japan's 
prosperity, it has affected the overall relationship between Japan and the region. This 
has created long-term Japanese influence, economic as well as political, in the region, 
and has expanded the sphere o f Japan's political activity. Rix describes this as Japan's 
'leadership from behind’, namely “a style o f leadership that aims at creating long-term 
Japanese influence in the region, and has been a successful form of long-standing 
entrepreneurial' leadership that has carved out a regional role for Japan as investor,
109 With respect to these debates, see Akihiko Tanaka, “Higashiajia no anzenhosho to nihon no 
scisaku |East Asian security and Japan's policy],” in Susumu Yamakage. ed.. Shin Kokusai 
Chitsuio no Koso I ideas of new international orderl (Tokyo: Nansosha. 1994). pp. 132-135. He 
shows that the trend of new Asianism has risen due to the recognition on the part of influential 
politicians and business leaders that East Asia has to have a new mechanism to maintain 
regional security in the post Cold War period, together with the confidence that Japan's East 
Asian policy, specifically its aid policy, has greatly contributed to the remarkable development 
of East Asian countries in the 1980s and 1990s.
""Arase, Buying Power, pp 252-253.
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trader, aid donor and political actor."1
In fact, it seems that Japan's regional initiatives have become more accepted by 
neighbouring countries since the early 1990s, although not all the countries, 
particularly China, North and South Korea, are positive, and Japan still has to deal 
with its diplomatic relationships with its East Asian neighbours in a very cautious 
manner. The Malaysian Prime Minister’s ‘Look East’ policy and the East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposal, which will be discussed shortly, probably suggest 
such a change. Some countries like Thailand have supported Japan's larger role even 
in the security area. It is also notable that ASEAN countries generally supported the 
deployment o f the Japanese Self-Defence Force in Cam bodia to participate in the UN 
peacekeeping operation in September 1992. Furthermore, the recent development o f 
the framework o f ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan and South Korea), which will be 
discussed in Chapter 5, can also be seen as an illustration of the region's growing 
acceptance of Japan's political role in East Asia Also, it is worth mentioning that, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, Japan’s substantial aid during the East Asian 
financial crisis has significantly improved its relations with regional countries 
including South Korea, with which Japan has had a  very difficult and sensitive 
relationship throughout the postwar period.
O f course, it should not be forgotten that there are other reasons for this changing 
regional position o f Japan as well, specifically Japan’s consistent efforts to improve its 
regional relations after the adoption o f the Fukuda Doctrine, such as almost regular 
prime ministerial visits to Southeast Asian countries. Also, Hook points out the 
importance in this respect o f Japan's more forthright apologies in the 1990s for its 
wartime aggression, as "without addressing the outstanding issue of wartime 
responsibility, no Japanese government will be able to play a full political and military 1
111 Alan Rix, “Japan and Region,” pp.62-82.
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role in the region.”112 *Also, with the end o f  the Cold War, East Asian resistance to a 
regional security role for Japan became less uniform and salient 111 In addition, the fear 
of the revival o f Japanese militarism has been abating to some extent, if  it has not 
disappeared, although the Chinese government, for instance, often expresses its 
concern about the possibility that Japan would emerge as a military power in the 
region in order to check Japan’s growing presence in the region.114 In any case, this 
changing regional relationship of Japan has enabled Japan to make a more independent 
policy and to exercise more political influence in the region, which will be discussed 
shortly.
Japanese policy towards Asian Pacific cooperation
These low-profile Japanese initiatives, or leadership from behind, to use Rix's phrase, 
have also been a feature o f its policy towards regional cooperation. Japan's interest in 
Asia Pacific cooperation goes back to the 1960s, as discussed before, and since then 
Japan has consistently and cautiously promoted it. That culminated in the 
establishment o f  APEC in 1989, although it has been more eagerly engaged in East 
Asian cooperation recently. The latter will be detailed in Chapter 5, and this section 
focuses on how and why Japan has participated in the development o f Asia Pacific 
cooperation.
The concept o f  Asia Pacific cooperation, or Pacific cooperation, was developed 
throughout the 1970s, but was discussed mainly in academic circles like PAFTAD, 
where Japanese and Australian scholars played a significant role. The original idea 
behind PAFTA was to help build a free trade area, but it was abandoned during the 
1970s and PAFTA evolved into a more loosely structured, government-level
11" Hook. "Japan and the Construction," p. 198.
11 ’ Hook et al. Japan's International Relations, p. 139.
114Tomonori Kojima. "Nihon no higashi ajia scisaku no tenkai [the development of Japan's 
East Asian policy].” Kokusai Mondai 384 (1992). pp.27-28.
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organisation to deal with trade and development issues, similar to OECD. The new 
organisation was called the Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD), 
and, by the late 1970s, came to be favourably received in PAFTAD. In this, while the 
issue o f development o f regional developing countries became more central, the initial 
project o f a free trade area o f developed countries was sidelined.
The concept o f Pacific economic cooperation generated by academics gradually 
penetrated into official circles in the region from around the end o f the 1970s. The 
official espousal of the idea o f Pacific Basin cooperation by the then Japanese Prime 
Minister Masayoshi Ohira, who took office after Fukuda in 1979, triggered this move. 
Ohira formed the Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group as one o f his personal 
policy-advisory bodies in March 1979; the group was headed initially by Saburo Okita, 
who had been a leading economist involved in developing the idea o f Pacific 
cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s.
In addition to Japan, the US also took the idea seriously at the official level. Congress 
contracted Hugh Patrick o f  Yale University and Peter Drysdale o f the Australian 
National University (ANU) for a study in 1978, and they submitted a detailed report 
about OPTAD Furthermore, some politicians in the ASEAN countries became 
interested in OPTAD, though they had preferred their own institution of A SE A N .'15
Thus, the development o f  Pacific economic cooperation entered a new era in the 1980s. 
The term of "Pacific’ as a region, which had not been accepted in the first PAFTAD 
conference in 1968, came to be used extensively by that time, though confined to the 
PAFTAD circle.* 116 Although, when it was first advocated in the 1960s, the concept o f  
Pacific cooperation referred the idea o f concerted efforts o f the Pacific developed 
countries for the development o f the region’s developing countries, this time it was
11 ’ Korhoncn, Japan and Asia Pacific Integration, p 121.
116 Ibid., p. 112.
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proposed as a framework aimed at advancing regional economic interdependence by 
cooperation among both developed and developing countries in the region.
The background against which Ohira became interested in Pacific Basin Cooperation 
can be looked at from two perspectives: international as well as domestic. 
Internationally, facing the fact that the deterioration in US-Soviet relations, triggered 
by the Soviet invasion o f  Afghanistan, reversed the trend o f  détente o f the 1970s, 
Fukuda’s regional policy, which had assumed that Japan had a  regional role as an 
arbiter and intermediary between ASEAN and Indochina, did not work effectively any 
more. Japan needed a new regional policy in order to show its will to play a larger role 
in the world as well as in the region. Funabashi argues that "Japan's Asian policy 
rapidly re-established the primacy o f Cold War concerns”, and that Ohira's Pacific 
design "widened the scope o f  Japan's regional diplomacy and reflected an 
acknow ledgement o f  Cold War realities.”117
Furthermore, C hina’s changing relations with the West gave Japan an easier 
environment to advance regional cooperation. China’s isolation in the region until the 
early 1970s had created an obstacle to Japan’s regional policy, as its positive policy 
towards Southeast Asia, either through bilateral aid or advancing institutionalisation, 
could possibly be taken for an anti-China policy domestically and internationally."8 
However, the new development o f China-West relations reduced the risk that Japan’s 
regional policy would be considered in that way. Kikuchi points out that Ohira’s visit 
to China in December 1979, when he w as confirmed in his belief that China preferred 
economic modernisation and a  peaceful international environment to conflict with the 
Soviet Union, became the turning point in the development o f  his thinking about the 
Pacific Basin Cooperation, as it implied the possibility o f  incorporating China into an 1
11 Funabaslii, Asia Pacific Fusion, p.229.
Watanabc. Aiia Taiheivo. p. 117.
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Asian framework. 119
Domestically, Ohira was contesting Fukuda for the premiership and to do this 
effectively he needed a different foreign policy platform. While Fukuda was identified 
with an Asian orientation, Ohira fought Fukuda with a package o f grandiose visions .12" 
Also, Korhonen argues that Ohira had to prevent Japan from being drawn into the 
reborn Cold War. That is. Ohira, who had inherited an intra-factional tradition from 
Ikeda and Yoshida, “had to find a  way to identify Japan clearly w ith the United States, 
but by using such language that Japan's economic orientation could continue. This is 
where a Pacific economic cooperation initiative fitted in perfectly.” 19 *21 In addition, 
Woods refers to the influence o f  almost two decades o f discussions about Pacific 
cooperation within Japanese policy-making circles.122
Meanwhile, Malcolm Fraser, the then Australian Prime Minister, responded positively 
to Ohira"s idea, and, at two meetings held between the two Prime Ministers in May 
1979 and January 1980, they agreed to cooperate in realising Ohira's idea, which led to 
the Canberra Seminar in September 1980, later referred to as the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Conference (PECC) I. Despite the initial reservations of some countries, 
particularly ASEAN countries, the second PECC conference was held in 1982 in 
Bangkok, and since then PECC has become a regular conference.12’
PECC featured a tripartite involvement o f  academics, business people, and 
government officials participating in a  private capacity from a wide variety o f
119 Kikuchi, APEC, pp. 104-105.
Korhonen. Japan and Asia Pacific Integration, p 123.
121 Ibid., p. 125-126.
122 iLawrence T. Woods. Asia Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and 
International Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press. 1993). p.90.
The third conference in 1983 was named PECC for the first lime and the first and second 
conference were referred as PECC I and PECC II respectively. (Korhonen, Japan and Asia 
Pacific Integration, p. 132.)
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countries, both developed and developing.124 This is partly because ASEAN countries 
were reluctant to  have an official level conference due to fear that it could compete in 
importance with its own institution o f  ASEAN.125
It should also be noted that the private nature o f  PECC was in accord with what 
Japanese policymaking agents considered preferable.12'1 The report o f Ohira’s Pacific 
Basin Cooperation Study Group stated that it would be difficult to create a 
governmental level organisation immediately, given the complicated diplomatic 
relations in the Pacific area. MOFA officials, basically agreeing with the advice o f  the 
report, considered that it was essential to take a  cautious and gradual approach to 
advancing Pacific cooperation. They thought that forming an extensive and formal 
framework would not be practical at that time, and that such an agenda had to be 
worked on in the middle and long-term perspective In order to keep the momentum, 
Japanese officials hoped that the Canberra seminar would reach an agreement to 
establish an informal body to further the idea o f  Pacific cooperation.
It must be noted that despite its unofficial status, PECC has strong official links. 
Woods argues that state officials in an unofficial capacity are "regarded by many as a 
polite fiction,” and that they are "state representatives, though the state belief that they 
arc attending as private citizens docs allow them to attach a disclaimer to everything 
they say and ensures that their home governments will not be obliged to uphold any 
decisions taken.”127 Thus, while the private nature o f PECC gives flexibility in the way 
in which participants discuss and interact across countries as well as sectors, their
1 1 The countries concerned were Australia. Canada, Japan. New Zealand, the US, the five 
ASEAN countries. South Korea and South Pacific countries, which were joined by the 
representatives of PAFTAD and PBEC. Thus, the Canberra seminar provided an opportunity to 
bring together people and organisations that had previously worked for Pacific cooperation on 
their own. (Kikuchi. APEC, p. 127)
1-5 Susumu Yamakage, “Japan s National Security and Asia-Pacific’s Regional Institutions in 
the Post-Cold War Era,” in Katzenstcin and Shiraishi, eds.. Network Power, pp.284-285, and 
Kikuchi. APEC, p.127.
The following discussion about Japan’s stance on this point draws on Kikuchi. APEC.
■ » .110- 136.
Woods. Asia Pacific Diplomacy, p. 117.
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activities in a series o f conferences has greatly affected government-level thinking on 
regional cooperation through deepening the understanding and knowledge o f  state 
officials. In fact, Woods notes that PECC activities stimulated some inter­
governmental initiatives later, such as the establishment o f the ASEAN-PMC as well 
as the initiation o f the Cairns Group and, more importantly, A PEC.128 *
It is interesting to note that, despite Ohira’s strong attachment to  the idea o f Pacific 
cooperation, Japan hesitated to come to the fore alone, and chose to advance the idea 
by supporting Australian leadership on this issue. As soon as the interim report o f his 
Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group was presented, Ohira visited Fraser to discuss 
the agenda in January 1980, stressing the significance o f  Pacific cooperation. 
According to the agreement reached at this meeting, Foreign M inister Okita asked 
John Crawford o f the Australian National University (ANU), w ho had been one o f the 
prominent scholars in PAFTAD. to organise the first seminar a t ANU. This can be 
interpreted as a  choice on the part o f Okita against holding the conference in Japan, 
w here he would have been put in a more exposed position. The choice of venue for the 
conference was in a sense reasonable, as Japanese and Australian scholars had been at 
the centre o f efforts to develop the concept o f Pacific cooperation in the 1960s and 
1970s It is reported that Ohira's secretary thought that because o f  Australia's strong 
research and interest in Pacific cooperation. Australia would best understand and 
promote Ohira's Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept ahead o f other countries.1' 9
However, it is reasonable to assume that there must have been some other reasons why 
Japan had not proposed that idea on its own. For one thing, if Japan had done so, East 
Asian countries could have criticised it as Japan’s attempted control o f East Asia or its 
new effort to create a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. By taking the initiative 
in partnership with Australia or allowing Australia to assume a  central role, it could
128 Ibid., p. 115.
Tetada. "The Origins,” pp.349-350,
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evade such criticisms to some extent.130 In addition, the US was also quite sceptical 
about Japan's positive move on regional projects, as it was worried that Japan was 
trying to create an East Asian block and to accumulate power over the region. Japanese 
policymaking agents considered that jointly proposing and advancing the concept 
could contribute to lessening th is concern o f  the US .131
To sum up, the idea o f  Pacific cooperation, which had been developed mainly in the 
academic circles in the 1960s and 1970s, gradually came to be entrenched among 
Japanese policymaking agents, following the then Prime M inister Ohira’s strong 
interest in it. However, Japan was very cautious in the way it promoted this agenda. 
Japanese policymakers considered that it was not practical to  push ahead a 
governmental organisation, and that this should be a  long-term goal, which could be 
pursued through a scries o f discussions and interactions within a private-level body. 
Japan was also cautious not to  be regarded as taking an independent regional initiative, 
and preferred to act with Australia so that it could apparently dilute its influence, in 
consideration of the concerns o f East Asian countries and the US about Japan’s 
dominance in the region. Indeed, this style o f  promoting regional cooperation 
incrementally and cautiously can be observed repeatedly in Japan 's later policies on 
this subject, as discussed below  and in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
The formation o f APEC in 1989, which is a government-level economic forum, as 
opposed to the unofficial status o f PECC, marked a watershed in regional cooperation 
in Asia-Pacific The fear that the expanding regional arrangements in North America 
and Europe might become protectionist, as well as the possibility that the multilateral 
trading system would collapse in the light o f  the difficulty o f the Uruguay Round of 
the GATT made countries in the Asia Pacific region concerned about the future o f  the 
international trading system. This was the impetus for the creation o f  APEC. However,
130 Kikuchi. APEC, p. 123.
131 Ibid., p. 123.
it should be noted that the remarkable economic growth o f the East Asian countries 
and increasing economic interdependence in the region laid the foundation for APEC, 
which was greatly supported by the continuing processes o f unofficial cooperation, 
namely PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC.
Against this background, both the Japanese and the Australian governments came to 
consider some new framework in the region However, it was Australia that took a 
direct initiative. Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke called for a formal regional 
mechanism for cooperation in Asia-Pacific in January' 1989, and this led to the 
establishment o f  APEC, which originally comprised the six ASEAN nations, Australia, 
Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and the United States; China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan joined in 1991. Mexico and Papua New Guinea in 1993, and Chile in 1994. 
Australia's original plan excluded the US, but later accepted the MlTTs strong 
insistence on the need for including the US in the original list o f members.
Despite the significant initiative o f Australia in founding APEC, some stress that Japan 
assumed more than a supportive role in the process.11" Prior to the Hawke initiative, 
the MITl's study group started to consider the issue in early 1988, and its interim 
report, which came out in June 1988, proposed the establishment o f a government- 
level framework for economic cooperation in Asia Pacific. As Krauss notes, “this 
report envisions APEC in the form it eventually developed: an open, regional forum of 
economies with government participation cooperating to achieve more integrated and 
balanced growth with a  gradualist and consensual approach respectful o f the region’s 
diversity.’’133 Hawke responded to the report very positively, and since then the M1TI 
and the Australian government worked together to persuade other countries.
Sec. Funabashi. Asia Pacific Fusion, and Ellis S. Krauss. "Japan, the US. and the Emergence 
of Multilateralism in Asia," The Pacific Review 13, 3 (2000). The following discussions draw 
on these studies.
Krauss. "Japan, the US. and the Emergence of Multilateralism in Asia." p.477.
However, Japan let Australia take the initiative, and itself assumed a behind-the-scenes 
role. Funabashi points out various reasons for Japan's inactivity with respect to its 
APEC policy: bureaucratic tu rf battles between the MITI and the MOFA, domestic 
pressure from agricultural constituencies to oppose trade liberalisation, especially o f 
rice, the Japanese decision-making processes such as bottom-up consensus building, 
and the lack of political leadership.* 1'4 The MOFA's adamant opposition to the MITFs 
initiative was based not only on jurisdictional territorial rivalry, but also its belief that 
the East Asian nations do not accept Japan's prominent le a d e rsh ip "  MITI officials 
also shared the same concerns as the MOFA. It was reported that there was a fear 
among MITI officials that the idea o f a regional grouping could raise for some 
countries the spectre o f the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere concept o f the 
1930s and 1940s, and thus MITI contented itse lf with a secondary, low-profile role 1 36 
A remark o f Shigeo Muraoka, the then vice-minister in international affairs and 
responsible to the MITI for creating APEC, confirmed this point: “ [tlhe reason I 
thought Japan should maintain a low-profile and that Australia should take the 
initiative in organising APEC instead, lay in the belief that memories o f  the Co- 
Prosperity Sphere still pervaded the region and people would not readily support a 
Japanese idea which might remind them o f the old awful days I thought the problem 
of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was deeply rooted.” 1'7 In short, it can be argued that the 
concern about the possible negative reactions o f regional countries to Japanese 
initiatives again prevented Japan from taking a  prominent leadership role, and made it 
keep a low-profile, as in the case o f PECC.
As to the significance of APEC in Japanese foreign policy, it was argued before that 
the concept o f Asia Pacific cooperation fits in well with the fundamental diplomatic 
goal o f  Japan, namely balancing its relations with the US and East Asia. APEC is
134 Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, pp.211-220.
Krauss. "Japan, the US. and the Emergence of Multilateralism in Asia.” p.480.
' 36 Japan Economic Journal. 8 April 1989, and 10 June 1989.
1 * Cited in Tcrada. “The Origins.” pp. 345-346.
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indeed a successful means for pursuing such a policy, and accommodates the 
diplomatic situation o f being caught between the US and Asia, which Japan has been 
grappling with for a long time. It was the realisation o f what the Japanese government 
had pursued since the 1960s, namely regionalism incorporating the US and East Asian 
countries. Japan in fact aimed at dealing with a number o f important diplomatic 
agendas with the US and East Asia simultaneously through the framework of APEC. 
The inclusion o f the US in APEC was seen by Japanese officials to contribute to the 
containment o f US unilateralism and to prevent the US from turning away from 
multilateral frameworks in their trade policy and becoming inward-looking. Also, in 
terms o f security, Japan, feeling nervous about a possible US withdrawal from the 
region after the Cold War, expected APEC to play a role in keeping the US engaged in 
the region. The US commitment to regional security is still important to Japan as well 
as to the region, as there remain a number of potential conflicts in East Asia, such as 
the Korean Peninsula Also. Japanese officials are aware that many o f  its neighbours 
accept Japan's growing presence, economically as well as militarily, in the region only 
because the US-Japan security alliance guarantees that Japan will not disturb regional 
order and threaten its neighbours. On the other hand. APEC is regarded as "an 
instrument that Japan is using to strengthen its ties with ASEAN” 138 It has become 
particularly important for Japan when it was aspiring to a political role in East Asia in 
the 1990s, as touched on before.
However, the alternative option that came from the Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir in 1990 created a problematic issue for Japan. It was the proposal to form 
EAEG (later EAEC), which was to be an 'Asian only' group that excluded North 
American and Oceanian countries. Japan's participation was considered crucial; 
Mahathir intended to anchor Japan to East A sia139 and expected it to take the lead.
138 Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 197.
‘ Linda Low. “The East Asian Economic Grouping,” The Pacific Review 4, 4 (1991). p.375.
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Apparently the US and Australia strongly opposed such an idea.
Japan's response was ambiguous and it did not take a decisive stance on the Malaysian 
proposal. On one hand, Japan obviously could not risk its US relations by endorsing 
EAEG in the face o f  US objections. In fact, the US strongly pressured Japan not to 
accept the proposal. The fact that there was no consensus on EAEG even among the 
ASEAN countries made Japan's stance more difficult as Japan was still very wary of 
the sensitivity o f  East Asian countries about Japan's regional presence. Furthermore, 
the negative image that EAEG would give the world, and thereby the possibility o f 
risking important American and European markets, was another concern of Japan, 
although the Malaysian government explained that it did not intend to establish an 
exclusive economic block.
On the other hand, Japan was not able to dismiss the EAEG concept, either. The 
proposal struck a  chord with a  great number o f  'Asiam sts' in Japan, including 
prominent politicians, many bureaucrats in elite ministries such as the MOF, the 
MOFA and the MITl. and business people and organisations like Keidanren and 
Kcizaidoyukai.',,<’The increasing economic interdependence in the region as well as 
the heightening tension o f  economic relations between the US and Japan were partly 
the reasons for more favourable views on EAEG in Japan. Also, the fact that the US 
itself had committed to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provided 
reasons for supporting EAEG. However, what is more noteworthy is that they reflect 
Japan's growing willingness to play a greater political role in the region beyond 
merely exercising economic power, independent o f the US. It is no wonder that 
Japanese policymakers saw the idea of EAEG as a  great opportunity to take a 
leadership role in East Asia. 140
140 Richard Higgott and Richard Stubbs. "Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: 
APEC versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific,” Review of International Political Economy 2:3 (1995), 
p 527, Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p.208.
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It can be argued that this inconclusiveness o f Japan with respect to EAEG amounts to 
saving that Mahathir's proposal re-awoke Japan's long-standing identity question of 
where Japan belongs, or ‘Japan's East versus West dilemma".141 142Likewise, Yamakage 
argues that the proposal "‘worked as a litmus test o f the Japanese public's inclination to 
either Asia or the United States.”1J: Hook joins these views, stating that “Japanese 
response to competing forms o f regionalism can be said to have cry stallised around the 
question faced by respective governments since the Meiji era: how relations with Asia, 
on the one hand, and the West, on the other, should be balanced.” '43 As long as Japan 
advocates the concept o f  Asia Pacific, it could escape from meeting the question head- 
on, and indeed the EAEG proposal forced Japan to consider this identity question anew.
Although Japan could not respond decisively to  the EAEG proposal in the early 1990s, 
the idea has re-cmcrgcd since the late 1990s, and this time Japan has not hesitated to 
give full support to the framework. The change in Japan’s stance on East Asian 
regionalism is indeed radical, given its consistent support for Asia Pacific cooperation 
and its earlier indecisive attitude towards EAEG. It will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5 how and why Japan has been positively involved in that process.
Finally, it is worth noting here that the interest o f Japanese policymakers in Asia 
Pacific regionalism for the last few decades can be understood in the context of 
Japan’s overall foreign policy goals or national interests, namely economic prosperity, 
political stability and higher international status. As discussed earlier, Japanese 
policymakers originally aimed at promoting the economic development o f East Asian 
developing countries through cooperation with the Asia Pacific developed countries, as 
they recognised that the development o f East Asian countries, and hence political
1" Funabashi. Asia Pacific Fusion, p.231.
142 Yamakage, “Japan's National Security,” p.299.
11 Glenn Hook. “Japan and Contested Regionalism," in lan G Cook. Marcus A. Docl and Rex 
Li. cds, Fraemented Asia: Regional Integration and National Disintegration in Pacific Asia 
(Aldershot. Hants: Avebury, 1996), pp.25-26.
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stability there, were an essential part o f Japan's own prosperity and stability. Also, as 
shown above, Ohira's strong attachment to  Pacific Basin Cooperation partly reflected 
the perception that Japan had to show its willingness to assume a greater political role 
under the re-emerging Cold War reality. W ith respect to the establishment o f  APEC, 
the M1TI, and to a  lesser extent the MOFA, seriously considered how Japan w ould be 
able to pursue and maintain its economic interests given the expanding regional 
arrangements in North America and Europe as well as the uncertain future o f the 
multilateral trading system. Thus, it can be argued that, against the background o f the 
Japanese policymakers' consistent interest in Asia Pacific regionalism, the policies 
pursued in this area have reflected an effort to promote Japan’s economic and political 
interests; these policies represented strategies for the pursuit o f specific national goals.
Japan’s increasing interest in taking more political and security initiatives in the region
In addition to these initiatives behind the scenes in developing regional cooperation, 
Japan began to show greater interest in taking more political initiatives particularly in 
East Asia. As mentioned before, by the 1980s Japanese policymaking agents began to 
realise that economic policy, specifically aid policy, alone was not enough to fulfil the 
international responsibilities that befitted a country of Japan's economic strength. 
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who assumed office in 1982, tried to pursue more 
positive political roles and to enhance Japan's presence internationally. He was 
proactive particularly in the security area, and abolished the one percent (o f  gross 
national product - GNP) ceiling on m ilitary spending,144 although this policy caused 
domestic and regional concerns about Japan’s military intentions Subsequent Prime 
Minister Noboru Takcshita, given the thaw  in Cold War tensions, suggested tha t Japan 
had to participate in forming a  new international order. He specifically proposed three 
pillars o f this international contribution, namely (1) further economic cooperation
" Japan's military spending exceeded one percent of GNP in 1987 (1.004%), and has been 
around one percent or less thereafter.
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through the expansion o f  ODA, (2) the advancement o f cultural exchange and (3) 
cooperation fo r peace including more positive diplomatic efforts and the dispatch of 
people. Tadashi Ikeda, a  senior MOFA official, explains that this third pillar o f 
cooperation for peace reflects the thought that Japan has to contribute to settling 
international conflicts not only through economic means but also by diplomatic efforts 
and the dispatch o f people, which led directly to discussions in the ministry concerning 
Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO).145 In fact, the MOFA 
began to discuss this issue at that time, but the resignation o f Takeshita, due to a 
political scandal, made the ministry put these plans on hold.14'' In short, Japan’s rise as 
an economic power by the 1980s. along with strong external pressures, made Japanese 
policymakers aware that Japan had to take a more positive political stance 
internationally This consideration has been strengthened since the end o f  the Cold War, 
as discussed above.
Japan's direct involvement in the Cambodian peace from the late 1980s is particularly 
noteworthy, as it shows Japan's willingness to take an independent initiative 
particularly in a regional conflict, where Japan had previously avoided being 
involved.147 After the outbreak o f the Cambodian dispute in 1978, ASEAN took the 
lead in form ing the framework o f  a  dialogue for resolving the conflict, and Japan was 
consistently supporting ASEA N ’s policies, independently o f  US interests, although 
Japan did no t itself play an important role in the events. Successive Foreign Ministers 
and Prime Ministers in the 1980s kept stressing Japan's full support o f the ASEAN 
stance concerning the dispute resolution. However, in the late 1980s, Japan took a  step 
further by following the above proposal o f  Takeshita for international cooperation It 
maintained good cooperation with ASEAN but it did not support it unconditionally,
" Tadashi Ikeda. Kanboiia Wahcicno Michi I the wav towards Cambodian peacel (Tokyo: 
Toshi Shuppan. 1996), p.19.
’’ lokibc, “Rcisengo no nihon,”p.234.
The following account on Cambodian peace draws on Takcda. "Tonan ajia gaiko.” Green. 
Japan's Reluctant Realism, and Masaharu Kono. Wahci Kosaku la Cambodian peace strategy I 
(Tokyo: Iwanami, 1999).
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and became involved more directly in that regional dispute. Japan tried to establish 
contacts between the four parties in Cambodia (the Hun Sen’s government in Phnom 
Penh backed by Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge backed by China, Prince Sihanouk’s 
faction and Son Sann's faction), which were in conflict w ith one another, while 
strengthening the negotiation channels w ith the countries concerned. This was a quite 
different approach from either the US, who supported the anti-Hun Sen forces one- 
sidedly, or ASEAN, who was divided over the policy. Japan convened a conference 
and invited the four factions to Tokyo in June 1990, which produced some significant 
results, such as the signing by Hun Sen and Sihanouk o f  a communiqué that included a 
statement on a power-sharing framework between the factions. This gave momentum 
to the peace process, leading to agreement on a draft peace document in the UN. 
However, the implementation process did not go smoothly as Hun Sen was resisting 
some parts o f the agreement, such as disarmament. Under the circumstances Japan 
again took initiative, and in February 1991, proposed a modified peace plan that 
compromised with Hun Sen. The US was highly critical about this independent effort 
o f Japan, but Japan tried to convince the parties concerned, and in the end all the four 
factions settled on a new plan largely based on the Japanese proposal It could be 
argued that Japan not only contributed its substantial financial resources to the peace 
process, but also took a quite independent diplomatic role, which eventually 
contributed to the conclusion o f  the peace agreement in Paris in October 1991.
Thereafter. Japan continued to contribute to Cambodian issues. Japan hosted almost all 
of the major international conferences on Cambodian economic reconstruction,148 and 
pledged a substantial amount o f economic contributions. In addition. Japan finally- 
dispatched the SDF to take part in the PKO in Cambodia, after the Japanese Diet 
passed the International Cooperation Law in June 1992. As Drifte argues, this has 
become the focal point for Japan's ability and willingness to contribute to the
118 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 176.
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maintenance of the international system beyond cheque book diplomacy.149 Also, 
Japan committed personnel to  monitoring the Cambodian election in 1993.
In short, Japanese policies towards Cambodian peace and economic reconstruction 
showed that Japan is willing to take more independent initiatives diplomatically. Green 
claims that the most striking motivation for the above Cambodian diplomacy o f  Japan 
was ideational, namely the MOFA's desire to demonstrate that Japan could play a 
leadership role in Asia as a  normal country.'50 In addition, Tadashi Ikeda, who was 
directly involved in the peace process as the Japanese minister to Thailand, writes that, 
even if Japan had remained indifferent to the issues o f  the Cambodian peace, it would 
still have been asked to pay the bill, as in the case o f  the Gulf War. And since Japan 
does pay the bill, this makes it difficult to justify w hy Japan would not or could not 
participate directly in the processes through which a  new  order that Japan considers to 
be right becomes established. He argues that ju s t paying a bill has become 
domestically unacceptable.151
In addition to the diplomatic effort concerning a series o f  Cambodian issues, Japan 
began to engage in the establishment o f some regional frameworks in an area o f  great 
sensitivity, namely regional security arrangements. After the Second World War, Japan 
contributed to regional security only indirectly through the US-Japan Security Treaty. 
The US preferred the hub and spokes system in East Asia rather than multilateral 
arrangements like in Europe, while Japan showed only the slightest interest in a  direct 
leading role for security issues as that was considered not to be acceptable 
domestically and regionally. Thus, the change in Japan’s stance in this area is 
particularly notable.
Japan was first uncnthusiastic about this issue, when Australia, then followed by
149 Drifte, Japan's foreign policy, p. 140.
" Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 179.
151 Ikeda Kanboiia Waheieno Michi. pp 18-19.
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Canada, proposed an Asian version o f the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) in 1990. This proposal was dropped when it could not obtain support 
from ASEAN or any major country in the region including the US and China. 
Nevertheless, soon after that ASEAN began to consider the idea that ASEAN-PMC 
could be expanded to multilateral security arrangements in the post Cold War period, 
while the Japanese government also became interested in the possibility o f  a new 
framework for regional stability.
In July 1991, Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama formally proposed to use the 
ASEAN-PMC for a  region-wide security forum. Although the Japanese proposal failed 
to get support from the countries concerned at that time, it was a significant gesture for 
Japan: it formally announced a  substantial change in its stance on security policy, 
which used to be very negative about multilateral security arrangements.152 Likewise, 
Midford claims, ” [t|hc Nakayama proposal represents a bold departure from Japan's 
reactive policy toward regional security, and marked the first time since the end o f the 
Second World War that Japan made a regional security initiative on its own, let alone 
in the face o f clear American opposition.”153 Despite the negative reactions o f regional 
countries to the Nakayama proposal, the proposal encouraged ASEAN countries to 
think about this issue more seriously,154 and eventually the ASEAN leaders declared at 
the Singapore summit in January 1992 that ASEAN should intensify' its external 
dialogues in political and security matters by using ASEAN-PMC. Japan also tried to 
convince the US of the significance of multilateral approaches with respect to regional 
security. In fact, there is evidence that the then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and 
the MOFA explained quite assertively Japan's stance on various occasions,155 although 
the US did not fully accept the idea o f a security framework in East Asia until Bill
152 Kikuchi, APEC, p.269.
53 Paul Midford, "Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism: the 
Nakayama Proposal and the Logic of Reassurance,” The Pacific Review 13, 3 (2000), p.368.
154 Kikuchi, APEC, p.270.
155 See Driftc, Japan's foreign policy, p.84, and Kikuchi, APEC, pp 271-272.
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Clinton took office in 1993.156 At the same time, ASEAN played a significant role in 
advancing the agenda through examining the issue at the ASEAN Institute o f  Strategic 
and International Studies (ISIS). The idea to  use ASEAN-PMC as a regional security 
forum ran into difficulties, as there was strong resistance within ASEAN to including 
Russia and China in ASEAN-PMC, an idea which was developed in talks between 
ASEAN and Western developed countries.157 In the end, it was agreed at the ASEAN 
foreign m inisters’ meeting in July 1993 to  establish a  new framework, the ARF, 
separately from ASEAN-PMC, and the following ASEAN-PMC meeting endorsed the 
idea The first meeting o f  the ARF was held in 1994 in Bangkok, joined by ASEAN 
(then six countries), its dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
South Korea, the US and the European Union (EU)), China, Russia, Laos, the Papua 
New Guinea and Vietnam.
The change in Japan's stance on regional security reflected the various impacts o f the 
end of the Cold War on Japanese foreign policy discussed above. Specifically, given 
the inevitable reduction o f  the US military presence in East Asia and the limitation of 
Japan's security contribution only through the US-Japan Security Treaty under the post 
Cold War conditions, Japanese policymaking agents have begun to recognise the need 
for a larger security role in the region for Japan, taking into account the potential 
benefits o f  some new regional security orders that could supplement the existing 
regional framework based on bilateral relations. Such regional multilateral security 
frameworks could not only help to fill the possible security vacuum in East Asia, but 
could also help Japan to define its political status and roles in the region in the post 
Cold War era. Kikuchi argues that such an initiative could give Japan an opportunity to 
recover the honour o f  its diplomacy that was tarnished during the G u lf W ar.158 
Furthermore, Midford points out that a unilateral Japanese contribution to  regional
155 Kikuchi, APEC, pp.271-272.
15 Ohba, “Chiikishugi,” p.271.
158 Kikuchi, APEC, p.267.
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security would likely backfire, considering Japan’s uneasy relations with regional 
countries; instead, Japan has an interest in developing stronger multilateral 
frameworks.159 *He further claims that Japanese policymakers identified the multilateral 
approach as a primary means for directly reassuring ASEAN states about the 
implications o f its expanding security role.lwl
In short, the process through which the ARF was created is o f  great significance when 
considering the recent Japanese foreign policy. It shows that Japan began to consider 
regional multilateral security arrangements, and actually took assertive actions and 
tried to make the US understand its intentions. Although ASEAN assumed a central 
role in realising the ARF, it is reasonable to say that Japan also contributed to pushing 
ahead the agenda to a significant extent.
Finally, it should be noted that Japan is not replacing the existing security system in 
East Asia centred on the US-Japan Security Treaty with regional frameworks. Rather, 
multilateral mechanisms in East Asia (or Asia Pacific) are considered as supplements, 
not substitutes, to existing bilateral frameworks,161 *and they are not aimed at creating 
firm relations, like a security alliance, but a looser entente.I, :: Yukio Takeuchi, a senior 
MOFA official, comments that the ARF can offer opportunities for regional security 
dialogues, but is not enough to maintain regional security, nor is it realistic to consider 
the establishment o f a  NATO-like organisation for collective actions in East Asia, 
hence it is necessary to keep the US engagement through the existing network o f 
bilateral alliances.163
Conclusion
Midford. “Japan's Leadership Role.” pp.389-390.
,6" Ibid., pp.389-390.
161 Kikuchi, APEC, p.284.
Ibid., p.277.
Comment in a panel discussion featured in Kokusai Mondai 490 (2001). p. 12.
99
This chapter has thematically looked at what Japan has done in East Asia since the end 
of the Second World War, and has demonstrated some im portant shifts in Japanese 
foreign policy. Japan’s foreign policy during the early postw ar period was quite limited 
in scope and greatly influenced by US global strategies, although it would be an 
exaggeration to say that Japan's policy was merely a  reaction to US pressures. 
However, Japan has gradually been more eager to take initiatives not only 
economically, but also politically. Even in security issues Japan has become more 
positive, compared to its earlier reticence, particularly since the 1990s. Economic 
resources are still the main tool o f  its foreign policy, but Japan has begun to make 
more diplomatic efforts than before, and has shown its willingness to participate in 
creating new international and regional orders. Also, Japan has begun to pursue 
regional policy more independently, rather than conducting it as an extension of US 
policy, although there is overall consistency with US interests, and the continued US 
engagement in East Asia is an important priority. The chapter has also discussed the 
sty le o f Japanese foreign policy, and has shown how Japan has quietly pursued its 
agendas In many cases Japan has avoided taking dominant initiatives, and preferred 
low-profile approaches, but in a long-term perspective, this style has enabled Japan to 
achieve its interests The subsequent chapters will look a t these discussions in more 
specific cases, which will not only offer empirical narratives o f  great significance to 
the study o f  Japanese foreign policy, but also consider in m ore depth what has caused 
the shifts in Japanese foreign policy identified above and what has made Japan adopt 
this unassuming style in its foreign policy.
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CHAPTER 3
The Washington Consensus versus the Japanese Approach
and Implications for the East Asian Financial Crisis
This first case study is about how Japanese policymakers, specifically MOF officials, 
have tried to challenge the popular discourse o f the neoclassical doctrine among 
policymaking agents in international organisations and major developed countries as 
well as Western academics, referred to as the Washington Consensus 1 One o f the main 
aims o f this chapter is to demonstrate the difference between the Japanese approach on 
economic development and systemic transition and the Washington Consensus. It will 
discuss how different their approaches to development and transition are, why Japan 
has become increasingly vocal in its policies since the late 1980s, and how arguments 
between Japan, specifically MOF officials, and the Washington Consensus institutions, 
particularly the World Bank, were developed throughout the 1990s. Subsequently, the 
last section o f this chapter will discuss how this divergence o f views is reflected in 
their different positions over the causes o f the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 
1998.
These points are o f great significance for the arguments o f  the thesis. Firstly, the quite 
critical manner in which Japan has advocated its approach against the Washington 
Consensus offers additional evidence of Japan's increasing assertiveness in its foreign 
policy in opposition to the argument that Japan has been merely reacting to outside 
pressures, which was discussed in a historical context in Chapter 2. Secondly, this 
ideological disparity and the resultant difference o f views on the crisis, together with 
the growing discontent o f  Japanese officials about the fact that Japan does not have a
1 This term, coined by John Williamson (John Williamson. "What Washington Means by Policy 
Reform." in John Williamson, ed.. Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? 
(Washington: Institute for International Economics. 1990)). is used in this thesis as the view on 
desirable economic management based on the neoclassical orthodoxy, shared by Washington 
based international organisations, specifically the World Bank and the IMF. and major 
developed countries, particularly the US and the United Kingdom.
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voice in the Western dominated organisations despite its large contribution, will help to 
understand Japan's positive policies towards the East Asian financial crisis as well as 
its growing interest in East Asian regional frameworks, which will be discussed in 
detail in the following chapters. This is particularly because the main figures involved 
in the above debates on the Japanese side are MOF officials, who played leading roles 
in the crisis and East Asian monetary regionalism as well.
Policy debates on development and transition between Japan and Washington
As mentioned above, Japanese policymakers, specifically MOF officials, and 
academics engaged in the country 's aid policy, backed by various Japanese and 
Western academic works, have advocated approaches for economic development and 
systemic transition that are considerably different from the neoclassical orthodoxy, 
which has dominated policy debates since the late 1980s. The Japanese government 
has convened numerous workshops and conferences within the Japanese development 
aid circles, consisting o f  officials and economists, which have led to a broad consensus 
on the alternative approach towards development and transition :
Strictly speaking, it is highly debatable to what extent there is ‘consensus’ among the 
major players in Washington and among those in Japan. In particular, as discussed 
below, the World Bank and the IMF do not always speak with the same voice, as the 
World Bank has been groping for a  new approach to development throughout the 
1990s. Even within the World Bank and the IMF, there are quite diverse opinions.3 
Furthermore, after the predominance o f  the neoclassical doctrine in the 1980s and 
1990s, the East Asian financial crisis that occurred in 1997 and spread worldwide has 
generated a 'mood swing" from this consensus to another, which is emerging as the
" Kcnichi Ohno, "Overview: Creating the Market Economy," in Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno. 
cds.. Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market (London: 
Routledge, 1998). p.l.
Juichi lnada. "Washinton konsensasu vs nihongata apurochi {Washington Consensus vs. the 
Japanese approach." Gaiko Jiho 1341 (1997), pp. 15-16.
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'Post-Washington Consensus’. The essence o f this change is a greater emphasis on 
civil society, institution building, safety nets and governance, which are added to the 
well-known vocabulary of the neoclassical orthodoxy, namely liberalisation, 
deregulation and privatisation.4 In particular, the recognition o f the significance o f 
governance, which "is underwritten by: (1) a managerialist ideology o f  effectiveness 
and efficiency of governmental institutions and (2) an understanding of civil society 
based on the mobilization and management o f social capital rather than one of 
representation and accountability,” is not historically trivial,5 and contrasts with the 
emphasis o f  the Washington Consensus on the shrinking role o f the state. On the 
Japanese side, there arc, o f course, a number o f Japanese neoclassical economists, thus 
it may be that the Japanese consensus is limited to a  specific community responsible 
for Japan’s aid policy.6
Nevertheless, it is important to note that there have been fundamental differences of
opinion betw een the development assistance communities o f Washington and Japan on
what policies developing and transition economies should adopt. The disagreement
between them is not simply a battle for establishing the order o f importance between
the state and the market as means towards achieving economic goals such as increased
productivity, efficiency and growth. Japan has never disregarded market mechanisms,
and on the contrary has put great importance on them, while Washington-based
officials and economists admit a certain role for the state. The differences emerge in
relation to the path that is taken towards a market economy. In other words, the point is
the difference of their views on how developing, or transition, economics can achieve
a market economy and can begin to enjoy its benefits. Based on Japan’s own
development experience, Japanese officials have put much greater emphasis on the
1 Kanishka Jayasuriya and Andrew Rosser, "Economic Orthodoxy and the East Asian Crisis,” 
Working Paper no.94, the Asian Research Centre, Murdoch University.
5 Richard Higgott. "Contested Globalization: the Changing Context and Normative 
Challenges," Review oflntemational Studies (2000), pp. 140-141.
6 However. Kenichi Olino comments that, unlike the US and the UK. the scholars that have 
supported the Japanese approach are on the side of the majority. (Interview. April 3, 2001)
103
role o f the state than neoclassical economics. In this sense, the recent swing in 
international political communities and academics towards a greater appreciation of 
the role o f institutions seems to have made the gap noticeably narrower between the 
Washington Consensus and Japan, although there still are divergences o f views 
between them. The following section will discuss the differences between their 
approaches by considering two issues, which are closely related: (1) the role o f the 
government in development and transition and the efficacy o f industrial policy, and (2) 
the issue o f  the sequence and time span of liberalisation
(U The different views on the role o f the government and the efficacy o f industrial 
policy
Neoclassical economists basically assume the existence o f  markets, or, at the very least, 
they consider that markets are achievable in a  few years, while trying to remove 
government involvement in the economy as soon as possible. Accordingly, to them the 
way developing and transition countries should follow is merely to liberalise 
immediately their economic systems, through domestic and external deregulation and 
the privatisation o f  state-owned enterprises while following strict macroeconomic 
restraints. On the other hand, in the light o f Japan’s past economic achievements as 
well as that o f other East Asian countries, Japanese policymakers and academics put 
more importance on the role o f  the government. They think that governments should 
take more active roles than neoclassical economics assumes in introducing and 
establishing market mechanisms. According to people in the Japanese policymaking 
circle, effective market mechanisms exist only in economies that have reached a 
certain level o f  development and cannot be created merely by liberalisation and 
deregulation. Throughout the 1990s, the World Bank has partially modified its position 
on the role o f  the government and, for instance, some o f  its officials have watched 
governance issues more closely, as argued below. At the same time, it seems that the
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IMF has been sticking more strictly to its traditional approach, at least until the East 
Asian financial crisis.
The above difference o f  views about the role o f  the government has been particularly 
conspicuous over arguments on the efficacy o f  industrial policy. The rationality o f 
targeted intervention by government to alter an industrial structure has been subjected 
to intense debate not only between Washington and Japan, but also academics in 
general, but as yet no clear consensus has emerged.
People working within the neoclassical orthodoxy deny that industrial policy is 
effective, arguing that it distorts market mechanisms and that such a policy is not only 
unnecessary, but can be harmful They argue that each country 's industrial structure 
must be realised through efficient allocation o f  resources by market mechanisms. 
Krugman and Obstfcld point out the reasons why most neoclassical economists 
studying this issue have been sceptical about the importance o f industrial policy, as 
follows. Firstly, East Asian economies have followed a wide variety o f policies, 
ranging from extensive government intervention in Singapore to virtual laissez-faire in 
Hong Kong, or from deliberate promotion to form very large industrial firms in South 
Korea to the dominance of small, family-run companies in Taiwan. Yet all these 
economies have achieved similarly high growth rates. Secondly, the actual impact on 
industrial structure is not certain and is difficult to assess, despite considerable 
publicity given to industrial policy. Thirdly, there have been some notable failures of 
industrial policy, for example, South Korea's promotion o f  heavy and chemical 
industries from 1973 to 1979.7
On the other hand. Japanese officials argue that there are certain sectors, particularly in 
developing countries, that require special support by the government at least for a
Paul R Krugman and Maurice Obstfcld. International Economics: Theory and Policy 
(Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.269.
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limited period in order to realise a faster and sustainable economic growth. For 
instance, Masaki Shiratori8 argues that a  country’s “competitive advantage should be 
understood in a dynamic context, not a static one as used in the neoclassical approach”, 
and “to select a currently uncompetitive industry that is judged important for an 
economy’s future and accelerate its development using policy instruments” is 
justifiable.9
The economic basis o f the Japanese argument is that government intervention can be 
rationalized where there is a case o f  market failure, including the case o f infant 
industry and economies o f  scale. In particular, most developing countries lack the 
basic conditions that enable market mechanisms to work properly. O f course, 
economists and policymakers in Washington understand that there are certain cases in 
which markets fail to achieve the optimum distribution o f resources. However, they are 
still sceptical o f the efficacy of large government involvement in the economy in 
general, and industrial policy in particular, pointing out the following problems Firstly, 
market failures are hard to identify. Secondly, it is difficult to establish what policies 
w ould be appropriate to address market failures, even if  they are identified. Under the 
circumstances, policy should be non-discriminatory, rather than sector-specific. 
Thirdly, governments can also fail. They can fail to pick possible successful industries. 
Also, there are risks that policies intended to promote development are subject to 
capture by special interests, and this sort o f thing is more likely to happen in 
developing countries. Fourthly, it is difficult to assess the cost and benefit o f 
government interventions.
In addition to economic theoretical grounds for industrial policy, there has been 
significant academic research to support Japan’s assertion about the importance o f the
8 Shiratori is a former high MOF official and Executive Director of the World Bank on behalf 
of the Japanese government.
' Masaki Shiratori. "Afterword lo the Japanese Translation of the World Bank Report the East 
Asian Miracle," in Ohno and Ohno. eds., Japanese Views, p.81.
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state and the role o f industrial policy in the light o f past economic development in 
Japan and other East Asian countries. This academic support has come mainly from 
people labelled as revisionists."’They share the view that Japan and some East Asian 
countries have achieved outstanding economic development in a way traditional 
economics cannot fully explain, and their economic performance is not merely the 
result o f efficient resource allocation that comes from well-functioning market 
mechanisms. Much o f the literature in this school analyses historically and empirically 
the policies implemented in these countries and explains carefully how these policies 
played significant roles in the countries' development.
The pioneering work of the revisionists is Chalmers Johnson’s MIT1 and the Japanese 
Miracle, which “spawned a  veritable cottage industry o f books on the role o f the state 
in the economy, and it framed both popular and scholarly debate In this book. 
Johnson argues that the key to understanding the Japanese economic miracle during 
the postwar period is the organisation and mechanism o f  the capitalist developmental 
state. According to Johnson, there are two different types o f states in the capitalist 
world, namely the regulatory, or market-rational states, such as the US, and the 
developmental, or plan-rational states, like Japan. While the former type o f state 
concerns itself with the forms and procedures o f economic competition, the latter “has 
as its dominant feature precisely the setting o f such substantive social and economic 
goals ” He also argues that in the developmental state “the government will give 
greater precedence to industrial policy, that is, to a concern with the structure of 
domestic industry and with promoting the structure that enhances the nation’s
" According lo Clialincrs Johnson, who is regarded as the founder of this school, those who 
point out that Japan has a political economy different from that of the Anglo-American 
countries in tenns of institutions, the role of the state, and the weight of economic nationalism 
arc said to be part of this school. (Chalmers Johnson. Japan: Who Governs?: the Rise of the 
Developmental Stale (New York: W. W Norton & Company. 1995). p 12.)
Meredith Woo-Cumings. "Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism 
and Development.” in Meredith Woo-Cumings. cd.. The Developmental State (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), p.27.
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international competitiveness.” l: Other characteristics o f the developmental model, 
discussed in the book, are the existence of an elite bureaucracy committed to state 
objectives, a  pilot agency like the MITI. a political system that enables the 
bureaucracy to operate effectively, and state institutional links with the private sector 
that work in a  market-conforming way, such as administrative guidance.
Since this book was published in 1982, and as the remarkable development o f  East 
Asian economies received particular attention, several scholars have taken up this 
issue and have extended it to East Asian countries, advancing Johnson’s arguments.13 
Among the extensive literature on the developmental state, o f particularly importance 
is the book by Robert Wade, Governing the Market.14 which analyses closely Taiwan's 
economic development. In this book. Wade proposed the ‘governed market theory’ to 
explain East Asian15 economic success.16 The theory' contains a three-level explanation. 
First, the high performance o f  East Asian countries w as the outcome o f (1) very high 
levels o f productive investment, making for fast transfer o f newer technology into 
actual production; (2) more investment in certain key industries than would have 
occurred in the absence o f government intervention; and (3) exposure o f  many 
industries to international competition, in foreign markets if  not at home. Second, the 
government guides, or governs, market processes o f  resource allocation so as to 
produce different production and investment outcomes than would have occurred with 
the policies supported by neoclassical economics Third, the government could 
successfully pursue these policies because o f a particular set o f political organisations, *1
12 Johnson, M1T1 and the Japanese Miracle, p. 19.
11 Johnson himself considers the application of the Japanese developmental model to East 
Asian success as follows Although none of the cases is a clone of the Japanese model, the 
Japanese model has been successfully emulated by the four East Asian NICs, South Korea. 
Taiwan. Hong Kong and Singapore, but beyond those countries, the model docs not exist. 
(Chalmers Johnson. "The Developmental State; Odyssey of a Concept," in Woo-Cumings, The 
Developmental State, p 40. Also, see Chalmers Johnson. "Economic crisis in East Asia: the 
clash of capitalisms." Cambridge Journal of Economics 22 (1998), pp 653-661.)
1 ’ Robert Wade. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East 
Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990)
By East Asia. Wade mainly means Japan. South Korea and Taiwan.
’6 Wade, Governing the Market, pp. 26-29.
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namely authoritarian, as opposed to democratic, regimes, and the government’s
corporatism as opposed to pluralist, relations, with capital and labour. 17
(2) The issue o f the sequence and time span of liberalisation
In addition to the different views on the role o f the government and the efficacy of 
industrial policy, another critical aspect o f the divergence o f opinions between Japan 
and the Washington Consensus is the speed and sequence of economic reforms and 
liberalisation in developing and transition economics, namely gradualism versus a big 
bang or a shock therapy approach. This issue arose in the 1990s in particular, when 
transforming the former centrally planned countries into market economics became a 
serious international agenda, but the argument also applies to economic development 
in general. As mentioned above, Japan does not dispute the efficacy o f market 
mechanisms in the circumstances where a  country has an economic system that can 
compete in the world economy. What makes Japan's approach different is the fact that 
it asks whether the same policies that apply to free markets should be implemented 
immediately in all countries irrespective o f their stage o f economic development. This 
leads to a  methodological difference between Japan and the Washington Consensus, 
namely that, in the view o f Japanese officials and academics in the aid policy 
community, there is too much deductive bias in neoclassical economics, in which one 
universal principal is pursued and applied to all countries in the same way.1*
The prevailing view in the international financial institutions, supported by a number 
of neoclassical economists including Jeffrey Sachs, is that domestic and external
1 Wade argues (hat while Korea and Taiwan arc examples of authoritarian corporatism. Japan 
illustrates a type of corporatism with characteristics between democratic and authoritarian, or 
soft authoritarian. (Ibid., p.27.)
'* This docs not mean that the deductive method is entirely dismissed by the Japanese officials 
and academics, of course Rather, some of the Japanese scholars propose the middle way 
between the deductive and inductive approaches For instance. Kcnichi Ohno argues that 
researchers must continuously go back and forth between the neoclassical method and more 
inductive area studies. (Kcnichi Ohno. ''Overview," pp. 19-20.) Also sec an interview with 
Kcnichi Ohno in Kokusai Kailialsu Janaru (1998 I). pp.22-25.
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liberalisation and the introduction o f rational price structures have to be implemented 
as soon as possible so that market mechanisms can begin to work properly and 
countries can become better off, although in the short term there could be some 
confusion in the economics. What is necessary in developing and transition economies 
is merely to comprehensively and promptly remove the impediments to the free 
operation o f markets The reforms in Russia and other former Soviet Union republics 
and Eastern European countries in the 1990s have been implemented based on this big 
bang approach People that follow this approach assume various time spans, but not 
more than five years.19 The big bang approach recommends that the following policies 
are implemented simultaneously: (1) macroeconomic stabilisation through the 
reduction of the financial deficit and the control o f  money supply, which is what the 
IMF usually demands o f  recipient countries as conditionality; (2) microeconomic 
liberalisation including price liberalisation, trade liberalisation, the establishment o f 
currency convertibility, and the creation of new institutions that enable these policies 
to function properly ; (3) the comprehensive privatisation o f state industries.
On the other hand. Japan, backed by numerous Japanese scholars as well as some 
Western scholars, favours the gradualist approach, which stresses that liberalisation 
and economic reforms must be sequenced properly from a longer-term perspective 
than neoclassical economists assume, and should not be carried out all at once. In other 
words, domestic and external liberalisation must be implemented step by step, 
depending on a country’s economic and social situation as well as the ability o f  its 
government, and there is not a universal rule on this process. This approach 
recommends that the government should retain a  certain control o f  the economy until 
the new' institutions that allow market economies to operate are firmly established and 
take root in the economy, thinking that if the government loses all control o f the state
19 Kcniclii Ohno and l/umi Ohno. IMF lo Sekaieinko I IMF and the World Bankl (Tokyo: 
Nihon Hyoronsha, 1993), p. 166.
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sector at an early stage o f transition, the social cost can be too costly and even 
intolerable. As far as trade and foreign exchange are concerned, the gradualist 
approach considers that there is a  great risk that rapid liberalisation w ill cause 
domestic industries to collapse and lead to too much dominance by foreign firms. 
Therefore, external liberalisation should be carried out very cautiously, and the 
government should protect some industries by restricting trade and capital transactions 
for a  certain period, until the domestic industry obtains a certain degree o f 
competitiveness.20
This approach also opposes the immediate privatisation of state industry, arguing that 
hasty privatisation does not necessarily lead to efficient management, and could cause 
high unemployment. For instance, Yoshiaki Nishimura, evaluating Russian 
privatisation in the early 1990s, doubts that rapid privatisation has brought about 
desired results, pointing out various problems, such as huge transfers o f  wealth from 
the poor to the rich, insider control (control by managers and employees of the 
enterprise), which has preserved socialist inefficient management, a concentration of 
state assets by the nomenclatura (a privileged class) and the conduct o f the 
privatisation process amid accusations of rampant corruption and fraud. He claims 
that a basic point has not been properly recognised in Russian privatisation, namely the 
point that "|p|rivatisation is a complicated process because ownership is not just a 
matter o f economic activity but also closely related to people’s consciousness which in 
turn depends on will and ideology.’’21 Ohno comments that Nishimura's negative view 
about Russian privatisation is now widely shared in Japan and abroad ‘
The gradualist stance o f the Japanese government is clearly shown in a research paper 
of OECF on transition published in 1995 entitled "Transition Strategics and Economic
This point has increasingly become recognised after the East Asian crisis.
Yoshiaki Nishimura. "Russian Privatization: Progress Report no. 1,” in Ohno and Ohno. cds., 
Japanese Views p259.
“  Kenichi Ohno. “Overview." p.44.
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Performance: Gradualism Revised.'’ It examines the transition process in Russia, 
Poland, China and Vietnam, and concludes:
Because institutions conducive to  market activities are slow to develop, it is 
vitally important to put institutional aspects at the center o f the analysis. The 
'big-bang ' approach tends to pay too much attention to  the need to shatter the 
old system, and insufficient attention to the dangers o f institutional breakdown 
and self-reinforcing fiscal and macroeconomic collapse.
Greater attention needs to be paid to an 'optim al' order o f reforms, in view o f  
the interrelationship among macroeconomic stability, liberalisation and 
institution building Immediate liberalisation and privatisation tend to result in 
a drastic fall in government revenues and impair price stability, unless an 
alternative public finance system is put in place; without the institution o f a 
new social security system, privatisation would impose heavy social costs.
It appears [from the transition experience to  date] that rapid 'privatisation’ is 
neither necessary or sufficient for successful transition.23
Finally, it may be worth referring to Japan’s view on the promotion o f democratisation 
and human rights in developing countries in connection with aid policy, because it 
shows some difference between Japan and Western countries over the time-span to 
deal with this issue. Since the end o f the Cold War, Western countries, particularly the 
US, have become very eager to promote democracy and human rights. On the other 
hand. Japan has been very cautious about this issue, as the historical legacy of 
colonising neighbouring countries has made it reluctant to force its values on others 24
' The Research Institute of Development Assistance (RIDA). OECF. "Transition Strategies and 
Economic Performance: Gradualism Revised.” OECF Discussion Papers 8 (1995), pp.9-10.
4 Yasuhiro Takeda. ‘Overcoming Japan-US Discord in Democracy Promotion Policies.” 
(Former MOFA high official Hisaliiko Okazaki’s homepage, www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki- 
inst/alliance-pro-eng/takcda.e.htm).
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However, it has begun to show its commitment to  democracy and human rights. 
Japan's ODA Charter, approved by the Cabinet in June 1992 and considered the most 
important basic document concerning the country’s ODA policies, reads: “ [f]ull 
attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of a 
market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing o f basic human 
rights and freedoms in the recipient country.”25
However, Japan is still criticised for its passivity on this issue by Western countries, 
and, in fact, it does not necessarily side with Western countries in giving and 
suspending aid according to human rights criteria. Take the example o f China. 
Although Japan had followed Western nations in sanctioning China after the 
Tiananmen incident in 1989, the Japanese government made every' effort to prevent 
prolonging this situation. In the Group o f Seven industrialised countries (G7) summit 
in July 1990, Japan pressured the other participating countries to soften the sanctions 
against China, and soon Japan resumed aid. In one way, Japan's activist policies can be 
explained as a  consequence of China’s economic significance to Japan and the 
Japanese policymakers' assessment that they did not want to risk bilateral relations. 
However, in addition to this economic consideration, there seems to be another factor 
that did not make Japan necessarily follow Western countries. A MOFA official 
commented that the issue o f démocratisation is important, but the cutting of aid does 
not necessarily advance démocratisation, and thus it is more important to support 
China's open policies rather than isolate it.26
Another example that shows that Japan has not always sided with Western countries on 
the issue of démocratisation is that o f Japanese policy towards Myanmar. Japan first 
suspended aid to Myanmar in September 1988, when the military regime suppressed a
"5 See MOFA homepage, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/ren.html
Cited in Juichi Inada. "Nihon no enjo gaiko (Japan’s aid diplomacy],” in Atsushi Kusano and 
Tctsuva Umemolo. cds. Gendai Nihon Gaiko no Bunseki lanalvsis of contemporary Japanese 
diplomacy 1 (Tokyo. Tokyo University Press, 1995), p. 161.
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démocratisation movement, because o f the strong international criticism against the 
military government. However, in February 1989 it recognised the military' authority' 
and resumed aid for continuing projects as well as humanitarian aid Also, despite that 
regime’s violation of democracy and human rights in the 1990s, Japan tried to soften a 
resolution by the Commission on Human Rights and the Third Committee o f  the UN 
General Assembly.27 In a sense, this disharmony between Japan and Western countries 
is related to its historical relations with its neighbours, which means that Japan cannot 
be seen to be very' harsh in the region. It is interesting to note that Japan joined other 
Asian nations and signed the Bangkok Declaration at the UN-sponsored Asia Regional 
Preparatory' Meeting for the World Conference on Human Rights in March 1993, 
attended by forty Asian countries, including Indonesia, China, Malaysia and Singapore. 
Arase argues that the key points o f the Declaration were that developed countries 
should not tie aid to human rights, and should respect the sovereign right o f states to 
manage human rights w ithin their borders, and Japan signed it after being criticised by 
some Asian governments for being too Western with regard to its stance on human 
rights in ODA policy.28
It also cannot be denied that there were considerations related to Japan’s direct 
economic interests at play, as shown in China’s case. With respect to the resumption o f 
aid to Myanmar, Orr points out that there were pressures from some in the Japanese 
business community through LDP members. He also notes the MOF and the M ITI’s 
concerns over issues falling under their bureaucratic purview. Namely, MOF officials 
wondered whether stopping aid would result in financial chaos, forcing Rangoon to 
default on previous yen loans from Japan, while the MITI was worried about the 
effects on future business in Myanmar. Orr argues that although the MOFA was 
concerned about Japan's international image if it did not follow other donors, these
David Arase. "Japanese Policy Towards Democracy and Human Rights in Asia,” Asian 
Survey 33. 10 (1993). p.946.
28 Ibid., pp.939-940.
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combined effects were simply too much for the ministry to ignore.29
Furthermore and especially relevant to the discussions in this section, this discord can 
also be attributed to the difference o f views between numerous officials and influential 
scholars in Japan and their Western counterparts over how to promote democracy and 
human rights. Inada argues that the thinking o f Japanese officials and scholars can be 
summarised as follows: democracy has universal value, which many countries share; 
however, the way towards a democratic system varies, according to the situation o f 
each country, and démocratisation should not be imposed uniformly and hastily; in 
some developing countries, particularly in East Asia, economic stability comes first, 
and then stability leads to démocratisation. Inada further argues that Japan's approach 
is to encourage indirectly the démocratisation of developing countries, and it is unlike 
the American approach, which imposes directly the values o f democracy onto those 
nations.30 Likewise, Yasuhiro Takeda points out that Japanese officials and intellectuals 
believe that democratic transition in developing countries would be better affected 
through changes in economic and social structures, and that démocratisation can be 
promoted indirectly through economic development.31 Related to this point, people in 
the Japanese aid community consider that an authoritarian regime is not necessarily 
evil, and although not ideal, it can be regarded as a transitional regime for the purpose 
of rapid industrialisation.32
The development of the arguments between Japan and the Washington 
Consensus
The previous section has discussed the divergence o f views on the role o f  states as well 
as the sequence and time span in policy implementation between Japan and the 
Washington Consensus. The discussion now turns to the point o f how Japan has
* Orr. The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, pp.84-86.
Inada, "Nihon no enjo gaiko,” pp. 169-170.
Takeda. "Overcoming Japan-US Discord." p.4 
' '  Kenichi Ohno. "Overview,” pp 32-34.
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articulated its policy stance since the late 1980s.
Neoclassical economics has provided the mainstream approach to the study o f 
economic development since the 1970s, when it became the policy basis o f the World 
Bank and the IMF. The hegemony o f the neoclassical economics was secured against 
the background that state-centred development in the 1950s and 1960s was believed to 
have revealed problems o f government failure and resulted in economic difficulties, 
such as the accumulated debt problem in the 1970s and 1980s in many developing 
countries, with the exception of some East Asian countries, who still enjoyed 
economic success.33 Neoclassical economics gained further momentum during the 
Reagan administration in the US and the Thatcher administration in the United 
Kingdom, both o f  which were ideologically devoted to the neoclassical orthodoxy. In 
the 1980s. the World Bank and the IMF began to demand o f  developing countries 
medium-term microeconomic policy that was more concerned with the countries' 
economic structures, supplementing traditional policy with macroeconomic 
stabilisation This came in the form o f the structural adjustment policy, which typically 
included comprehensive reforms of institutions, liberalisation and privatisation, and 
was attached by the IMF and the World Bank as a conditionality to their loans. 
Ishikawa argues that structural adjustment policy is an attempt to replace rapidly the 
dirigisme that characterises the economic regime o f  most developing countries with a 
market economy.34
Despite the fact that Japan gradually increased the volume o f  ODA throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, having become the largest aid donor in the world in 1989 for the first 
time and having substantially increased its financial contributions to international 
organisations including the World Bank, Japan did not articulate its development 
philosophy and merely contributed funds during this period. This silence o f Japan was
13 Shigeru Ishikawa. “Kozochosei Istructural adjustment!," Aiia Keizai 35, 11 (1994). pp.3-6. 
34 Ibid., p.2.
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due, Yasutomo points out, to the Japanese officials’ lack o f  knowledge about 
development processes.35
However, some MOF officials began to raise questions about the prevailing orthodoxy 
in international organisations, particularly the World Bank, and to express openly their 
disagreement with the orthodoxy, as the Bank's development approach began to clash 
with, or contradict, the Japanese aid policies in the late 1980s. Isamu Kubota36 states 
that the debate on the right development approach between Japan and the World Bank 
was triggered by a  divergence o f opinions concerning Japan's subsidised policy- 
directed loans to developing countries.37 Specifically, the World Bank criticised 
Japan's policy to  give developing countries two-step loans. These are aid loans that are 
extended to a financial institution of a developing country with low interest rates for 
the purpose o f being passed on to specific, or targeted, sectors in the country' at lower 
interest than ongoing commercial interest rates.
This issue surfaced over the ASEAN-Japan Development Fund, 38 which was 
established in 1987 by the Japanese government, w ith the aim o f  extending two-step 
loans to ASEAN countries to promote the development o f the private sector in those 
countries and to help finance joint ventures in East Asia. The plan was not successful 
largely because Japan failed to  provide subsidised loans in the face o f opposition from 
the World Bank and the IMF. The World Bank insisted that credit should be extended 
at market or nonsubsidised rates, for the following reasons: (1) the system that treats 
specific sectors favourably will distort market mechanisms in financial markets; (2) in 
many developing countries, governments lack the institutional capability to distribute
35 Yasulomo, The New Multilateralism, p 75.
36 Kubola is a former high MOF official and engaged in the discussion about development 
philosophy as a managing director in the OECF in the early 1990s.
Isamu Kubota. "Higashi ajia no kiseki |East Asian miracle),” Fainansu (1993.12 / 1994.1)
8 Doner. “Japan in East Asia.” p.226. and Albeit Fishlow and Catherine Gwin, “Overview: 
Lessons from the East Asian Experience." in Robert Wade ct a l . Miracle or Design9: Lessons 
from the East Asian Miracle (Washington. DC: Overseas Development Council. 1994). p.3.
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funds fairly within the countries; and (3) in the case o f  subsidised loans, these 
problems become more serious.39 Shiratori writes that these arguments o f the World 
Bank were hardly acceptable to Japanese officials, for practical reasons, as two-step 
loans were one o f the main vehicles for Japan's ODA loans, as well as in light of 
Japan's postwar experience o f economic development.411 Japan, who basically believes 
that financial policies should be subordinated to a broader industrial strategy, insisted 
that: (1) aid unavoidably distorts market mechanisms in developing countries, and it is 
contradictory that the World Bank only criticises the distortion o f  financial markets; 
and (2) institutional incapability o f governments for distributing funds properly 
supports the necessity for their institutional reforms, but it cannot be a basis for 
denying subsidised loans 41
The MOF, along w ith numerous Japanese academics, also became very sceptical about 
the effectiveness of the World Bank's structural adjustment policies and their universal 
application to developing economies, at the same time that Japan considerably 
increased the portion o f  co-financing with the World Bank in its total ODA in the late 
1980s. Yasutomo notes that as Japanese officials studied the Bank's approach to 
structural adjustment loans as well as the Japanese and East Asian development in the 
past, they found contradictions: Japan and East Asian countries have achieved marked 
economic development in a different way from what the W orld Bank instructed 
developing countries to do, while in Latin American countries, w ho had followed the 
neoclassical orthodoxy, the crisis o f accumulated debt intensified.42 Japan did not 
completely deny the effectiveness o f  structural adjustment loans, but it opposed the 
universal application of the same set o f conditionalities to every country and insisted 
that loan and aid conditionality should take into account each country’s development 
stage and economic condition in a long-term framework. These divergences over two-
Takaslii Shiraislii. "Japan and Southeast Asia." p. 191.
* Shiratori, “Afterword," p.77.
4' Ibid.
'  Yasutomo. The New Multilateralism, p.77
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step loans and structural adjustment loans led to a  serious debate between Japan and 
the World Bank concerning development philosophy in the 1990s.
The Japanese government openly questioned the World Bank's policies for the first 
time in an OECF report released in October 1991 entitled “Issues Related to the World 
Bank's Approach to Structural Adjustment.” 4 The report criticises the Bank’s 
overemphasis on market mechanisms and macroeconomic issues in structural 
adjustment loans, arguing that: (1) structural adjustments are not enough to generate 
sustainable growth, and there should be measures aiming directly at promoting 
investments; (2) trade liberalisation must be implemented cautiously from a long-term 
viewpoint, and it is too optimistic to expect that industries capable o f sustaining the 
economy o f  the next generation will come up automatically through the activities o f 
the private sector, and some measures for fostering industry are required; (3) the 
significance o f lending at subsidised interest rates, specifically two-step loans, to 
financial institutions for developmental projects should not be disregarded; and (4) the 
World Bank tries to apply the same policies to every' country' universally, but the 
various conditions o f  each country should be taken into account.
Since publishing the report, Japan has become increasingly more assertive about its 
development philosophy as well as its view on aid policy. At the annual lMFAVorld 
Bank meeting in the same month, Yasushi Mieno, the then Governor o f the Bank o f 
Japan, made the following statement:
Experience in Asia has shown that although development strategies require a 
healthy respect o f the market mechanism, the role o f government cannot be 
forgotten. I would like to see the World Bank and the IMF take the lead in a 
wide-ranging study that would define the theoretical underpinnings o f this 41
41 OECF, "Issues Related to the World Bank's Approach to Structural Adjustment: Proposal 
from a Major Partner." OECF Occasional Paper 1 (1991).
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approach and clarify the areas in which it can be successfully applied to  other 
parts o f the globe.44
Also, it was observed that there was growing assertiveness about Japan’s development 
approach among Japanese officials at the World Bank, including Japan’s executive 
director and his deputy.45 It is also reported that, in a symposium sponsored by the 
OECF in early 1992, the then Vice President o f the World Bank was strongly 
challenged by several Japanese panellists who stressed the important role o f 
governments in the development o f Japan and East Asian countries.46 An OECF 
official was reported to comment that what fuelled this assertiveness w as the 
increasing frustration with the World Bank economists’ lack o f attention to the role of 
the state.47
On the other hand, since the beginning o f  the 1990s the World Bank has somewhat 
changed its stance and has begun to pay more attention to the role o f the state in 
development. The 1991 World Development Report (WDR) proposed the market- 
friendly approach, which the World Bank itself later described as a middle ground 
between the neoclassical economics and the revisionist views. The report stresses that 
development is associated with the proper role o f government, which is larger than 
merely standing in for markets if  they fail to work well, and markets m ust be 
complemented by government policies such as investing in people, building better 
social and regulatory' systems, and providing stable macroeconomic conditions. The 
report considers that the role o f the government should be wider than neoclassical 
economics would allow, but it holds a negative view about government interventions 
that distort the resource allocation by market mechanisms.
41 Cited in Shiratori. "A fterw ordp.78. Shiralori writes that the MOF offered to finance this 
sort of study, which led to the launch of the study on the East Asian miracle.
45 Far Eastern Economic Review. March 12, 1992, and Shiratori. “Afterword”, p.78.
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Meanwhile, Japan convinced the World Bank to conduct a major study on the role o f 
the state and industrial policy in the past development o f Japan and East Asia.48 
Although Japan appreciated the 1991 WDR in the sense that the World Bank had 
begun to turn its attention to the importance o f  the state in development rather than just 
preaching the value o f markets, it was still dissatisfied with the Bank’s under­
evaluation o f  what the governments had done in Japan and some East Asian countries. 
The study, w hich was mainly sponsored by Japan, was conducted for two years by 
World Bank staff and some outside experts, and the report entitled The East Asian 
Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy49 was published in 1993.
The report basically takes the same middle position, as the 1991 WDR did, between 
neoclassical orthodoxy and the Japanese approach. The study grappled squarely with 
the issue o f  the role o f the state in economic development, stating that governments 
had played an important role in Japan and other East Asian countries. It particularly 
notes that their policies for getting the fundamentals right had contributed to the rapid 
growth, while admitting that some government interventions beyond getting the 
fundamentals right, particularly in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, were effective. It 
says that in these countries “government interventions resulted in higher and more 
equal growth than otherwise would have occurred.”5" However, the report gave a 
negative view about the effectiveness o f industrial policy in general, which had been 
the main point o f  controversy betw een Japan and the World Bank since the early 1990s. 
It argues that, despite the achievement in these countries, 'th e  prerequisites for success 
were so rigorous that policymakers seeking to  follow similar paths in other developing
18 Masaki Shiratori. “Sekai ginko repoto higasshi ajia no kiseki wo do yoinuka |Hou do we 
read the World Bank Report the East Asian Miracle?],” ESP (1994.2). p.70. Johnson notes that 
Japan forced the World Bank to write the study as a condition for further Japanese funding. 
(Johnson. "The Developmental State." p.35.)
4’ The World Bank. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1993).
50 Ibid., p.6.
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economies have often met with failure.”51 The report also stresses that the use o f 
industrial policy to achieve more rapid productivity growth by altering the industrial 
structure was generally not successful even in these three countries, and industrial 
growth "tended to be market-conforming, and productivity change was not 
significantly higher in promoted sectors.”52
Although Japan was not completely satisfied with the arguments o f the report, as it 
never went outside the confines of neoclassical economics, it welcomed the report to a 
certain extent. In fact, Japanese officials were not surprised at the outcome of the 
report, given the dominance o f neoclassical economics in the World Bank’s 
management, staff and organisational culture.53 Kubota argues that the report is not 
perfect from the Japanese viewpoint, but nevertheless he finds substantial changes 
from the previous stance o f the World Bank 4 He also considers that there is not one 
absolute approach to development, and thus Japan should keep pressuring the World 
Bank from the outside to make the bank officials consider policies more flexibly.55 In 
short, it seems that what Japan aimed at through sponsoring the East-Asian-Miracle 
report was not to upset the established orthodoxy completely. It was more modest. 
Japan wanted its development experiences and philosophy to be more widely 
acknowledged and tried to restrain the establishment from relentlessly and narrow­
mindedly pursuing its emphasis on market mechanisms In this sense, Japan’s attempt 
was fairly successful as it could at least put its development approach on the agenda.
The 1997 WDR, "The State in a  Changing World,” goes further than the East Asian 
Miracle, and pays more attention to the role o f  the state. It particularly focuses on the 
governance issue. The report stresses that, without an effective state, development,
51 Ibid., P.6.
52 Ibid., p354.
A comment by a Japanese official cited in Yasutomo. Hie New Multilateralism, p.79.
Kubota. “Higashi ajia."
55 Ibid.
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both economic and social, is impossible. It classifies the functions o f  the state into 
three categories, minimal, intermediate and activist, and suggests matching the state’s 
role to its capability; namely countries with low state capability need to focus first on 
basic functions, the provision o f  pure public goods, and those with strong capability 
can take on more activist functions. According to the report, the activist functions 
involve industrial policy, but it is careful to  say that 'high-intensity government 
support’ such as coordinating investment (by the public and private sector) or picking 
potentially successful industries must be limited to countries with unusually strong 
institutional capability. Instead, the report suggests more flexibility o f ‘light-touch 
initiatives' such as government initiatives to  private-to-private networks. The report is 
significant in that, although it does not recommend implementing active interventionist 
policies, it hints that they cannot be dismissed completely. The comments o f James 
Wolfenson, President o f the W orld Bank, following the publication o f the report, arc 
noteworthy: he states that people learned that many states were not able to implement 
what they promised, and thus they began to  believe in the minimalist state. However, 
such a state is not harmful, but neither is it effective.56
This change in the attitude o f  the World Bank can be attributed to various factors. It is 
widely recognised that the change in attitude, particularly the 1997 W DR, is associated 
w ith Joseph Stiglitz’s taking on  the post o f  Chief Economist o f the World Bank from 
February 1997 to December 1999. He is a  leading academic on the economics o f the 
Public Sector and has written extensively on the role o f  the government. He is also a 
leading critic o f the W ashington Consensus, and exposed the limitations of 
neoclassical economics. A lso, Ohno comments that it is not clear how much Japan's 
voice has contributed to such a  change, but perhaps it has had some impact, in addition 
to other factors such as W olfenson’s personal initiative, the voice o f non-governmental 
organisations (NGO), and the difficult economic situation in transition countries after
6 See World Bank Tokyo Office homepage, www.worldbank.or.jp/llprcss/updatc/P71 html.
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implementing neoclassical reforms ' 7
These changes in the stance o f the World Bank indicate that in the 1990s the World 
Bank increasingly began to adopt a  philosophy different from the line o f the IMF, 
which remained confined to neoclassical orthodoxy, although their disagreements and 
confrontations are not necessarily a new issue.'1’ It could also be argued that in a sense 
the World Bank's position moved closer to that o f  the Japanese, and became positioned 
somewhere between the IMF and Japan. Furthermore, as argued above, given the 
mood swing from the Washington Consensus to the Post-Washington Consensus after 
the East Asian financial crisis, the difference between Japan and Washington has 
somewhat narrowed.
However, there still seems to be a gap between their views, and it is not certain 
whether the gap will narrow or widen in either the long or short term. It is arguable to 
what extent Stiglitz's thinking has been accepted within the World Bank, particularly 
after he left the institution. Izumi Ohno is quite sceptical about this point. In her book, 
she takes for discussion a World Bank report entitled East Asia: The Road to Recovery, 
published in September 1998. and argues that overall the report shows a change of 
course away from the Stiglitz line in the World Bank: the policy proposals o f the report 
for the East Asian economy are inspired by the Anglo-American approach.'9 She also 
stresses that, although under Wolfensohn, the World Bank has pursued a  new approach, 
in which non-economic factors are incorporated into its policy considerations in 
addition to economic factors, the latter having been the only consideration of 
neoclassical orthodoxy, the approach is still based on Western thought: namely, the 
new line o f the World Bank is not in defiance of the Washington Consensus, but it
 ^ Interview, April 3. 2001.
See. for instance. Ryoichi Mohri. Gurobali/.cshon to IMF/Sckai Ginko I globalisation and the 
IMF/ the World Bank (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten. 2001). pp 56-61.
l/.uini Ohno. Sekai Ginko: Kaihatsu Enio Scnrvaku no Hcnkaku Ithe World Bank: the change 
of its development assistance strategy I (Tokyo, NTT Shuppan, 2000), p. 199-203.
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extends the arguments o f  the Washington Consensus to other aspects like non­
economic factors, while keeping its basic philosophy.“  Likewise, Jayasuriya and 
Rosser argue that
It would be an error to see policy frameworks emerging from the new 
consensus as a departure form  the earlier emphasis on open markets, 
deregulation and less government. Rather, the new consensus should be 
understood as a  political counterpart to the earlier economic emphasis on 
structural reform. Indeed, it m ay be useful to think o f  these new policy 
frameworks as attempts to institutionally ‘bed down’ the structural reforms 
championed by multilateral policy in the last two decades.61
Furthermore, methodologically the Post-Washington Consensus has not left behind the 
Washington consensus. Kcnichi Ohno points out that W ashington's belief that there is 
one best practice for development to  be adopted for every country has not changed 
throughout the 1990s. and Washington still tries to apply the same policies to every 
country uniformly by using a checklist or a matrix.62 Higgott also notes that the Post- 
Washington Consensus is no less universalizing, and attempts to be no less 
homogenizing, than the Washington Consensus, and its prescriptions still demonstrate 
’one-size-fits-all' formula."'
Finally, it is worth referring to the silence of other figures such as M1TI and MOFA 
officials. Despite the fact that the M1TI was without doubt a  central institution in the 
past Japanese industrial policy,64 and the fact that the MITI and the MOFA as well as 
the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) have been involved in aid policymaking
6,1 Ibid , pp.212-215.
’ Jayasuriya and Rosser. "Economic Orthodoxy." p. 15.
" Interview. April 3, 2001.
’ Higgolt. "Contested Globalization," p. 146.
Ryutaro Komiya. "Introduction." in Ryutaro Komiya. Masaltiro Okuno. and Kotaro 
Suzumunt eds.. Industrial Policy of Japan (San Diego: Academic Press Japan. 1988). and 
Johnson. MITI and the Japanese Miracle.
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processes,65 they have not actually joined the MOF’s assertive policies towards the 
Washington Consensus concerning development and transition. This is partly because 
the relations with the IMF and the World Bank are within the jurisdiction o f the MOF. 
Other ministries conducted some research about these subjects within their 
organisations, but they did not have any means to show their views to these 
international organisations.66 This is also to do with the general nature of the MITI as 
an economic ministry, whose prime interest is the direct economic benefit o f Japan, 
and that o f the MOFA, whose priority is to maintain cordial relations with the US. As 
Orr argues, the MITI tends to determine the extent to which aid will help or hinder 
Japan's overseas market and domestic industry,67 and it docs not get ideologically 
involved. Also, Green notes that the MITI and the MOFA were not included in the 
MOF’s ideological campaign, as they were worried about the impact o f MOF officials’ 
aggressiveness on bilateral trade and security relations respectively.68 In addition, 
Ohno comments that few MOFA officials have expertise in international finance and 
economic development, and thus do not seek to engage with the international financial 
organisations.69 As far as the EAP is concerned, it has convened several workshops and 
conferences, attended by prominent Japanese scholars. However, the agency does not 
have enough influence to  make its views known even within Japan, and its reports, 
some of which were written in English, did not have any impact, cither in Japan or 
abroad.7" In addition to these factors, Ohno points out that personal initiatives were 
also important In the early 1990s, there were powerful advocates o f the Japanese 
approach, such as Masaki Shiratori and Isamu Kubota in the MOF, and Yasutami 
Shimomura71 concerning OECF reports, but there were no similar voices in other
65
66 
67 
66
69
70
71
Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, pp. 31-51. 
Interview with Kenichi Ohno. April 3, 2001.
Orr. The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power, pp.36-39.
Green. Japan's Reluctant Realism, p.238 
Interview with Kcnichi Ohno, April 3. 2001.
Ibid.
Shimomura is the then Director of the OECF's Economic Department
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institutions.72 These factors explain the silence o f  others except the MOF and the 
OECF. although they have basically shared the same view  with the MOF and the 
OECF and have conducted some internal research on development.
The divergence of opinion on the causes of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997
It has been argued so far that, although it shares with the Washington Consensus 
institutions the goal o f  promoting economic development, Japan has quite different 
opinions about how economic development and systemic transition can be achieved, 
and has consistently articulated its views openly since the early 1990s. It could also be 
argued that, although MOF officials were the main actors in the debates with 
Washington, these view s are, on the whole, shared am ong Japanese intellectual and 
policymaking circles.
This led to a divergence of opinions between Japan and Washington, particularly the 
IMF and US Treasury,7' about the causes o f  the East A sian financial crisis and the 
necessary measures for easing the crisis, when the incident took place and spread 
beyond East Asia in 1997 and 1998. The following discussion relates their respective 
views on the crisis to  their ideological differences presented above by drawing a broad 
picture o f their stances on the crisis.74
The IMF and the US basically regarded the crisis as originating in structural problems 
in the affected countries, stressing the problems of the financial sectors and the 
inappropriate relationships between the public and private sectors. The IMF explains, 
in its published document concerning 'The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis', issued
" Interview with Kenichi Oluio, April 3, 2001.
1 The World Bank took a quite different stance on the crisis from the IMF See East Asia: Road 
to Recovery. In particular, Stiglitz aggressively criticised IMF policies.
For a more comprehensive comparison between Japan and Washington concerning views on 
Ihc crisis, sec. for instance. Kcnji Aramaki. Aiia Tsukakiki to IMF Ithe East Asian currency 
crisis and the IMFI (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha. 1999).
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in January 1999,75 its view on the causes o f the crisis as follows. The primary reason 
for the crisis is not macroeconomic imbalances, but weaknesses in financial systems 
and, to a lesser extent, governance:
A combination o f inadequate financial sector supervision, poor assessment and 
management o f financial risk, and the maintenance o f  relatively fixed 
exchange rates led banks and corporations to borrow large amounts of 
international capital, much o f  it short-term, denominated in foreign currency, 
and unhedged. As time went on, this inflow o f foreign capital tended to be 
used to finance poorcr-quality investments.
Although private sector expenditure and financing decisions led to the crisis, it 
was made worse by governance issues, notably government involvement in 
the private sector and lack o f transparency in corporate and fiscal accounting 
and the provision o f  financial and economic data
Therefore, the core o f the policies adopted by the IMF was, together with austerity 
macroeconomic policies, the 'forceful, far-reaching structural reforms', which involve 
the comprehensive reform o f  financial systems and measures to address the 
governance issues, namely "the measures designed to improve the efficacy o f markets, 
break the close links between business and governments, and ensure that the 
integration o f the national economy with international financial markets is properly 
segmented.” The US government in essence shared these views.76
On the other hand, the Japanese officials regarded the crisis as a liquidity problem, or a
' See IMF homepage, www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts.asia.htm These views of the IMF 
were slightly revised in the updated report issued in June 2000. (www.imf.org/cxtemal/ 
np/cxr/ib/2000/062300.htm) The new version argues that the crisis was caused partly by 
macroeconomic imbalances, and docs not emphasise the governance problem in afTecled 
countries as a source of the crisis: it simply mentions that implicit government guarantees 
remained pervasive in an environment of large private capital inflow and rapid domestic credit 
expansion.
See Aratnaki, Aiia Tsukakiki to IMF, pp.84-86.
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sort o f panic, which could be ascribed to som e faults inherent in the global financial 
markets. They accepted that there were some problems in the affected countries 
particularly in the financial sectors, and also  that their real economies were declining 
somewhat, partly due to the pegging of the ir currencies to the dollar, and partly to the 
rise o f  China's economic competitiveness. However, they thought that it was totally 
wrong to blame only the economic system s o f  the affected countries for causing the 
crisis, arguing that these countries had achieved remarkable development, praised as 
the East Asian miracle, under the same systems. Instead, the Japanese officials insisted 
that what has to be considered is the present state o f the governance o f international 
financial markets. A speech by Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi M iyazawa in 
December 1998 reflects well these arguments:
The Asian crisis revealed the weakness o f the financial sectors and the lack of 
proper financial sector supervision in these countries... Still the sense o f  crisis 
did not seem to be shared evenly throughout the world: 1 suppose that this was 
because some observers attributed the Asian crises to specific deficiencies in 
the economic management o f the Asian countries, including seemingly opaque 
and improper relationships between governments and businesses.
However, when turmoil also took place in Russia and Brazil this year, it 
became very clear that crises such as those experienced in Asia are  more 
general phenomena. One cannot help but realise that these successive crises 
stemmed not only from specific problems in particular economies, but also 
from general problems inherent in today’s global economic system.77
The Subcommittee on Asian Financial and Capital Markets under Gaitame Shingikai 
(Committee on Foreign Exchange and O ther Transactions), established in the MOF,
Speech at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan. December 15. 1998. (MOF homepage, 
www. mof. go.jp/english/if7e 1 e057. htm)
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also discussed the issue. According to its report, although there were some problems 
such as macroeconomic imbalances particularly in Thailand, the spread o f  the Thai 
crisis to the neighbouring countries was due to  the contagion effect, which was 
generated by a  radical shift in market perceptions. In the case o f South Korea, various 
economic problems had surfaced well in advance to the crisis, which led to the 
situation that foreign creditors who had become increasingly sensitive to  their 
investments due to the crises in South East Asia rapidly withdrew their funds.78 Also, 
the then Japanese Vice Finance Minister Eisukc Sakakibara argues that the crisis was 
caused not by the structures peculiar to East Asia, but by ‘global capitalism’, and that 
could happen anywhere in the world.79
It must be noticed that with the spread o f the crisis to Russia and Latin America, 
attributing the crisis only to the domestic problems o f  the affected countries in East 
Asia has decreased, and the systemic defects o f  global financial markets have become 
more widely recognised This has led to a mood sw ing' towards the Post-Washington 
Consensus. It is important to note that G7 Finance Ministers discussed the issue o f the 
international financial architecture and agreed on the necessity to reform and 
strengthen it. Haruhiko Kuroda, Vice Minister o f  the Japanese MOF, argues that the 
meeting was significant particularly in the following aspects: (1) the Ministers agreed 
that capital account liberalisation in developing countries should be carried out in a 
careful and well-sequenced manner, accompanied by measures to support a  sound and 
well-regulated financial sector and by a consistent macroeconomic policy framework; 
(2) they recognised the importance o f improving transparency by all market 
participants, including the disclosure o f the exposure to hedge funds; (3) they agreed 
that the international financial community needs to set out a  framework for involving 
8 See MOF homepage, www.mof go.jp/cnglish/tosin/ela703.hlm
‘ Eisukc Skakibara. Kokusai Kinvu no Gcnba I The scene of international financel (Tokyo: 
PHP Shinsho. 1998). and Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai Also, sec the literature of other senior 
MOF officials. For instance. Flaruhiko Kuroda. "Atarashii kokusai kinyu shisutemu no kocliiku 
ni inukclc |towards the building of a new international financial system]." Yomiuri Shinbun. 
November 18, 1999.
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the private sector in the resolution o f crises, stating that private creditors should not 
believe that their credits are protected by the IMF, and that in some cases it is likely 
that net debt payments to the private sector are reduced. Kuroda stresses that it is 
particularly surprising that the champions of the market economy, the US and the 
United Kingdom, agreed on these points, which are com pletely different from G 7’s 
traditional stance.8"
Returning to the divergence o f  opinions between Japan and the Washington Consensus 
concerning the causes of the crisis, this difference is to a large extent a  reflection of 
their arguments on development and transition that was discussed in the early part of 
this chapter. It is no wonder that the IMF and the US held the views on the crisis 
outlined above. As the efficacy o f markets mechanisms is their basic assumption, it 
seems to them that what was wrong could not have had anything to do with the global 
financial markets, but something that had hindered the markets from working 
effectively in the affected countries. Therefore, such hindrances to the operation of 
market mechanisms, specifically statism. 'crony capitalism ' and mercantilism, had to 
be blamed and hence the call to have them removed from th e  economies immediately. 
To Washington, the crisis looked as though it was justifying its philosophy, marking 
the triumph o f its philosophy over other capitalist models after having defeated the 
Soviet style planned economy, and was a window o f  opportunity to dismantle what it 
saw as obstacles to spreading the free market systems to the East Asian economies. 
Furthermore, some scholars point out that their ideological interest for such a policy 
was reinforced by economic considerations: namely, the crisis was not only significant 
ideologically, but was a great opportunity to promote th e  US national interest by 
removing the barriers to US businesses expanding in the E ast Asian markets.81
8" Kuroda. "Atarashii kokusai kinyu shisutemu.”
8 Sec Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso. "Asian Financial Crisis: the Undergoing Risk of the 
IMF's Asia Package,” Working Paper 128 (February 10, 1998). Russell Sage Foundation, and
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On the other hand. W ashington's views on the causes o f  the crisis and its subsequent 
policies, which completely deny what Japanese officials and intellectuals had 
considered to  be important for developing and transition economies, were totally 
unacceptable to Japan.83 It is true that the East Asian economies are not a copy o f the 
Japanese economic system or its developmental model, and on the contrary their 
economic and social systems are  quite diverse.83 However, the Japanese officials argue 
that these countries have achieved remarkable economic development by following 
some o f  the core elements o f  the Japanese experience in the past. In most o f the 
countries, the governments played an important and leading role in economic 
development, which was much larger than neoclassical economics recommends as the 
appropriate role o f government, and selectively promoted specific sectors. To Japanese 
officials and academics, these are the essential parts o f the success o f East Asian 
development, and what the IM F was doing was trying to convert their economic 
systems to the American framework based on market mechanisms. Higgott puts it as 
follows: “what has been challenged in the crisis o f the East Asian NIES in the late 
twentieth century is the very' model on which they have built their success. It should be 
seen not only as an economic crisis, but as an "ideas battle" or an ideological battle ,”84
To Japan the crisis was, in a  sense, caused by Washington’s over-emphasis on market 
mechanisms, namely the policies to encourage developing countries to liberalise their 
financial and capital markets. This argument o f Japan may have the benefit o f 
hindsight. Japanese officials and academics did not articulate their opinions on this 
issue before the crisis, largely because they failed to give much thought to the issue of
Jagdish Bhagwati. "The Capital Myth: the Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars.” 
Foreign Affairs 77-3 (1998). pp. 7-12.
Japan’s criticism of the IMF policies was backed by some prominent Western scholars, such 
as Jeffrey Sachs and Martin Feldstein
Linda Weiss. "Developmental states in transition: adapting, dismantling, innovating, not 
normalizing." The Pacific Review 13-1 (2000). pp.21-55.
' Richard Higgott. "The International Relations of the Asian Economic Crisis: a Study in the 
Politics of Resentment," paper presented at die Third Pan European International Relations 
Conference and Joint Meeting with the International Studies Association. Vienna. September 
16-19, 1998. p.10.
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financial liberalisation. However, the crisis crystallised their views on this issue, and 
now they strongly advocate that the liberalisation o f  financial and capital markets in 
developing countries must be dealt with very cautiously, as sometimes it could be 
harmful for their economic stability. For instance, Ohno argues that financial 
liberalisation should not be demanded uniformly from developed and developing 
countries, and it should be considered according to their level o f development.85 In fact, 
Japan apparently supported Malaysia’s capital controls in the midst o f the crisis. 
Despite the IM F's reluctance, Japan included Malaysia in the list o f countries to  be 
supported under the New Miyazawa Initiative, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
With respect to the IM F's policies. Japanese officials and academics regarded them as 
an attempt to impose market mechanisms hastily and rigidly and with little 
consideration o f  each country's situation, and to dismantle what had been vital for the 
development o f  East Asian countries. In particular, as discussed in the next chapter, 
Japan's discontent grew as the IM F’s policies became more far-reaching and 
comprehensive with the spread o f the crisis, and went far beyond a sensible line as far 
as the Japanese were concerned. Japan’s stance on this point is as follows: East Asian 
countries have to address the problems that they are facing, which were revealed by 
the occurrence o f the crisis, and also they have to deal with the liberalisation o f  their 
economic systems in the long term, including trade and financial liberalisation 
However, this must be done step by step, according to the economic situation and the 
level o f development, and in certain areas, government involvement is still justified in 
these countries. At the very least, it is not a matter to be addressed in the midst o f  the 
crisis.
85 Kenichi Olino. "Ajia kiki no kci/aigaku [Economics of the East Asian Crisis|." Shukan 
Daiamondo April 25, 1998, pp.60-61.
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Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the ideological disparity between Japan and Washington, 
which has led to  their different views on the East Asian crisis. Although they start from 
common policy goals that developing and transition countries should pursue, namely 
introducing market economy and democracy, Japan has a quite different view about 
the way to achieve these goals, particularly in terms o f the role o f  the government and 
the policy time span. Considering Japan's past stance o f trying not to disturb its US 
relations or o f  compromising with US policy, M OF officials’ quite assertive attitude 
against Washington itself deserves special attention. In addition, the discussions in this 
chapter will help to understand Japan’s policies towards the crisis and East Asian 
regionalism in the following chapters. This chapter suggests that there is a deep-rooted 
background against which Japan and Washington have taken a different policy stance 
on the crisis and Japan advocated its policies assertively during the crisis. Also, 
Chapters 4 and 5 will show that MOF officials' interest in financial regionalism has 
been closely related to these ideological debates throughout the 1990s.
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CHAPTER 4
Japanese Policies Towards the East Asian Financial Crisis
Follow ing the discussion in the previous chapter about the causes of the East Asian 
financial crisis, this chapter offers a detailed narrative and analysis o f  Japan’s policies 
towards the crisis as well as the background against which these policies came out and 
were implemented. It looks at how and why Japan has become interested in regional 
financial cooperation in general, and the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in particular, 
while considering the significance o f  the New' Miyazawa Initiative in analysing the 
recent Japanese foreign policy. It is also discussed how and why Japan became 
positively involved in this incident together with the IMF This subject has not been 
sufficiently studied so far from the perspective of political economy, and in addressing 
this limitation in the exiting literature, this chapter makes a significant empirical 
contribution to knowledge. At the same time, the findings presented here will advance 
the central argument o f the thesis about Japan's increasing willingness to take the 
initiative in the region. Also, the relevance o f this evidence about Japan's interest in 
regional financial cooperation will be explored further in the discussions about East 
Asian regionalism in the next chapter Additionally, by noticing some elements o f  the 
style in which these policies were pursued, this and the next chapter prepare the 
ground for a comprehensive analysis o f the style o f Japanese foreign policy in Chapter 
6 The Thai crisis, which eventually triggered the region-wide, or global, crisis, 
provides the starting point o f this chapter
I he T hai Crisis
In Thailand, share prices and real estate prices fell significantly in 1996, and 
eventually the problems o f its economy came to be revealed on May 13, 1997, when 
an unprecedented level o f market attack against the Thai baht took place The Thai 
government tried to defend the currency by intervening in the market alone or
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coordinated with Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong, and by imposing a ban on 
taking the baht out o f the country. However, it finally announced, following IMF 
advice, that it would let the baht float on July 2, judging that it was impossible to keep 
the baht pegged to  the US dollar any more. Nevertheless, in response to  the 
announcement, the speculative attacks o f the market increased and the value o f  the 
baht against the dollar dropped fu rther1, which caused the crisis to expand to 
neighbouring countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. In the end, the 
Thai government called in the IMF on July 28.
Prior to the decision to resort to IMF assistance, the Thai government asked Japan to 
provide bilateral assistance to help weather the situation, but the Japanese government 
did not accept the request. Japan's stance at this stage was to coordinate with the IMF, 
although, as the crisis spread, it came to take a critical position against IMF policies. It 
was not that Japan was indifferent to the plight o f the Thai economy, and in fact the 
MOF dispatched its senior officials on a mission to Thailand in order to obtain 
accurate information about the Thai economy at an early stage in mid-May, and a 
second mission in mid-July, while the Thai Finance M inister met his Japanese 
counterpart in Tokyo later in July.2 However, Eisuke Sakakibara, who was a central 
figure in dealing w ith the East Asian financial crisis as the Vice Minister o f the MOF, 
argues that, although it might have been possible for Japan to put up most o f the 
necessary funds to stabilise the currency and to ask other East Asian countries to 
contribute a small share, it considered this option too risky, as the Thai government did 
not disclose any essential information about its economy, such as the exact amount of 
its foreign reserves and the extent o f the government intervention in the m arket.1 
Another finance official commented that Japan had to coordinate with the IMF, 
because Japan did not have unlimited funds for intervention, and also because only the
1 ll lost 20 percent of its value on the day of the announcement 
' Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai. pp 167-177.
’ Ibid. p. 177.
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international organisations were in a position to advise other countries about their 
policies.4 Under the circumstances, Japan suggested that the Thai government request 
IMF assistance, while Japan itself began to contact the IMF to discuss closely the Thai
issues.
Japan's persistence in believing that the IMF should play an important role at this early 
stage of the crisis should be noted. As argued in the previous chapter, while there has 
been a great deal o f disagreement about economic management between the 
Washington Consensus institutions and Japan, few Japanese officials and academics 
failed to dispute before the crisis the tenet o f the Washington Consensus w ith respect 
to the governance o f international finance, namely the tenet that the liberalisation o f 
financial and capital markets will lead to economic benefits even for developing 
countries. Many East Asian countries followed this position, having rapidly liberalised 
their financial markets and having positively taken foreign capital into their economies 
since the early 1990s. Thailand, for instance, established an offshore market called 
Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF) in 1993, through which it tried to 
obtain short-term capital for economic development. These policies o f the East Asian 
countries were supported not only by the IMF and the World Bank, but also by the G7 
countries, including Japan, at that time, although later they admitted that the eventual 
reckless inflow o f foreign capital was one o f the factors that caused the crisis, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. This support for liberalisation in East Asia on the part o f the 
West and Japan was, to a degree, a  response to pressure from their own financial 
institutions, who had been keen on lending to East Asian firms since the early 1990s, 
and who lobbied their governments to encourage East Asian governments on the path 
towards radical financial deregulation. Furthermore, when the idea o f floating the baht, 
which became the trigger o f the crisis, was suggested by the IMF, Japan did not oppose 
it In short, despite the apparent difference between Japan's stance and that o f the IMF
Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). March 28. 2001.
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with regard to economic development, Japan failed to contest the Washington 
Consensus in the field o f  finance at this time.
In spite o f refusing to grant Thailand’s request for bilateral assistance, Japan played an 
important role in organising the Thai rescue package under the IMF scheme. Although 
an agreement was promptly reached between the IMF and Thailand, it soon became 
clear that the estimated US$14 billion necessary fund far exceeded the available 
resources from the IMF and other international organisations. 5 Under the 
circumstances, Japan, who, after consulting with the IMF, convened a meeting for 
rescuing Thailand in Tokyo on August 11, w ent to  great lengths to make the meeting 
successful MOF senior officials flew to East Asian countries to tty to persuade them 
to contribute to the package by stressing the importance o f  cooperation by regional 
countries and emphasising that Japan would contribute US$4 billion, which was equal 
to the IMF contribution.0 Eventually, the meeting was a greater success than expected, 
and a total o f  US$ 17 billion was committed to  the package In addition to US$4 billion 
each from Japan and the IMF and 1.5 billion and 1.2 billion from the World Bank and 
the ADB respectively. East Asian countries and Australia offered a total o f US$6.5 
billion, while the US failed to make a contribution.7 although the US instead pressed 
for an increase in Thailand's access to the IM F's regular loan facilities from 300 
percent o f its quota to 500 percent. Sakakibara writes that the hall o f the conference 
was filled with unusual enthusiasm that could be described as "Asian solidarity",K and 
Japan's positive attitude continued after the Thai meeting.
IMF Assistance to Tliailand was US$4 billion at most then.
Shigcki Kimura. "Ajia tsukakiki- kokusaikyoku kara mita kono ichinen |lhc East Asian 
financial crisis- a year as seen by the International Bureau]." Fainansu 34:7 (1998). and 
Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai. pp. 179-180. Also, interview with a MOF official (International 
Bureau), March 28, 2001.
After the Mexican crisis in 1994. Congress put restrictions on US emergency funding to the 
Exchange Stability Fund (ESF). That restriction was close to expiring when the Thai crisis 
occurred, and the Treasury hesitated to ask Congress for an exemption for Thailand in order to 
avoid further restrictions on the ESF. (Green. Japan's Reluctant Realism, p 245)
" Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai. p. 180.
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The AMF proposal -  the origin and initial discussions
Given impetus by  the great success o f  concluding the Thai rescue package, which 
demonstrated an inclination towards collaboration among East Asian countries with 
the US refusing to  participate in it, the idea o f  establishing the AMF, which would be a 
permanent fund contributed to by regional countries to prevent a future crisis from 
occurring, was pu t forward and discussed intensively among Japan, other East Asian 
countries, the US and the IMF during the rest o f the year.
There is no consistent view about who, Japan or ASEAN, originally initiated the idea 
and how it was discussed among the countries concerned. However, by putting all 
available information together, it is reasonable to suggest that a similar, but not 
identical, idea w as examined among the ASEAN countries and also separately within 
Japan before it became public in mid September. On August 19, the Thai Foreign 
Minister was reported as saying that he would propose the establishment o f an ASEAN 
monetary fund (as was tentatively named then) by the ASEAN countries to support 
their currencies against foreign speculations.9 Later, the Philippine Foreign Minister 
revealed that the ASEAN countries had been considering the idea and that it would be 
discussed in September during the meeting o f ASEAN Foreign Ministers. " The 
ASEAN countries agreed in principle to have such a preventive organisation of their 
own at that tim e, but wondered about the feasibility o f financing an adequate fund by 
themselves and the discussions were at a standstill " It was under these circumstances 
that Japan told them that it was thinking about a region-wide financial organisation in 
East Asia, and was ready to be the largest contributor to the organisation.12
Sankei Shinhnn 19 August 1997. and Nihon Kci/ai Shinbun. 19 August 1997.
Sankei Shinhnn 31 August 1997.
Interview with a MOF official. May 12 (International Bureau). 2000.
Interview with a MOF official. May 12 (International Bureau). 2000. Also. Anthony Rowley 
notes that, according to some observers in Hong Kong. Tokyo was "acting under the guise of 
supporting the so-called ASEAN initiative, which, after all, owed much of its genesis to 
Japanese thinking and bchind-thc-sccncs persuasion." (Anthony Rowley. "Asian Fund Special:
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The MOF started to work on establishing the AMF immediately after the conference 
on August 11. Sakakibara writes in detail about how Japan proceeded with 
negotiations with the countries concerned. 13 Before drafting Japan's proposal, 
Sakakibara first sounded out the Governor and the Vice Governor o f the Flong Kong 
Monetary' Authority on August 24 as well as the Finance M inister o f Singapore on 
August 30. Then the MOF worked on the Japanese plan, which was proposed 
unofficially to Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia. Indonesia, and Korea by Sakakibara 
himself on September 10, while other senior officials in the International Finance 
Bureau of the MOF visited China and Australia to explain the proposal on the same 
day. On September 12, the Japanese Finance Minister sent out the Japanese proposal to 
the nine countries o f  Australia. China. Hong Kong. Indonesia, Korea. Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, which were expected to be members o f  the AMF 
according to the Japanese plan. Then Japan requested these countries to hold a session 
to discuss the proposal during the IMFAVorld Bank meeting scheduled on September 
23 and 24 in Hong Kong.
The original Japanese plan was to establish a fund o f  US$100 billion, out o f 
contributions by member countries. It was reported later that Japan intended to 
contribute US$50 billion.14 The proposal contained several controversial issues, which 
provoked the strong opposition of the US and the IMF, as discussed below.
The first contentious point o f the proposal was the issue o f membership According to 
the Japanese plan, membership was limited to the countries that Japan had sent its 
proposal to. and the US was not included. Japanese officials insist that Japan did not 
try to exclude the US from East Asia, but that they assumed there was no chance that
the Battle of Hong Kong," Capital Trends 2:13 (1997), w w w .gwjapan.com/ftp/pub/nrca/ 
ctv2nl3b.html.)
' Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai. pp. 182-185. The rest of the paragraph draws on Sakakibara’s 
memoirs.
' Sankci Slnnhim 9 October 1997.
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the US would contribute to such a regional fund, given the US reluctance to participate 
in the Thai package.15 Also, Sakakibara states that if  the US were included in a 
regional framework, it would not be really regional, and no different from the IMF, as 
it would be expected that the US w ould interfere in what Japan and other East Asian 
countries would like to do.16 Apparently, his comment indicates that Japan (or at least 
Sakakibara) wanted a regional organisation free from US intrusion. The US 
unsurprisingly became very anxious about Japan's intentions.
Secondly, the AMF proposal was no t clear about what the relationship between the
AMF and the IMF would be, and there was a question about what sort o f conditionality,
if an\, the money provided by the A M F would carry with it. Japan's stance on these
issues was not necessarily consistent throughout the negotiation process that lasted
until mid November. Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, the then Japanese Finance Minister, was
reported on several occasions as insisting that the AMF would be a supplementary
organisation to the IMF Horvever, Anthony Rowley writes that, despite the MOF's
insistence that the neyv regional facility  should be contingent upon IMF approval and
the money’ it provides should be additional to IMF resources, sources close to Tokyo’s
official thinking suggested that the new facility could offer funds in cases yvhere no
policy conditionality is required or in cases where the IMF might be slow in coming
up yvith the money.17 Sakakibara also notes that he and other officials originally
considered the possibility that the AM F yvould attach less stringent conditions to its
assistance than the IMF and retain some independence from the IMF.18 A finance
officer said that, although there yeas not necessarily consensus about this matter, some
were of the opinion that the AMF should be independent o f  the IMF. But, he continued,
later the MOF came to stress the AMF's consistency yvith IMF conditionality in
response to the fierce criticism of the US and the IMF claiming that the AMF yvould be
15 Interview with MOF officials (International Bureau). May 12. 2000 and March 28. 2001.
18 Interview with Eisuke Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18. 2001.
A n t h o n y  R o w l e y .  " A s i a n  F u n d  s p e c i a l . ' ’
18 Sakakibara, Nihon to Sekai. p 184.
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The US and the IMF began to attack the AMF. after Japan sent its AMF proposal to the 
intended member countries. On September 17, the then US Treasury Secretary Robert 
Rubin alerted the Japanese Finance Minister by telephone that the US was definitely 
against the AMF, while the US government sent letters to the Finance Ministers o f the 
member nations o f APEC, which were signed by Rubin and the US Federal Reserve 
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan. The letter stated that the US was ready to consider 
regional concerted actions to manage economic crises instead o f the AMF and that the 
IMF had to be at the centre o f any such attempt.20 Meanwhile, Japan tried to counter 
this move o f the US.
The climax o f the battle over the AMF, according to Sakakibara. came on September 
18-21, 1997. when the finance ministers and senior officials o f the countries 
concerned came together to attend a series o f  meetings.21 The Japanese proposal 
concerning the AMF was discussed among the ASEAN finance ministers on 
September 18 in Bangkok, preceding the finance ministers' meeting o f the Asia- 
Europe Meeting (ASEM) countries scheduled on the next day, and the proposal was 
supported there. Then, the venue was changed from Bangkok to Hong Kong. The 
AMF was one o f  the items on the agenda o f the G7 meeting on September 20, when 
some European countries expressed reservations about it. On September 21, prior to 
the annual IMFAVorld Bank general assembly on September 23, the ten proposed 
member countries plus the US and the IMF held a Deputy-level meeting to discuss the 
proposal As expected, ASEAN countries and Korea were in favour o f the proposal, 
while the US strongly opposed it. China. Hong Kong and Australia did not express 
their stance clearly, but Australia had given Japan a negative message before the
Interv iew with a MOF official (International Bureau). March 28. 2001.
' Sakakibara. Nihon to Sckai. p i86.
21 Ibid pp 186-189.
a potential cause of moral hazard.10
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meeting.22 The meeting finally failed to reach a conclusion.
The politics surrounding the AMF
In order to understand this outcome, it is necessary to make clearer the stance o f  the 
countries concerned towards the AMF proposal.
Not all the ASEAN countries were enthusiastic about the Japanese proposal 
particularly after the US expressed strong opposition23, although none o f them 
objected to it publicly.24 Malaysia, particularly Prim e Minister Mahathir Mohamad, 
which had long been against the IMF or perhaps "Western values' and never wanted to 
rely on the IMF. was unsurprisingly a strong supporter for the AMF. It may be that the 
Malavsian officials did not want to accept the reform s suggested by the IMF o f the 
country's industries, in which they had vested interests Thailand and Indonesia were 
also in favour o f  the proposal. In Thailand, who w as already under the IMF program, 
there was resistance to the severe structural reform s that IMF had demanded. The 
situation was similar in Indonesia, who wanted to  avoid IMF reforms that could 
damage the government, although it was soon to request IMF assistance. On the other 
hand. Singapore, who was the closest to the US among the ASEAN countries and 
strongly wished to keep the US engagement in the  region, was not in favour o f the 
framework that excluded the U S,26 and neither was the Philippines, which was 
concerned that the formation of a new economic organisation in the region could cause
Ibid., p. 187.
Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12. 2000.
24 Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). March 28. 2001. The following 
account on the stance of ASEAN countries is largely based on an interv iew with a MOF official 
(International Bureau). May 12. 2000. who was posted in the Japanese embassy in Thailand 
then and was able to sound out informally ASEAN countries.
Ncsadurai argues that IMF reforms were unacceptable to Malaysian leaders, because the IMF 
conditionalities could involve the eventual dismantling of the ethnic-based distributive policy 
that favours ethnic Malays. The political legitimacy o f  the current government is based on the 
continuation of this policy, which is also an essential element of the politics of patronage that is 
entrenched in the Malaysian political economy. (Helen E. S. Ncsadurai. "In Defence of 
National Economic Autonomy?: Malaysia's Response to the Financial Crisis." The Pacific 
Review 13, I (2000), pp.73-113.)
Another officer also noted Singapore’s negative stance about the AMF. (Interview with a 
MOF official (International Bureau). March 28. 2001).
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a decline in the authority o f the ADB. whose headquarters were located in the 
country's capital .
South Korea was supportive o f the AMF. Although the country tends to dislike any 
Japanese initiative in the region because o f  Japan's colonisation during the war, it can 
be inferred that it wanted to secure a way to achieve liquidity, without making a 
humiliating request for IMF assistance, given that its foreign reserves had been 
critically diminished since the Thai crisis. In fact, the level o f South Korea’s foreign 
reserves was only about US$21 billion as o f the end of September and foreign capital 
was still being withdrawn.27
Although China did not oppose the Japanese proposal directly, it remained cautious 
about Japan's leadership in East Asia and did not support the AMF.2* China tends to 
associate Japanese initiatives in the region with Japan's attempts to create a  Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the past, and this always makes China sceptical 
about Japan's goodwill in its regional policy.21 In addition, China basically wants 
neither Japan nor the US to dominate the region. If a regional framework does exist, 
such as in the case o f  APEC, China has to participate in order to prevent Japan or the 
US from dictating, but sees no reason to positively support the creation o f a  new 
organisation, in which Japan or the US could exert influence.3"
In the meantime, Hong Kong was reluctant to give its support to the proposal as well.
Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai. p.202-203.
Interview with MOF officials (International Bureau), May 12. 2000 and March 28, 2001. 
Masalsugu Asakaua (Director. Office of Regional Financial Co-operation. International Bureau. 
MOF). March 30. 2001 and Eisuke Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18. 
2001). According to a Japanese daily. China and the US had conferred on the AMF behind the 
scenes and had agreed not to support it before the conference in September It reported that the 
US used the card of the issue of WTO membership. (Sankei Shinbun. 7 December 1997.)
Shaun Breslin. "Beyond Bilateralism? The Local, the Regional and the Global in Sino- 
Japancsc Economic Relations.' paper presented at Japan and China: Economic Relations in 
Transition. Gennan Institute for Japanese Studies. Tokyo. January 2001.
Ibid Also. Eisukc Sakakibara (Fonncr MOF Vice Minister) commented about China's dislike 
of Japan's regional initiatives. (Interv iew. September 18. 2001)
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It was reported that it had difficulties building a domestic consensus for the AMF, as 
the government had had a hard time dealing with the parliament's opposition to the 
country’s US$ 1 billion contribution to the Thai rescue package in August 1997.31 Also, 
according to one newspaper, China and Hong Kong preferred to hold on to their 
foreign reserves as the currency peg of Hong Kong remained under pressure, rather 
than commit to a larger framework.33 Meanwhile, Australia was also negative about 
the AMF plan, explaining that it would be difficult to get domestic support for 
contributing to the fund.33
As far as the IMF was concerned, the AMF would be just an awkward institution, 
which could undermine its authority and the effectiveness o f its activities and could 
reduce its influence in East Asia. As argued before, some Japanese officials hinted that 
the AMF would not simply be a  subset o f the IMF, but retain some autonomy. Also, the 
Malaysian Prime Minister asserted that the AMF should be completely independent o f 
the IMF. Those remarks m ade IMF officials very cautious about the idea They 
claimed that such a regional fund was not only unnecessary, but also harmful, as a 
fund that was readily and easily available during any crisis could lead to  poor banking 
and business management, namely it would create moral hazard. They also feared that 
the IMF would have difficulty in getting countries to accept its conditionality and to 
agree about the reforms it demanded.
European countries were relatively indifferent to the matter, but there w as no reason 
why they should support the establishment o f an organisation that could reduce the 
importance o f the IMF, which traditionally had had a close relationship w ith Europe.
The US opposed the AMF proposal giving the same reasons as the IMF. namely the 
duality o f function between the IMF and the AMF and the possibility o f  creating moral
Mainichi Shinhun. 28 September 1997.
’■ 'flic South China Morning Post. 21 November 1997.
Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai. p. 187.
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h a z a r d  H o w e v e r ,  a n o t h e r  p r o b l e m  w i t h  t h e  A M F .  a s  f a r  a s  t h e  U S  w a s  c o n c e r n e d ,  w a s  
t h a t  t h e  U S  w a s  n o t  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  p r o p o s e d  o r g a n i s a t i o n  T h e r e  s e e m s  t o  b e  a  
c o n c e r n  a b o u t  i t s  d e c l i n i n g  i n f l u e n c e  i n  E a s t  A s i a  w h i l e  J a p a n  l o o k e d  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
d o m i n a t i n g ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a f t e r  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  T h a i  r e s c u e  p a c k a g e ,  w h e r e  J a p a n  
h a d  p l a v e d  a  c e n t r a l  r o l e  a n d  t h e  U S  h a d  f a i l e d  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  S a k a k i b a r a  w r i t e s  t h a t  h e  
h a d  a  p h o n e  c a l l  f r o m  t h e  t h e n  D e p u t y  T r e a s u r y  S e c r e t a r y '  L a w r e n c e  S u m m e r s  o n  
S e p t e m b e r  1 4 .  a n d  S u m m e r s ' s  w o r r i e s  w e r e  t h a t  t h e  U S  w a s  n o t  s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  a  
p a r t i c i p a n t  i n  t h e  A M F .  a n d  t h e  A M F  c o u l d  a c t  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  t h e  I M F . 14 S a k a k i b a r a  
f u r t h e r  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  U S  s e e m e d  t o  h a v e  t a k e n  t h e  A M F  a s  J a p a n ' s  c h a l l e n g e  t o  U S  
h e g e m o n y  i n  A s i a
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  U S  h a s  n e v e r  b e e n  a b l e  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a n y  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
t h a t  c o u l d  w e a k e n  I M F  i n f l u e n c e ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  I M F  i s  a  v e r y '  i m p o r t a n t  a n d  c o n v e n i e n t  
c h a n n e l  f o r  U S  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  T h u s ,  t h e  U S  c o u l d  n o t  s u p p o r t  a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n  t h a t  
c o u l d  b e  a  t h r e a t  t o  I M F  a u t h o r i t y  T h e r e  a r e  a  n u m b e r  o f  r e a s o n s  w h y  t h e  I M F  i s  s o  
i m p o r t a n t  t o  U S  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
F i r s t ,  t h e  U S  a n d  t h e  I M F  s h a r e  t h e  s a m e  i d e o l o g y  o f  e c o n o m i c  m a n a g e m e n t ,  n a m e l y  
t h e  n e o c l a s s i c a l  o r t h o d o x y ,  a s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  C h a p t e r  3  T h e  U S  c a n  c o n s e q u e n t l y  s p r e a d  
w h a t  i t  b e l i e v e s  t o  b e  c o r r e c t  v i a  t h e  I M F ’s  s t r u c t u r a l  a d j u s t m e n t  p o l i c y
S e c o n d ,  t h e  U S  c a n  p u s h  i t s  a g e n d a s  o n  i t s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  m o r e  s m o o t h l y  a n d  w i t h  l e s s  
c o n f l i c t  v i a  t h e  I M F  t h a n  b y  i t s e l f  C o h e n  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  I M F  i s  a  c o n v e n i e n t  
c o n d u i t  f o r  U  S  i n f l u e n c e ,  b e c a u s e :
A n y  e f f o r t  b y  W a s h i n g t o n  i t s e l f  t o  i m p o s e  u n p o p u l a r  p o l i c y  c o n d i t i o n s  o n  
t r o u b l e d  d e b t o r s  w o u l d  u n d o u b t e d l y  h a v e  f a n n e d  t h e  ( l a m e s  o f  n a t i o n a l i s m ,  i f
"  Ibid p. 185.
1 Ibid p 186
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not revolution, in many countries. But what would be regarded as intolerable 
when demanded by a major foreign power might, it seemed, be rather more 
acceptable if administered instead by an impartial multilateral agency.36
Similarly, Kahler writes that the US utilises the IM F "as a buffer in awkward bilateral 
relations, imposing economic conditions that the United States would find it hard to 
impose bilaterally.”37
Third, given that the US public interest has shifted from international to domestic 
matters after the end o f the Cold War, bailout through the IMF is much more likely to 
get the support o f the American people, as well as that o f Congress, than bilateral 
assistance. In particular, the government has been increasingly constrained by 
Congress from committing to international initiatives financially, as observed in the 
Thai bailout package in August 1997. Although the US government has been facing 
the difficulty of Congress opposition to the increase of the IMF quota, any bilateral 
rescue would be even more difficult domestically.
Fourth, the US can simply shift some costs o f  any bailout to other industrialised 
countries through the IMF. In the case of the East Asian financial crisis, given the size 
of the economic stakes that American firms had in East Asia, (low er than the stakes for 
Japanese firms operating there, though), the US could not be indifferent to the region's 
trouble. IMF packages arc quite convenient means for pushing a part o f the cost o f  any 
bailout onto other countries. Also, it could be said that under the IMF umbrella, it is 
more feasible to involve more countries in a rescue package.
Benjamin J Cohen. In Whose Interest? International Banking and American Foreign Policy 
(New Haven: Yale University Press. 1986), p.229.
Miles Kahlcr. "The United States and the International Monetary Fund: Declining Influence 
or Declining Interest?” in Margaret P. Kams and Karen A. Mingst. cds. The United States and 
Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence (London: Unwin 
Hyman. 1990). p 110
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Finally, the US is traditionally in a position to pursue its own favourable policy 
through the IMF. It enjoys a dominant influence on the decision-making process in the 
IMF. where it keeps the largest share in the quotas among all the member countries, 
although this has declined in the last few decades.38 The US dominance in the IMF 
may also come from what Jagdish Bhagwati calls a Wall Street-Treasury Complex,39 
that is, "a definite networking o f  like-minded luminaries among the powerful 
institutions -  Wall Street, the Treasury Department, the State Department, the IMF and 
the World Bank.” which arises from the fact that the members o f this elite go back and 
forth among these institutions, for instance Secretary Rubin comes from Wall Street. 
Bhagwati argues that this powerful network is "unable to look much beyond the 
interest o f Wall Street”, and ‘"the IMF has been relentlessly propelled toward 
embracing the goal o f capital account convertibility” In short, IMF policy could easily 
tend to favour US national or domestic interests. Also, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, with respect to IMF policies towards the East Asian financial crisis, Wade and 
Vcneroso document the influence o f the US Treasury Department and the Wall Street 
on the IMF policies, arguing that the IMF ‘bail-outs’ with the combination o f massive 
devaluations, the IMF pushed financial liberalisation, and the IMF facilitated recovery 
are equally 'bails-ins' for foreign corporations and the multilateral institutions, where 
US firms would benefit greatly, while these policies are likely to cause far-reaching 
damage in Asia.4"
What made Japan interested in a regional financial mechanism?
Although it may look as if Japan's proposal for the AMF was simply an unexpected 
response to the East Asian crisis, strengthening financial cooperation for the sake o f 
financial stability in the region, or even creating some regional financial framework, 
had been on Japan's agenda for some years, which probably enabled Japan to put forth
" ll has declined from 38 percent in 1946 to around 18 percent at present.
,J Jagdish Bhagwati. "The Capital Myth.” pp 10-12.
Robert Wade and Frank Vcncroso. "Asian Financial Crisis."
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the AMF proposal very promptly.
Some efforts for closer regional cooperation had been already made before the crisis. 
In particular, the Mexican crisis in 1994 gave some concern to the Japanese monetary 
authorities, the MOF and the Bank o f Japan (BOJ), and made them take some actions 
to assure financial stability in the region and put forward some regional mechanisms.41 
Japan signed an agreement for entrustment intervention with Flong Kong and 
Singapore in February 1996. Subsequently, in April 1996 the Japanese monetary 
authorities agreed on the repurchase (repo) arrangements o f US dollar government 
securities to provide liquidity on a bilateral basis with seven countries in the region, 
namely Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Australia 42 These repo arrangements were not directly linked to Japan's proposal for 
the AMF, but later developed into more networked arrangements called the Chiang 
Mai Initiative,43 which were agreed on in May 2000, as discussed in the next chapter.
Even before the Mexican crisis, the BOJ initiated an unofficial forum for the region’s 
central banks (Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New7 
Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) in 1991, which is called the 
Executive Meeting o f East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) Its primary objective 
is to strengthen the cooperative relationships among its member countries and to 
exchange opinions about each other's financial policy and the like. For the first six 
'ea rs  it held Deputies' meetings twice a year, but since 1996 Governors' meetings and 
various working/study groups have been held on a regular basis. The BOJ has 
provided the secretariat function since its inception. Although the US has shown an 
interest, it is not a member, probably because ASEAN countries have opposed US
" Eiji Yamamoto. Kokusai Tsuka Shisutemu llhc international currency system! (Tokyo: 
Kvanatni Shotcn. 1997), p.224.
1 The arrangements placed the limit at US$1 billion Before these arrangements, the five 
Southeast Asian economics of Hong Kong. Indonesia. Malaysia. Singapore and Thailand 
agreed on the same sort of transactions in November 1995.
1 Interv iew with a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12. 2000.
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membership
Moreover, some informal discussions about further financial mechanisms in the region 
were going on before the crisis. Even the idea o f the AMF itself had been nursed at a 
private level by some Japanese officials, such as Haruhiko Kuroda, the then C hief of 
the International Finance Bureau and currently Vice Finance Minister, supported by 
some intellectuals, such as Hajimc Shinohara, Managing Director o f the Institute for 
International Monetary A ffairs.45 Also, it was reported that prior to the Thai crisis 
some MOF officials had considered establishing a regular meeting of East Asian 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, which would be held three times a 
tea r in order to discuss frankly the macroeconomic performance as well as the 
monetary policies o f their countries and to take collaborative action when necessary.^ 
Furthermore, in an EMEAP Governors' meeting, where Japan naturally has a large 
influence, held in July 1997 in Shanghai, prior to  the Thai rescue conference, they 
agreed to investigate some kind of financing facility among the EMEAP member 
countries to support the economic policies o f their countries, in cooperation with the 
IMF.47
Although these policies and discussions prior to the crisis were not necessarily 
concerned with Japan's proposal for the AMF directly, it is noteworthy that there was a 
mood in the MOF to consider a regional framework. The Thai crisis provided an 
opportunity for Japan to advance such an idea. In fact, Sakakibara writes that he and 
other officials thought that they should take advantage of the atmosphere that arose in 
the Thai conference and use it as a driving force to advance the agenda 4k It could be 
argued that this background helped Japan propose the AMF so speedily in September.
” Masayuki Tadokoro, “Ajianiokcru chiiki Isuka kyotyoku no kosatsu |a study on currency 
cooperation in East Asia|,” Leviathan 26 (2000), p.65.
1 Sakakibara, Nihon to Sekai. p. 182. also interview with Sakakibara. September 18, 2001.
1 Sankci Slnnhiin 2 November 1997.
Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai. p 182.
4* Ibid., p. 182
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Although the interest o f Japan in closer financial cooperation in East Asia is partly due 
to the lessons from the Mexican crisis as well as past policies and discussions during 
the 1990s, there are also various underlying factors at play in this interest o f Japan. 
These factors arc a reflection of the shift in the nature o f Japanese foreign policy, 
namely its increased interest in East Asia and an East Asian framework, as well as a 
growing willingness to take initiatives in the region.
One apparent reason for Japan's interest in creating a regional mechanism is the 
deepening economic interdependence in East Asia. As discussed in Chapter 2, East 
Asia has become considerably more important to Japan economically because of 
Japan's closer economic ties with the region. From a microeconomic point o f view, a 
sound East Asian economy has been vital for Japanese firms and financial institutions. 
East Asia is an important trading partner as well as a foreign direct investment 
destination Also, the Japanese financial institutions have massive exposure to East 
Asia, much larger than the American and European financial institutions have. 
Financial instability in the region could be a serious blow' to the Japanese economy. In 
addition, the disturbance o f  the East Asian financial system, and subsequently that of 
the international financial system, could damage Japan's macro-economy through the 
fluctuation o f the yen and the plunge in the value o f the stock markets. Therefore, it 
can be argued that Japan's interest in East Asian financial regionalism and its positive 
attitude towards it has been consistent with its national interests.49
In addition, a political factor, namely Japan's willingness to assume a greater political 
role in the region, has also contributed to Japan's turn towards regional financial
' ‘ For instance, the report of the Subcommittee on Asian Financial and Capital Markets under 
daiiame Shingikai in the MOF about the East Asian crisis reads: “Japan has a vital interest in 
the stability of the region and its sound economic development " (p.46.) Also, some 
interviewees noted that the importance of the stability of the East Asian economies to Japan 
was behind Japan's interest in regional financial cooperation (Interview with a MOF official 
(International Bureau). May 12, 2000. Mitsuo Miura (Yomiuri Shinbun), May 24. 2000. 
Masatsugu Asakawa (Director. Office of Regional Financial Co-operation. International Bureau. 
MOF). March 30. 2001 and Eisukc Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18. 
2001(
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cooperation. It was already discussed in Chapter 2 why since the 1980s and 
particularly the end o f the Cold War Japan has been more interested in taking political 
initiative in regional matters beyond aid giving. The end o f the Cold War has made 
Japan's international status quite uncertain, while inducing the Japanese policymakers 
to recognise that contributing money alone was no longer sufficient or acceptable. For 
maintaining and enhancing its international status, they have come to believe that 
Japan has to demonstrate its ability and willingness to take more initiative beyond 
chequebook diplomacy, and. due to historical, economic and geographic reasons. East 
Asia has become the main venue where Japan can do this. Also, the financial area is 
one of the areas where Japan's initiatives are quite feasible. In other areas, particularly 
security', its positive policies are still quite limited due to Japan's extraordinary 
dependence on the US as well as the history o f  its colonisation o f  the region, although, 
as argued in Chapter 2, even in the security field, Japan has gradually showed a  more 
positive stance than before. It can be argued that this political understanding o f the 
Japanese policymakers after the end o f  the Cold W ar has led to their growing interest 
in East Asian relations and their enthusiasm for East Asian regionalism and financial 
regionalism in particular.
It could also be argued that Japan's interest in financial regionalism or a  regional 
financial mechanism has been in a sense a  reflection o f its dissatisfaction with the 
existing international economic system that centres on the Washington Consensus As 
argued in Chapter 3, there has been an ideological divergence, which has lasted 
throughout the 1990s, between the Washington Consensus institutions and the 
Japanese government, particularly the MOF, concerning economic development and 
systemic transition Japan has increasingly become sceptical about the effectiveness of 
what Washington has promoted, such as structural adjustment policy, and its 
inclination to implement the same policy universally to any country. The previous 
chapter also argued that this ideological disparity led to their different interpretation o f
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the causes o f  the crisis. These differences have made Japan dissatisfied with IMF 
policies towards the crisis, although Japan failed to oppose the arguments about the 
efficacy o f  financial openness and deregulation in the East Asian developing 
economics before the crisis, as discussed above. Sakakibara clearly made this point 
when he said that he and other finance officials in charge were very dissatisfied with 
IMF policies towards the crisis, and according to them the IMF, led by the US, 
imposed unreasonable structural reforms on crisis-hit countries. He continues, by 
proposing the AMF and later by advancing regional financial cooperation, he together 
with other finance officials consciously tried to challenge the existing international 
system: the US strong opposition to the AMF was couched in terms that indicate that 
the US officials sensed such an intention from Japan.'" Strictly speaking, when it 
proposed the AMF. Japan had not had a  clear idea about the causes o f the crisis, and 
onlv the later policies towards closer regional financial cooperation, as argued below', 
reflected to a  greater extent these differences o f interpretation and interest in relation to 
the East Asian crisis. However, as Sakakibara’s remarks show, even the proposal o f the 
AMF should be considered in the context o f these ideological disparities, which had 
made Japanese officials, particularly MOF officials, sceptical o f  the Washington 
Consensus for about a decade.
Moreover, Japan's dissatisfaction with the establishment in Washington is not limited 
to their ideological difference: Japan’s influence in the existing international 
organisations is quite limited, and it is difficult to get Japanese views reflected on their 
policies, despite the fact that Japan is now one o f  the main contributors in most 
organisations.51 This is partly because Japan is a latecomer to these organisations. Also, 
Japan's voting share in the international organisations is not high, considering the
Interview with Eisukc Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister), September 18. 2(X)1. 
Aramaki also notes that the AMF proposal comes out of Japan's dilTercnt stance on IMF 
policies towards the crisis. (Interv iew with Kcnji Aramaki (MOF). March 27. 2001)
Interv iew with Masatsugu Asakavva (Director. Office of Regional Financial Co-operation, 
International Bureau. MOF). March 30, 2001. and Kcnji Aramaki (MOF). March 27. 2001.
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amount o f  its contributions.'2 Moreover, the number o f the Japanese staff in these 
organisations is small, particularly in some o f the key posts, and it is said that the 
Japanese officials that are stationed there on temporary posts feel uncomfortable and 
helpless in the Western dominated organisations. 53 Aramaki comments that 
Washington's language is neoclassical economics, and thus influencing Washington's 
policy is hard for Japan, who does not share the language.54 It can be argued that these 
situations have made MOF officials interested in establishing th e ir ' organisations.55 
which has indirectly contributed to Japan's assertive policies towards the crisis and the 
regional financial cooperation.
At the same time, there is some awareness among the MOF officials about the risk of 
relying solely on the international organisations. They think that, due to their US- 
centred nature, these organisations are limited in their ability to deal with East Asian 
issues because o f their access to a  limited volume o f available resources and 
information. A MOF official comments that the MOF does not take the stance that the 
IMF is unnecessary, and when problems emerge, its existence is crucial Ffowever, he 
continues, the IMF cannot be expected to resolve future crises on its own, and, in fact, 
the IMF alone was not able to provide sufficient funds for the East Asian financial 
crisis.56 The fact that the US has been less willing to commit to East Asian matters, as 
revealed in its reluctant attitude towards the Thai rescue package, gives another reason 
for this position o f the MOF officials. In short, the MOF officials have come to believe 
strongly that it is essential to establish some self-help mechanisms in East Asia to
Japan is pul in the second place in the IMF and the World Bank (6.33% and 7.91% 
respectively), but this is still proportionally far behind the US (17.67% and 16.49%). (as of 
June 2000)
"  Aramaki states tliat the organisational culture of the international organisations is quite 
different from that of Japan, or the MOF (Interview with Kcnji Aramaki (MOF), March 27, 
2001).
1 Interview with Kenji Aramaki (MOF), March 27, 2001.
5 Yoiclii Funabashi points out tliat the MOF officials lack Ihc ability to influence policymaking 
processes in Ihc international organisations, and thus they tend to have parochial considerations 
and to do something by themselves, rather tlian make an effort to advocate their views 
internationally. (Interview with Funabashi (Asahi Shinbun). June 1. 2000)
Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). March 28. 2001
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supplement the existing international system for preventing and preparing for any 
future financial disturbance.
It is not true that Japan is moving away from the existing international organisations It 
has been traditionally a supporter o f the international organisations and. in fact, tried to 
cooperate w ith the IMF in the early stages of the East Asian financial crisis, as argued 
above. Japan has made, and will make, an effort to raise its position in the existing 
organisations and to voice its views on their policies. This has been consistent with 
what Japan has been doing throughout the postwar period, namely enhancing its 
international status. Nevertheless, Japan’s dissatisfaction with the international 
organisations should not be overlooked. As discussed below, this dissatisfaction 
became more conspicuous as the crisis spread and deepened.
Finally, it may be possible to  think about Japan's positive attitude towards closer 
financial cooperation in the region from the viewpoint o f  Japan's domestic 
policy making process At the risk o f  over-generalisation, it can be said that the MOF 
tends to be less constrained by US relations in its policy and to be in a position to 
assert the importance of East Asian relations more, compared with the MOFA O f 
course this is not to say that the MOF tends to neglect the importance to Japan o f US 
relations, but sometimes the MOFA has been too cautious about US relations, which 
has prevented the ministry from taking positive East Asian policies in the past 7 In fact, 
it is even said that many o f the MOF officials were sympathetic to the EAEC when 
proposed by the Malaysian Prime Minister in the early 1990s. These differences can be 
attributed to the M OF’s character as an economic ministry as against the MOFA, 
which is a diplomatic ministry . It may also be that due to the MOF's historical tie with 
the ADB, discussed in Chapter 2, there have been more ’Asianists’ in the MOF than in 
the MOFA, while the decade-long ideological discussion o f development issues has
Hook ct al. Japan's International Relations, pp 43-45.
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possibly been an opportunity for MOF officials to become motivated to display a 
measure o f  assertiveness towards the US and to learn how to do it. It can be argued 
that the differences in mandate and orientation o f the MOF and the MOFA arc one o f  
the reasons why Japan's interest in regional cooperation became conspicuous in the 
financial area.
The failure of the AMF proposal and its replacement with the Manila Framework
Although Japan continued to make an effort to realise the idea o f the AMF and 
discussed the issue with some ASEAN countries bilaterally even after the meeting in  
Hong Kong on 21 September 1997, the deepening and the spreading o f  the crisis made 
the situation difficult for the pursuit o f this project. The currencies o f Thailand, 
Malaysia. Indonesia and the Philippines, which had been under strong pressure since 
July, continued to fall, and on October 8, Indonesia finally appealed to the IMF, 
following Thailand and the Philippines.58 Furthermore, the crisis reached Taiwan in the 
middle o f October, when the Taiwan dollar plunged, which triggered a speculative 
attack against the Hong Kong dollar Overnight interest rates in Hong Kong rose from 
7 % to nearly 300% on 22 October, while the stock market fell by 10.4% the follow ing 
day Then, the crisis spread to Korea at the end o f October, leading to the sharp drop o f  
the Korean won. Japan experienced two large bankruptcies o f financial institutions in 
November and its stock markets and the currency plummeted, although it is arguable 
that Japan's difficulty at that time could be regarded as the result o f the contagion o f 
the crisis. Under these circumstances, the impetus for the AMF was lost rapidly.
The AMF proposal was finally replaced by a different framework for regional 
cooperation, called the Manila Framework, at a meeting o f the finance and central 
bank Deputies in Manila on November 18-19. Fourteen countries (Australia. Brunei,
58 The Philippines had been already under the IMF program, and it asked to expand IMF credit 
on July 18.
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Canada. China. Hong Kong. Indonesia, Japan. South Korea, Malaysia. New Zealand, 
the Philippines, Singapore. Thailand, and the US) attended the meeting, along with the 
IMF, the World Bank and the ADB as observers. They agreed on four broad principles, 
on which the framework was based:
I A mechanism for regional economic surveillance to complement global 
surveillance by the IMF.
2. Enhanced economic and technical cooperation particularly in strengthening 
domestic financial systems and regulatory mechanisms.
3 .  Measures to strengthen the IM F’s capacity to respond to financial crises.
4. A cooperative financial arrangement that could supplement the IMF resources.
The Manila framework is different from what the Japanese officials had envisaged in 
the AMF proposal. There is no specific pooling o f  resources by member countries, and 
no standing s ta ff or secretariat. Moreover, the framework does not have any room to 
act independently o f the IMF, being completely subordinated to the IMF. The Manila 
framework has primarily a monitoring and supervisory role, although, if  necessary', 
funds could be provided on a  case-by-case basis after a  program and conditionality are 
agreed between the IMF and a  country threatened by a  crisis.
What has to be noticed here are the reasons why Japan finally gave up the AMF. It is 
generally recognised that the US and the IMF opposition forced Japan to abandon the 
idea, together w ith Japan's domestic financial problems that surfaced in the autumn o f 
1997. They w ere certainly crucial factors. An official comments that it is unlikely that, 
under the opposition o f not only the US and the IMF, but also international society in 
general. Japan and East Asian countries could advance regional cooperation 59 
However, this should not be taken as another example o f  Japan behaving as a reactive
' Interview w itha MOFofficial (International Bureau). March 28. 2001.
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state. What is important is the influence that the US had on other East Asian countries. 
In particular. ASEAN countries did not want to risk their economic and security 
relations with the US by supporting the Japanese plan, even though they were 
discontented with the US negative attitude and the slow movement o f the IMF towards 
the Thai rescue plan. Altbach points out that it “quickly became clear that there was 
little appetite in Asia for a confrontation with the United States and the IMF amidst 
plummeting currencies and stock markets.’’6" Although some countries, like Malaysia, 
still strongly supported a fund independent o f the IMF, other countries moderated their 
positions in the face o f strong US opposition and the deepening crisis. In addition, no 
country' other than Japan was willing, or able, to contribute to the proposed fund. As 
stated before, China, Hong Kong and Australia, who were possible contributors to the 
fund given the level o f  their foreign reserves, were not positive from the onset. Also, 
the Singaporean government was beginning to feel the public pressure domestically 
against giving assistance to troubled countries after extending US$1 billion to Thailand 
and later US$5 billion to Indonesia. In short. Japan did not maintain a regional support 
large enough to press forward with its proposal under US opposition. Furthermore, 
some officials stress that China’s reluctance was a fatal blow to the AMF proposal 1 
Japan has increasingly come to take China's stance seriously in its foreign policy 
decisions, as the country has grown as a regional power in the 1980s and particularly 
since the 1990s. Also, without China's participation, East Asian regionalism could 
have only limited significance.
Furthermore, perhaps the fact that there was no sufficient consensus even within Japan 
might be another reason that made it difficult for Japan to advance the AMF proposal. 
It seems that there was broad agreement within the MOF about pressing forward with *61
Eric Altbach. '1110 Asian Monetary Fund Proposal: a Case Study of Japanese Regional
Leadership." Japan Economic Institute Report 47A (1997). p. 10.
61 Interview with Eisuke Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 28, 2001, 
Masalsugu Asakawa (Director. Office of Regional Financial Co-operation. International Bureau. 
MOF). March 20. 2001 and a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12. 2000.
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the AMF. Even the Budget Bureau, which is usually reluctant to  increase its 
disbursements, did not disagree.6" Sakakibara also obtained the Prime M inister’s 
consent.63 However, according to M OF officials, the MOFA, which does not have 
jurisdiction over international and regional financial issues, was not positive about the 
MOF's plan64 or continued to be indifferent, at best,6S partly because the MOFA tends 
to be more anxious about US relations than the MOF, as argued above, and partly 
because the MOFA, which is the ch ief ministry with responsibility for the assistance to 
East Asia through ODA, technical assistance and so on. does not want to lose its 
dominant position on this matter. 66 The AMF proposal was abandoned before 
comprehensive discussions with other ministries were took place.67
The AMF proposal and the implications for Japan’s policy style
A series o f  Japanese policies over the AMF proposal have significant implications for 
one of the arguments o f the thesis, namely the style o f  Japanese foreign policy. This 
will be the main subject o f Chapter 6, and here it is outlined only briefly to draw 
attention to the relevance o f this issue for the manner in w hich Japan acted towards the 
East Asian financial crisis. Japan's unsuccessful attempt to establish the AM F is 
seemingly considered as a reflection o f  its lack o f ability to take independent initiative 
in East Asia, let alone the world. Despite Sakakibara’s remark that the Manila 
Framework was in essence consistent with Japan's original ideas, it obviously w as not. 
Several newspaper articles reported that Japan had lost to the US and the IMF, or that 
Japan bowed to US pressure. The Sankei Shinbun. a Japanese daily, even wrote that
According to a MOF official, the Budget Bureau preferred to appropriate a large one-off 
payment, rather than having to deal with a request each time a crisis happened (Interview with 
a MOF official (International Bureau), May 12. 2000)
' Interv iew' with Eisuke Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister), September 18. 2001.
' 1 Interv iew with a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12, 2000.
Interview with Eisukc Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18. 2001. 
Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12. 2000.
Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau), March 28. 2001.
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Japan had been defeated in the struggle for currency hegemony in Asia 6’'
However, as will be discussed later in detail, the AMF proposal was not necessarily a 
failure from the perspective o f  Japanese MOF officials, nor was the Manila 
Framework merely a compromise for Japan. Rather, these policies should be 
considered in the context o f Japan’s longer-term policy goals as well as its style in 
pursuing them. In other words, it is possible to see Japan's proposal for the AM F and 
the advancement o f  the Manila framework as a step tow ards the long-term policy goal 
of closer financial cooperation in East Asia. It can be argued that the AMF proposal 
contributed to advancing such a long-term goal by initiating intense regional 
discussions about closer financial cooperation, and in fact it led to the regional swap 
arrangements, as discussed in the next chapter. Also, in supporting the establishment of 
the Manila Framework, there was an implicit motive among Japanese officials to keep 
on with regional dialogues and maintain momentum for further regional cooperation. 
These policies are quite consistent with Japan’s style o f foreign policy, namely to 
pursue its goals gradually and in a low-profile, less contentious manner. This point will 
be elaborated in Chapter 6. together w ith more evidence from the rest o f this chapter 
and the next chapter.
The spread of the crisis to Indonesia and Japan's policies towards it
The crisis in Thailand soon spread to Indonesia, as mentioned above. The Indonesian 
government was forced to float its currency, the rupiah, on August 14, 1997 after it had 
plunged due to speculative attacks. Thereafter, despite various measures taken by the 
technocratic ministers in the government, the currency and the stock market continued 
to drop, and on October 8, Indonesia announced that it was seeking IMF assistance.
With respect to the content o f  the IMF program for Indonesia, there was clear
* Sankei Shinhun. 7 December 1997.
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divergence o f  opinions between Japan and the IMF. although Japan eventually had to 
give in and cooperated with the IMF to organise a rescue package. The IMF insisted 
on an overall, and ambitious, structural reform o f the Indonesian economy, which 
included the cancellation o f the national car project, the reduction o f  government 
subsidies and the drastic restructuring o f  the banking system in a short period o f time. 
On the other hand. Japan stressed that the pressing need was to stabilise the rupiah 
through concerted intervention as the crisis centred on confusion on the foreign 
exchange markets, although Japan accepted that the restructuring o f  the economy was 
necessary' as a  long and medium-term goal. ’9 There was a heated discussion between 
Sakakibara and the chief o f the IMF mission, Vijian Agebri, on October 16, but Japan 
failed to win concessions in the end.711 On October 31, the IMF and the Indonesian 
government reached an agreement for a US$23 billion package, and detailed measures 
for reforms were announced immediately, including the closure o f  sixteen ailing banks.
Although Japan was not satisfied with the content o f  the agreement, it had no choice 
but to try to make the program successful, once the IMF and Indonesia agreed to i t 71 
On November 1. Japan discussed bilateral assistance with Singapore and Indonesia, 
which would be supplementary to the assistance from the IMF and other multilateral 
institutions. This effort o f Japan led to additional assistance as the second line o f 
defence (Japan and Singapore contributed US$5 billion each, the US, US$3 billion, 
and others, about US$3 billion altogether). This brought the total amount o f  the 
package to US$39 billion.
Despite this considerable assistance, far exceeding the US$17 billion package for 
Thailand, the rupiah continued to fall throughout the rest o f the year. The fall was 
greatly affected by the Korean financial problems as well as the uncertainty over *70
Sakakibara, Nihon to Sekai. pp 195-196.
70 Ibid. pp. 196-197.
1 Ibid, p i98.
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President Suharto's health. In addition, the closure of the sixteen banks, without 
providing a safety net, implemented under the IMF agreement, exacerbated the 
situation by causing a run on banks and panic selling of the rupiah. In January' 1998 
the problem worsened. The national budget, unveiled on January 6, disappointed the 
markets, as it was 31 percent expansionary despite the fact that Indonesia was under 
the IMF austerity policy and the markets regarded this as evidence that Indonesia did 
not intend to implement the IMF program. Although Suharto and the IMF signed a 
nexx agreement on January 15, the government had lost market confidence completely 
by this time, which led to a further sharp drop of the currency to a level that had been 
unthinkable previously.
It is debatable what made the crisis in Indonesia more prolonged and more severe than 
in other countries. For one thing, it was said to be a problem o f the political institutions, 
or Suharto himself. For instance, MacIntyre argues that “the unfettered power o f the 
presidency and the resulting uncertainty about his policy commitments was highly 
destructive o f  investor confidence in the context o f a regionwide economic crisis.”72 
On the other hand, Japan overtly stresses the mismanagement o f the IMF. A report o f 
the Subcommittee on Asian Financial and Capital Markets under Gaitame Shingikai 
reads:
the IMF agreement with Indonesia which contained numerous terms 
addressing structural issues invited questions and criticism... the question 
remains as to whether these issues had to be addressed in the midst o f a 
currency crisis. The attention o f  the market was directed toward the resolution 
of structural issues because this was presented as the central issue in re­
establishing confidence. As a result, confidence in the rupiah was further
Andrew MacIntyre. "Political Institution and the Economic Crisis in Thailand and 
Indonesia.” in T. J. Peinpcl. cd.. The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 1999), p. 155.
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eroded when it became clear that the Indonesian government was not prepared 
to rectify quickly its structural issues "
Sakakibara further argues that the IMF reform plan, particularly the financial 
restructuring plan, was hastily drawn up w ithout taking into account its economic and 
social impact, and it completely destabilized not only the financial system, but also the 
whole economic system.74
It should be noted that Japan’s discontent with, and distrust of, the IMF policies over 
the crisis began to increase from around this time. Japan did not accept the IMF 
policies towards Indonesia despite contributing to the IMF program, and the fact that 
the IMF policies could not help the crisis situation but rather worsened it, at least in 
the view' o f Japanese officials, let Japan begin to criticise the IMF policies publicly, as 
argued below.
The Korean crisis and Japan’s policy towards it
Following the economic turmoil in Southeast Asia, the South Korean currency, the 
won. came under attack in the middle of October 1997. Since early 1997, various 
problems o f  the Korean economy had come to be recognised publicly, and there had 
been some collapses among the chaebol. South Korea’s large diversified 
conglomerates. Under the circumstances, South Korea easily became another target o f  
currency speculation. The won dropped sharply, and by early November this process 
accelerated. The Korean government first sounded out Japan and the US about the 
possibility o f bilateral assistance, but the US quickly made it clear that it did not have 
any intention to assist the Korean economy bilaterally.75 Japan also declined the 
request, since, as Sakakibara argues, the effect o f Japanese assistance alone would
1 Sec MOF homepage, www.mof.go.jp/english/tosin/ela703.htm.
1 Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai. p.200.
Financial Times. 15 January 1998.
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have been limited: private financial institutions, Japanese, US, and European, were 
withdrawing funds from South Korea at a rapid speed, and there was no choice but to 
coordinate with the IMF and the US.76 On November 21, Korea announced a  request 
for loans from the IMF, and on December 3, it signed the agreement for the US$55 
billion bailout package (later increased to US$58 billion), which also included US$10 
billion from Japan and US$5 billion from the US as a second line of defence.
Nevertheless, the agreement with the IMF was little help in regaining the confidence 
of the markets and the won continued to decline. This was because, in addition to 
speculation that the situation o f  South Korea’s foreign reserves was worse than 
reported, foreign bankers questioned the government's commitment to undertaking the 
IMF reforms 77 In addition, Sakakibara argues that South Korea's request to the IMF 
was regarded as an announcement o f a sort o f defeat, and also the credibility o f the 
IMF program had deteriorated, as the Indonesian reforms did not look to  be going 
well.78 79*FIc also stresses that the IM F’s insistence on structural reforms, as was the case 
for Indonesia, threw the South Korean economy into disorder, and the announcement 
of the closure of nine merchant banks and the liquidation o f two commercial banks, 
subsequently leading to the failure o f the settlement operations in other eight merchant 
banks, seriously damaged the financial system "  By mid December, foreign banks 
rolled over only 20-30 percent o f Korea’s short-term debt as each tranche expired.811 
South Korea was on the verge o f  bankruptcy.
Under the circumstances, South Korea negotiated with the IMF and the G7 countries 
the accelerated disbursement o f  the next instalment o f  assistance funds81 in return for
8 Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai. p.203.
Financial Times. 15 January 1998.
8 Sakakibara. Nihon to Sekai. p.204.
79 Ibid., pp.204-205.
8 Financial Times. 15 January 1998.
81 The IMF decided lo finance Ihc total amount of US$22 billion step by step, not altogether, 
while demanding severe conditions and trying to extract concessions by stages
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agreeing to a new set o f proposals that would speed up economic reforms, including 
the rapid opening o f the financial markets to overseas investors. Simultaneously, the 
G7 requested the creditor private financial institutions to roll over their loans to South 
Korea. The negotiations did not go smoothly, but finally on December 24, a new 
agreement including the acceleration o f  payments was reached among the IMF, the G7 
and South Korea. wfiile a meeting o f  the creditor foreign banks w as held in New York, 
and the rolling over o f their loans to the South Korean banks was granted. Thus South 
Korea overcame the critical situation.
Japan made every' effort to assist in the rescue of the South Korean economy within the 
framework set by the IMF and tried to make the IMF package successful. A MOF 
official who was directly involved in this issue at that time argues that, when the 
negotiations among the IMF, the G7 and South Korea seemed to  break down, Japan 
helped them to find a way to reach an agreement by presenting various schemes, and 
provided a bridge loan until IMF funds were disbursed.8 He also writes that MOF 
officials really tried hard to help South Korea not only because the plight o f the South 
Korean economy was seen to have the potential to affect the Japanese economy 
negatively, but also because they genuinely wanted to lend a hand to their 
neighbouring country,* 83 which perhaps derived from a sense o f responsibility as a 
regional economic power.
Although South Korea's crisis was abating due to the successful involvement o f  the 
private creditor financial institutions, Japan's discontent with the IMF was increasing. 
As discussed above. Japan criticised the demand for drastic structural reforms in the 
midst o f  a  crisis, and in fact the initial IMF policies towards South Korea were not able 
to contain the crisis effectively. In particular, the IMF demanded extensive structural 
reforms, which included not only financial restructuring and financial opening, but
8‘ Kimura. "Ajia Tsukakiki," p. 17.
83 Ibid, p.17
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also trade liberalisation, the restructuring of cooperate governance and reforms in 
labour markets Aramaki points out that the content o f structural reforms became more 
comprehensive as the crisis spread.84 Wade and Veneroro also argue that the IMF 
program for South Korea (and to the same extent, for other East Asian countries, too) 
goes beyond standard IMF programs.85 These factors further increased the divergence 
o f opinions between Japan and the IMF w ith respect to crisis management.
The New Mivazawa Initiative
Although in the first half of 1998 the exchange rates o f most East Asian countries 
gradually regained some stability and the stock markets showed signs o f recovery, 
these economies were still in a serious state o f disarray. In particular, the 
reconstruction o f  the financial systems, which had been severely damaged by the IMF 
programs, and the decline in the growth rates had to be grappled with urgently. It was 
also pressing to build up social safety nets as a  large increase in poverty and 
unemployment could cause social unrest. Against this background, Japan announced 
the New Miyazawa Initiative in October 1998.
The New Miyazawa Initiative was a  package of various support measures totalling 
US$30 billion, h a lf o f  which was made available for the medium to long-term 
financial needs for economic recovery in East Asian countries.8" and the rest was set 
aside for their possible short-term financial needs during the process o f implementing 
economic reforms.87 The countries that the initiative was intended for were Thailand, 
Indonesia. South Korea. Malaysia and the Philippines. It was politically controversial *8
84 Aramaki. Aiia Tsukakiki to IMF, p. 119.
8' Wade and Vencroso. "Asian Financial Crisis."
81 The New Miyazawa Initiative reads that East Asian countries affected by the currency crisis 
need medium to long-term capitals to implement the following policy measures for economic 
recovery : (1) support for corporate debt restructuring in the private sector and efforts to make 
financial systems sound and stable; (2) strengthen the social safety net; (3) stimulate the 
economy (implement public undertakings to increase employ ment): and (4) address the credit 
crunch (facilitate trade finance and assistance to small- and medium-sized enterprises)
Tltc short-term facility takes the form of swap arrangements. Japan has established a facility 
for South Korea (up to US$5 billion) and that for Malaysia (up to US$2.5 billion).
166
to include Malaysia in the program, as the country had overtly criticised the way the 
IMF conducted the rescue operations and had introduced capital controls while 
enforcing an expansionary policy domestically in defiance of the IMF. However, the 
Japanese government decided to support Malaysia within the framework o f  the New 
Mivazawa Initiative, holding the view that the Malaysian policy of capital controls 
was justified in the situation in which Malaysia had been put.88 Various measures were 
emplovcd under the New Miyazawa Initiative including not only the traditional direct 
official financial assistance, such as yen loans through the Export-Import Bank of 
Japan, but also indirect ways to support East Asian countries in raising funds from 
international financial markets, such as the provision o f guarantees. Furthermore, 
Japan later established ‘a fund' within the ADB, called the Asian Currency Crisis 
Support Facility (ACCSF), as part o f the New Miyazawa Initiative.89 This facility has 
the following three instruments: (1) interest payment assistance grants which are 
applied to interest payment for ADB loans or official or commercial co-financing o f 
ADB-assisted projects; (2) technical assistance grants; and (3) guarantees to co-finance 
loans yvith the ADB and bond issues by the affected countries.
It should be noted that the New Miyazayva Initiative implicitly stated that Japan yvas 
still aiming at establishing a regional financial mechanism. Although the Initiative 
itself is a bilateral frameyvork, not the multilateral fund that the AMF yvas supposed to 
be, it leaves open the possibility that it could develop into a multilateral framework in 
the region, like the AMF. Specifically, the MOF officials thought that the above- 
mentioned ACCSF could lead to a multilateral frameyvork in the future. The New 
Miyazawa Initiative reads: “ACCSF will be an open facility in which all countries are 
yvelcome to take part." Shuhei Kishimoto, the then Director o f the Office o f Regional 
Financial Cooperation in the MOF, who yvas involved in implementing the New 8
88 Toshinori Doi. "Ajia tsukakiki to kongo no kadai |thc Asian currency crisis and future 
problems]," Fainansu 35:7 (1999). p.27.
8 The Board of the ADB approved the establishment of the ACCSF on March 23. 1999.
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Mivazawa Initiative, explained that Japan was considering that ACCSF could move 
forward to a  regional organisation, although at this stage Japan was the sole 
contributor.9" For instance, he continued, it may be possible that some countries could 
establish the same sort o f agreement with the ADB as Japan did, and those separate 
agreements could be reorganised into an independent regional fund, something like an 
East Asian regional guarantee institution, which would help East Asian countries issue 
bonds by giving guarantees.* 91 The New Miyazawa Initiative also reads: "it is hoped 
that in the long run the establishment o f  an international guarantee institution with a 
prime focus on Asian countries will be seriously considered." This confirms that 
Japan’s motive behind the New' Miyazawa Initiative involved the creation o f  some 
kind o f regional framework. Notably, Kishimoto further maintains that this East Asian 
guarantee institution should develop into the AMF in the future.
The New Mivazawa Initiative also indicates the change in the nature of Japanese 
foreign policy in the sense that Japan overtly broadcasted its policies, rather than 
keeping a low-profile, as it had done in the case o f  the AMF proposal. In fact, the 
announcement o f  the New Miyazawa Initiative was quite effective, and not only 
regional leaders, but also the public in the region, have become aw are of the Japanese 
assistance to the region A MOF official said that the Japanese government tried to 
publicise its assistance as much as possible through the local media, which had not 
been done before.9'  Furthermore, the Japanese bureaucrats were more positively and 
assertively involved in the implementation o f the assistance given under the New 
Miyazawa Initiative than in the past. Japanese aid policy is generally based on a 
request from recipient governments (yosei shugi). Orr argues that "[as) the aid program 
was initiated in Southeast Asia, the yosei shugi approach was undertaken to allay fears
Shuhei Kishimoto. “Shin miyazawa koso no shimei to ajia tsuka kikin |thc task of the New 
Miyazawa Initiative and the AMF)." Fainansu (1999). pp.42-43.
91 Ibid. p.43.
9‘ Ibid. p.43.
n Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12. 2000
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of the recipients o f  an incipient reemergence of Japanese imperial policy.”94 However, 
the Japanese officials were more actively engaged in the implementation o f  the New 
Miyazawa Initiative. Japan dispatched emergency missions to the five countries that 
were the beneficiaries o f the Initiative from the end o f October to the end o f  December, 
and they discussed with the recipient governments how to implement the economic 
reconstruction plans through the New Miyazawa Initiative.9'  Also, after the programs 
began to be implemented from the middle of December, Japan remained involved in 
discussions with the recipients.
The New Miyazawa Initiative was largely welcomed and appreciated not only by the 
recipient countries, but also the US, which had opposed the AMF proposal a year 
before. The US support for the New Miyazawa Initiative was partly because the 
Initiative was a  bilateral scheme, which in a sense could be regarded as an extension of 
past Japanese ODA policy. In addition to that, with the spread o f  the crisis beyond East 
Asia to Russia and further to Latin America, the claim o f the US and the IMF that the 
economic and social systems peculiar to East Asia, such as crony capitalism, had 
caused the crisis was losing support Furthermore, facing the need to cool down the 
instability in Latin America and to prevent the crisis from expanding further whatever 
the cost, the US policy seemed to shift from imposing structural reforms on the 
affected countries to stabilisation through strengthening public credit lines.96 Japan 
also sounded out China about the New Miyazawa Initiative beforehand, as Japanese 
officials thought that China's understanding was important to the success o f the 
proposal. In fact, Sakakibara was sent to Beijing in secret to explain Japan's
1 Orr. The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, p.60.
Doi. "Ajia Tsukakiki,” p.28.
Masayuki Tadokoro. "Asian Monetary Crisis and Japanese Policy Reactions." paper prepared 
for presentation for What is to be Done?: Global Economic Disorder and Policies for a New 
Financial Architecture in the Millennium. University of Amsterdam, February 3-5. 20(H). p 11.
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proposal.97
In the process o f drafting and implementing the New Miyazawa Initiative, not only the 
MOF. but also the MITI and the MOFA were heavily involved. A MOF official states 
that there were close exchanges of opinions and discussions with the MITI and the 
MOFA about making the proposal.98 This means there were various motivations 
involved behind Japan's proposing the scheme.
First, the MOF and the MITI had to address pressing issues to do with the condition of 
the Japanese economy. As discussed earlier, due to the increasing economic 
interdependence between Japan and the East Asian countries, the instability o f the 
regional economy was a considerable blow to Japan's already sluggish economy. 
Green points out that one driving force behind the New Miyazawa Initiative was the 
desperate situation o f  the Japanese banks, whose loans were tied up in long-term FD1 
that affected the Japanese trading, construction and auto companies that had large 
exposure to the stagnant Japanese economy.99 Also, in the words of an official from the 
MOF. the New Miyazawa Initiative was one part o f a broader set o f measures to 
resolve the financial turmoil in Japan.1119
Second, the New Miyazawa Initiative can be considered as a reflection o f the growing 
importance of the political and diplomatic relations with regional countries, as already 
discussed. After giving up the proposal for the AMF and with the deepening o f the 
regional economic problem. East Asian countries became sceptical about Japan's 
commitment to the region as well as its ability to take the lead there. This could have 
seriously undermined Japan's overall East Asian relations, which it had made such an 
effort to cement during the previous decades. The New Miyazawa Initiative was aimed *8
Nihon Kei/ai Shinbun. 1 December 1998.
8 Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12. 2000.
"  Green. Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp 254-255.
911 Cited in Green. Japan's Reluctant Realism, pp.254-255.
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to and actually was able to change this perception and maintain, or probably strengthen, 
Japan's influence in the region101, which could, in turn, enable Japan to take initiative 
there. It could be argued that the size o f  the sum o f  itself, i.e. USS30 billion, showed 
Japan's large commitment to East Asia and its recovery, particularly given the situation 
that Japan had economic problems domestically, and that it had already committed 
US$43.5 billion before announcing the New Miyazawa Initiative. 102 Eventually, 
Japan's total assistance offered in response to the East Asian financial crisis reached 
approximately US$80 billion by March 1999.103 This is an extraordinary contribution 
even when the size o f  the Japanese economy is taken into account. A MOFA official 
argues that Japanese foreign policy has been criticised sometimes as merely 
chequebook diplomacy but without this money countries could have collapsed. East 
Asian countries realised that no country or organisation, other than Japan, would pay 
such a large sum for regional m atters,1114 and their relations with Japan improved 
considerably.
Third, the New Miyazawa Initiative can be seen as a reflection o f Japan's discontent 
w ith IMF policies. The IMF was, in the view o f Japanese officials, particularly MOF 
officials, too obsessed with market mechanisms and imposed on countries hasty, 
inappropriate, measures for structural reforms, which sacrificed economic stability and 
resulted in social disorder. After the strict economic restructuring plans were 
implemented in accordance with the IMF programs, the economies o f the crisis-hit 
countries suffered from severe recession. The New Miyazawa Initiative was largely 
aimed at revitalising these economies and to help them get out o f the severe economic
lul Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12, 2000.
""The breakdown of this is: contribution to the international assistance package harmonised 
with the IMF (US$19 billion), assistance for private sector activities, facilitation of trade 
financing (approximately US$22.5 billion), assistance for economic structural reforms, human 
resources development (approximately US$2.3 billion) and assistance to the socially vulnerable 
(approximately US$0.15 billion). (MOFA homepage, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/ 
asia/crisisOOlO.html)
’ Sec MOFA homepage, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asia/crisis0010.html.
1 Interview with Masahiro Kohara (Director. Regional Policy Division. Asian Affairs Bureau. 
MOFA), May 12, 2000.
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downturn and resume healthy economic development by creating employment as well 
as expanding their social safety nets. A Japanese official argues that the New 
Miyazawa Initiative was significant for its feature o f quick disbursement, and for 
trying to get some results straight away and to maintain employment during the 
process o f economic restructuring."15 It can be argued that what the Japanese officials 
believed to be necessary was to give these countries time to take a breath and regain 
market confidence. In this context, the New Miyazawa Initiative can be regarded as 
Japan's tacit criticism against the IMF policies.
(Conclusion
This chapter has discussed how Japan was positively engaged in resolving the East 
Asian financial crisis. Japan's contribution to organising the Thai rescue package 
involved a great deal o f diplomatic effort, as well as contributing funds, and the 
subsequent proposal o f the AMF was an ambitious attempt to create a new regional 
framework aimed at financial stability in the region. Also, the Japanese policymakers 
were positively and assertively involved in proposing and implementing the New 
Miyazawa Initiative, which represents a departure from the traditional aid policy­
making, such as yosei shugi. Furthermore, Japanese policymakers became able to 
articulate Japan's stance overtly and to criticise IMF policy towards the crisis publicly, 
although on the whole Japan tried to cooperate with the IM F and the US. These 
proactive policies o f  Japan have continued and have led to the current momentum in 
financial regionalism, which is one o f the main subjects o f the next chapter. 
Furthermore, this chapter also highlighted the specific policy style characteristic to 
Japan, namely its low-profile and incremental style o f policy, as it tried to establish a 
financial framework in the region by taking into account the long-term perspective. It 
has been argued that the AMF proposal was not necessarily a failure from the
Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12. 2000.
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viewpoint o f  Japanese policymakers, nor was the Manila Framework merely a  face- 
saving effort Moreover, the New Miyazawa Initiative has the potential to lead to  a  
regional framework, possibly the AMF These points are also relevant for the 
discussions on the style o f  Japanese foreign policy in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5
Japanese Policy Towards East Asian Regionalism
The previous chapter documented Japan’s interest in financial regionalism in East Asia. 
This chapter expands the subject from the financial area to East Asian regionalism in 
general, as the last case study of the thesis It analyses how East Asian regionalism has 
developed, particularly since the late 1990s, as well as Japan's role and the background 
factors behind this new trend, including the impact of the East Asian financial crisis. 
Building on the argument developed in the previous chapters, this chapter 
demonstrates Japan’s increasing initiative in the region by looking at how Japan has 
been involved in a  new regional project; to support this claim, it brings to bear new 
empirical evidence, which has not received sufficient scholarly attention so far. 
Furthermore, the way in which Japan has contributed to the development o f East Asian 
regionalism has important implications for the discussion about the style o f Japanese 
foreign policy in the next chapter.
As discussed in Chapter 2, for the last few decades, specifically since the early 1990s, 
there have been two contesting conceptions o f  the Asian region, namely Asia Pacific 
and East Asia. The former was more predominant until the mid-1990s, while the latter, 
specifically the idea of the EAEC, whose identity is constructed around the opposition 
between Asia and the West, has shown remarkable resilience in the face o f strong US 
opposition in the early 1990s. Regions are cognitively constructed, and the concept o f 
East Asia, which "is an exercise in invention, seen by leaders, who advance such 
notions, as a way o f  stemming the intrusion o f Western cultural and moral values 
sy stems w ithout rejecting the dy namic aspects o f Western economic and technological 
modernization,’’1 has had consistent appeal. In fact, since the latter half o f the 1990s, 
there has been a shift o f emphasis from Asia Pacific, or APEC, to East Asia, or EAEC,
1 Richard Higgott and Richard Stubbs, "Competing conceptions of Economic Regionalism."
p.530.
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and this chapter examines the sources o f  this change.
The initial development of the ASEAN + 3 meeting
East Asian regionalism has developed out o f  ASEAN's invitation o f  three Northeast 
Asian countries, China. Japan and South Korea, to its informal and formal meetings. 
The first meeting o f what is now called 'ASEAN + 3’ was held in December 1997 in 
Kuala Lumpur. It was actually a meeting among the same countries that constitute the 
EAEC, and the leaders o f these countries had already met in February 1996 for the 
first time as part o f the ASEM process.2 Despite the symbolic meaning o f the ASEAN 
+ 3 framework, the meeting in Kuala Lumpur did not attract much attention from the 
press or the public. Even the US, who had been a strong opponent o f  the EAEC, did 
not interfere. Instead, there was actually an atmosphere o f  gloom and tension, as the 
meeting took place in the midst o f the financial crisis.
Whilst holding the meeting o f the East Asian leaders in itself was highly significant, 
there was little substance in the first ASEAN + 3 meeting. It was reported that issues 
concerning the currency crisis occupied most o f the agenda ’ Although the joint 
statements o f  the meetings between ASEAN and each o f the three additional countries, 
China, Japan and South Korea, were publicized, that o f the ASEAN + 3 meeting itself 
was not announced. Also, the leaders did not agree at that stage that this sort o f 
meeting would be held on a regular basis, although this summit meeting later evolved 
into the current trend o f regional cooperation in East Asia, as discussed in the 
following.
The initial impetus for the Kuala Lumpur meeting can be traced back to the beginning
" The foreign ministers' meeting and that of the economic ministers were also held in July and 
September 1996 respectively. Also. East Asian senior officials’ meetings (SOM) under ASEM 
have been held as needed in order to coordinate the East Asian positions for ministerial and 
summit level meetings.
' Sankci Shinhnn 16 December 1997.
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of 1997, to the visit o f the then Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to 
ASEAN countries, when Japan proposed holding regular talks between the Japanese 
and the ASEAN leaders. This visit to ASEAN had particular significance to Japan, as 
Hashimoto was aiming at a diplomatic breakthrough in the trip, and revealed during 
his speech in the visit the ‘Hashimoto Doctrine’ that would replace the Fukuda 
Doctrine as the basis o f Japanese policy towards ASEAN. Hashimoto emphasised the 
importance o f  ASEAN in Japanese foreign policy and the necessity o f ‘broader and 
deeper exchanges between Japan and ASEAN at top and all the other levels'. The 
proposal to hold regular meetings between Japan and ASEAN was the focal point o f 
his speech.
However, the response o f ASEAN countries to this proposal was not enthusiastic. 
Indonesian President Suharto was reportedly positive, but the Malaysian Prime 
Minister did not give a definite answer to Hashimoto.4 Tanaka argues that ASEAN was 
cautious about Hashimoto’s proposal because ASEAN countries wondered what their 
relations with China would be like if  Japan alone had a regular summit with ASEAN.5 *
Instead of giving Japan a direct answer, ASEAN announced at the end o f May 1997 
that it would invite the leaders o f  three countries, China, Japan and South Korea, to its 
informal summit scheduled in December o f 1997. The three countries accepted the 
invitation, and the meeting was held as planned.
What has to be noticed here is the fact that, although the current enthusiasm for East 
Asian cooperation is seen to have grown out o f  the financial crisis in 1997, the first 
meeting of the ASEAN + 3 countries, which became a  stepping stone for the recent 
trend in East Asia, was set up before the crisis occurred What this implies is that, 
while the crisis has been a driving force in the development o f East Asian regionalism
4 Mainichi Shinbun. 12 January 1997.
5 Akihiko Tanaka. "Japan and Regional Integration in Asia-Pacific," paper presented at the 40'1
Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington. D C., February 16-20,
1999, p.7.
as discussed later, regionalism in East Asia has been developing in a  larger context. It 
could be argued that the proposal for the formation o f the EAEC, which did not 
receive an enthusiastic response in the early 1990s, was not in fact abandoned 
completely, and on the contrary the idea has gradually become more acceptable to the 
countries o f  East Asia. In other words, the concept o f East Asia came to be considered 
as the basis for cooperation throughout the 1990s Tanaka points out that as early as 
1995, when the question o f w ho should be the Asian members o f  ASEM was 
considered, the ASEAN nations and China, Japan and South Korea were regarded as 
being the 'natural' representatives o f the Asian part o f  ASEM.'1 In short, there have 
been some underlying forces to push the trend o f  East Asian regionalism forward since 
the early 1990s, and the crisis in 1997 just accelerated the process.
One of the forces behind this trend has been the increasing economic interdependence 
in the region, which has made regional countries more aware o f  each other’s 
importance. The economic 'régionalisation', which has been progressing since the 
1980s. has made regional leaders think about the necessity o f  cooperating with each 
other for stability and further economic prosperity. Ohba argues that the emergence of 
East Asian regionalism in the form  o f ASEAN +3 was based on the confidence o f the 
East Asian countries backed by the increasing independence o f their economies and 
the economic boom in East A sia.6 7 As discussed later, the crisis has strengthened the 
sense o f closeness of the economies in East Asia.
In addition, the region's interest in East Asian cooperation is, to a large extent, a 
reaction to stagnation in APEC. There are various reasons for this stagnation. As APEC 
has developed, the various discords among member countries have increased, 
particularly w ith regard to the speed and extent o f the institutionalisation o f APEC as 
well as the imposition by the US o f its liberal economic norms and social standards.
6 Tanaka, "Japan and Regional Integration," p.6.
Ohba, “Chiikishugi,” p.276.
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Some East Asian countries were concerned about the US dominance o f  APEC, which 
has made them resist Washington's agendas. Ellis Krauss argues that, as APEC rests on 
several different interests o f  its major players and is pulled in different directions 
simultaneously, if  it goes primarily in just one o f these directions, it will lose the 
interest and cooperation o f  the other players.8 Also, several MOFA officials note that it 
has become difficult to discuss a complicated issue and reach an agreement in APEC 
due to the increasing number o f  member countries (21 countries at this moment) 
particularly after the inclusion of the Latin American countries and Russia.9 10In addition, 
some argue that now that the WTO deals w ith the global rules o f trade between nations, 
the APEC way o f advancing liberalisation voluntarily has become outdated."’ Finally, 
Krauss points out that the East Asian financial crisis moved the attention and need to 
respond from the trade and development arena to the financial arena and. as APEC is 
not really an organisation set up to deal with financial matters, it became something of 
a side show.11 It could be argued that all these factors have contributed to a loss o f 
impetus in APEC, if  not its virtual disintegration, and have motivated East Asian 
policymakers to turn to alternative options.12 In fact, APEC revealed its limitations as a 
regional mechanism to provide stability in the region during the crisis.
Japan’s participation in the first ASEAN + 3 meeting is relevant for the change o f 
course in Japanese foreign policy explored in this thesis. Japan had not supported the 
EAEC proposal, and this was one o f the main reasons why the EAEC could not be
8 Comment from Ellis Krauss by email to the author in December 2000.
9 Interviews with Naoto Hisajima (Deputy Director. Aid Policy Division. Economic 
Cooperation Bureau. MOFA). May 11. 2000. and with Katsuhiko Takahashi (Deputy Director, 
Developing Economies and APEC Division. Economic Affairs Bureau. MOFA), May 16, 2000.
10 Fukushigc Kimura. Nihon Keizai Shinbun. 31 October 2000, and Ohba. "Chiikishugi.’’ 
pp. 278-279.
Comment from Ellis Krauss by email to the author in December 2000.
1 ' Even Japanese senior officials in the MOFA and the M1TI admit that impetus for APEC has 
been declining. (Interviews with MOFA officials [Tsutomu Himeno (Director, the Second 
International Economic Affairs Division. Economic Affairs Bureau). May 17. 2000 and 
Katsuhiko Takahashi (Deputy Director. Developing Economics and APEC Division. Economic 
Affairs Bureau). May 16. 2000|, and a MITI official |Akira Kawamoto (Director. International 
Trade and Research Office. International Trade Policy Bureau). May 26, 2000))
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realised during the first half o f the 1990s. In addition to the other factors that have 
underlain recent East Asian regionalism, the decision of Japan to participate in the 
meeting is evidence o f the increasing importance o f East Asia, particularly ASEAN, in 
Japanese foreign policy for political reasons, as discussed in Chapter 2. Japan has 
assumed a more active political role, and East A sian regionalism is one area where this 
can be demonstrated most easily. Also, as discussed later. Japanese participation in the 
ASEAN +3 meeting reflects Japanese policym akers' evaluation that East Asia has to 
reinforce its own frameworks to prepare for a possible US withdrawal from the region 
in the long-term due to the end o f the Cold War. In short. Japanese policymakers think 
that the framework of East Asia regionalism is very useful for Japan, considering the 
political conditions influencing post Cold War Japan
In any case, it would have been too difficult fo r Japan to turn down the invitation from 
ASEAN without causing offence. As mentioned before, Hashimoto and the Japanese 
government took the ASEAN relations very seriously. His visit to ASEAN was more 
than merely a diplomatic visit, and the invitation from ASEAN to its informal summit 
in December was in a sense a response to Hashimoto"s proposal during the visit. Also, 
ASEAN announced that it would have m eetings with each of the three countries, 
China, Japan and South Korea, separately from the meeting o f the ASEAN + 3 
countries, responding to Hashimoto’s request.1 ’ A MOFA official stated that Japan did 
not have any hesitation to attend the meeting, and it accepted ASEAN’s proposal in 
May immediately.14
Furthermore, other conditions were also favourable to Japan's participation in the 
meeting. When the Malaysian Prime Minister proposed the EAEC, Japan was cautious 
about the attitude o f other regional countries, as some o f  them were opposed to the
13 The meeting between the Japanese and ASEAN leaders was the first one in ten years: it was 
twenty years ago that a joint statement from them was adopted.
11 Interview with a MOFA official (Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau). March 29. 2001.
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idea o f  the EAEC. However, this time there was a consensus within ASEAN, as the 
invitation to the commemorative Kuala Lumpur summit that would mark its thirtieth 
anniversary came from ASEAN as a group. In addition, as a diplomatic signal to other 
countries, the meeting was less problematic than convening a conference for setting up 
the EAEC or having an East Asian summit. The three northern countries were invited 
to what could be presented as a regular ASEAN summit, thus avoiding causing offence 
to non-Asian countries, particularly the US. Moreover, it seems that the idea of East 
Asian cooperation has been gaining ground among the Japanese policymaking elite. As 
touched on before, some o f  the MOF officials had supported the EAEC from an early 
stage, but the support has been expanding, and even the MOFA, which wants to 
prevent APEC from losing in importance or status, has not been entirely negative 
about East Asian cooperation, although the idea o f  Asia Pacific cooperation remains 
important. As discussed below, Japan's interest in East Asian regionalism has become 
more conspicuous since then.
It has to be noticed that by participating in the ASEAN + 3 meeting Japan did not 
express a decision to  disregard APEC, or to exclude the US from the region. On the 
contrary; they want to keep the US in the region as much as possible. W hat they are 
trying to do is to establish a  new framework to complement the traditional frameworks 
in East Asia, and to have multiple options, so that they can pursue Japan's political and 
economic interests in the post Cold War era. It could be also argued that they are 
searching for a new regional framework within which the post Cold War problems o f 
Japan could be addressed.
The second meeting of ASEAN + 3 in December 1998
Although the leaders o f the ASEAN + 3 countries did not promise during the first 
meeting to meet on a regular basis or to have the second meeting in the next year, the 
leaders o f the same countries got together in December 1998 in Hanoi. This time the
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meeting was more fruitful and showed that there was a growing tendency towards 
closer economic cooperation among the participating nations. The economic issue was 
again the main focus o f the meeting, as East Asian countries were still struggling with 
the after-effects o f the crisis, but it is noteworthy that ASEAN clearly demonstrated its 
interest in closer cooperation with the three northern countries, and  proposed to hold 
an ASEAN + 3 summit once a  year. The northern three agreed to establish a  working 
group to consider the proposal from ASEAN. This means that there was a degree of 
consensus among these countries to hold a regular annual meeting.
As for Japan, the then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi gave an im portant policy speech 
titled "Towards the Creation o f  a  Bright Future for Asia’ in Hanoi before the summit. It 
is particularly noteworthy that he stated in his speech that this sum m it meeting among 
the ASEAN + 3 countries aimed at realising "region-wide cooperation in East Asia’. 
This was indeed the first speech in which the Japanese leaders referred to East Asian, 
as opposed to Asia Pacific, cooperation on an official occasion, and can be regarded as 
Japan's endorsement o f the growing trend o f East Asian regionalism Obuchi also 
argued that in order to uphold this objective the network o f dialogues among the three 
countries o f  China, Japan and South Korea must be strengthened as well.
Furthermore, China proposed to hold a  regular forum o f the Finance Deputies o f the 
ASEAN + 3 countries to exchange opinions about financial issues. It is important to 
note the change in China’s stance towards regionalism. Ruan Wei, an assistant 
manager o f Norinchukin Research Institute, points out that, although China had been 
reluctant to form alliances with other countries since it fell out w ith  the former Soviet 
Union in the 1960s, 1997 marked a turning point in its policy, and it is now engaged in 
forming regional frameworks. 15 She identifies several factors behind China's 
inclination towards regionalism. First, having witnessed the chain reaction o f  the East
Ruan Wei, “Japan should work with, not against,” Asahi Shinbun homepage, 
www.asahi.com/english/asi anct/column/eng_020322.html.
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Asian financial crisis, China understands that a stable external environment is 
indispensable for its economic growth. Second, it recognises that most major countries 
arc participating in free trade agreements. Third, it understands that the stability and 
advancement o f the ASEAN economy leads to increased Chinese exports to the region. 
Fourth, it hopes to dispel the anxiety of its neighbours about the competitive pressures 
created by the Chinese economy by promoting regionalism and encouraging other 
participants to jointly reap the benefits o f trade and cooperation. Finally, it hopes that 
forming a regional framework with ASEAN would pre-empt any US attempts to 
besiege China.16
ASEAN was positive about China’s idea o f holding a forum o f the Finance Deputies, 
and its response was very quick. ASEAN soon invited the Deputies o f  the three 
northern countries to a meeting with the ASEAN counterparts in March 1999, which 
was followed by the first Finance Ministers' meeting among these members in April of 
the same year. These meetings o f the Finance Ministers and Deputies were a 
significant step towards further cooperation in East Asia. A Finance Ministers meeting 
was held again in the subsequent year, when there was important progress in terms of 
East Asian financial regionalism, as discussed later, although there was little substance 
in the first 1999 meeting itself.
The Mission for the Revitalisation of the Asian Economy (The Okuda Mission)
In June 1999, two years after the currency crisis had begun, and East Asian countries 
were starting to show signs o f recovery, Prime Minister Obuchi announced that he was 
going to dispatch a mission, called the Mission for the Revitalisation o f  the Asian 
Economy (The Okuda Mission), to six East Asian countries (South Korea, Vietnam, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) in August. The mission consisted 
of eight members, including business leaders from Japanese leading companies and
16 Ibid.
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influential academics, with Hiroshi Okuda. Chairman o f the Board o f Toyota M otor 
Corporation and Chairman o f the Japan Federation o f Employers’ Association 
(Nikkeiren) as the head o f the mission .17 The aim of the mission was to study the issues 
and needs facing East Asian countries and to identify, in the light o f the crisis, the 
issues that East Asia must address to safeguard its prosperity in the twenty-first 
century and the role that Japan has to play in addition to the assessment o f Japan 's 
assistance to the countries hit by the crisis.
It is worth discussing the contents o f the report o f the mission briefly because the 
mission was dispatched at the direct request o f the Prime Minister, and its 
recommendations were taken into account in later regional policy making, although it 
was not an official statement o f  the Japanese government. In fact, some o f  the 
recommendations took shape as concrete policies, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative. 
Also, a  large part o f this report is directly reflected in the Obuchi plan that was 
announced during the third ASEAN + 3 summit in November 1999, and was highly 
appreciated by ASEAN countries, as discussed later.
In addition, it could be argued that the emphasis on East Asia and East Asian 
cooperation in the report indicates that the concept o f  East Asian cooperation had 
become more broadly accepted within Japan. The members of the mission not only 
included influential private people and academics, but also a  number o f high-ranking 
officials o f the four prestigious ministries o f the MOFA, the M1TI, the EPA and  the 
MOF as observers. The report was the result o f their intensive discussions based on 
interviews, amounting to almost 200, with East Asian leaders, high officials and 
business leaders.
The rest of the members arc: Tasuku Takagaki (Chainnan of the Board, the Bank of Tokyo- 
Mitsubishi. Ltd.), Tovoo Gyotcn (President. Institute for International Monetary Affairs), Jiro 
Aiko (Advisor. Sony Corporation). Taizo Watanabc (Professor. University of Aoyama Gakuin). 
Toshihiko Fukui (Chairman of Economic Research Center. Fujitsu Research Institute). Yukio 
Okamoto (President. Okainoto Associates. Inc.) and Motoshigc Ito (Professor. University of 
Tokyo).
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First o f all, the report clearly states the necessity to build a new relationship with East 
Asian countries. It argues that, although the currency crisis was an unfortunate event, it 
clearly showed where reforms were needed, and the fact that the crisis hit many East 
Asian countries almost simultaneously indicates that East Asian countries are 
developing into a community; they are no longer just a collection o f individual 
countries. More significantly, the report also reads that the formation o f regional 
economies that has taken place in Europe and North/South America needs to take 
place in East A sia  as well, although the form may be different. Furthermore, the report 
suggests, in m aking a regional effort to address past failures, which caused the crisis in 
1997, Japan’s larger role will bring substantial benefits to Japan as well as East Asian 
countries.
Subsequently, the report makes specific recommendations in the areas of people, 
goods, money and  information. With respect to people, it emphasises three points: (1) 
the cooperation for human resources development in East Asia; (2) the opening of 
Japan to the E ast Asian people; and (3) the assistance for the socially vulnerable. As 
far as goods are concerned, the report addresses the issue o f w hat is necessary for the 
development o f  manufacturing in the region as well as what roles Japan can take on, 
including the importance o f opening Japanese markets. Furthermore, it is noteworthy 
that the report supports the idea o f  regional free trade agreements, arguing that a free 
trade agreement is one way to  strengthen and deepen economic relations between 
Japan and the East Asian countries, particularly South Korea and ASEAN It suggests 
that the talks for a bilateral free trade agreement with South Korea can be 
supplemented by studies o f similar agreements with Singapore and other countries that 
arc enthusiastic about the idea.
In the field o f  money, the report suggests that five issues should be addressed: (1) the 
stabilisation o f  East Asian currencies; (2) the internationalisation o f the yen; (3) the
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development o f East Asian bond markets; (4) the establishment o f early warning 
svstems to prevent currency crises in the future; and (5) the standardisation of 
corporate accounting according to an international criteria. The report holds that 
appropriate foreign exchange regimes and concrete schemes for emergency regional 
financing should be discussed at regional forums such as the ASEAN + 3 meeting. 
This point was taken up in Japan's initiative in the Chiang Mai Initiative.18 Finally, 
regarding information, the report made various recommendations including the 
enhancement o f information networks in East Asia.
The third meeting of ASEAN + 3 in November 1999
The third summit in November 1999 made great strides forward for East Asian 
regionalism. A joint statement on East Asian cooperation was announced by the 
participating nations for the first time, and the heads of the countries pledged further 
deepening and broadening o f cooperation. They stressed the importance o f cooperation 
particularly in the following eight areas: (1) economic cooperation, including trade, 
investment and technology transfer; (2) monetary and financial cooperation; (3) social 
and human resources development; (4) scientific and technical development; (5) 
culture and information; (6) development cooperation; (7) politics and security ; and 
(8) trans-national issues. It is noteworthy that they agreed to expand cooperation to the 
political and security fields and beyond economic issues. In order to realise 
cooperation in these areas, the leaders instructed the relevant ministers to oversee the 
implementation of the joint statement through existing mechanisms. Japan also 
proposed to hold an ASEAN + 3 foreign ministers meeting, and the joint statement 
included a commitment to this. In addition, a  meeting o f  the leaders o f the three 
countries, China, Japan and South Korea, separately from the ASEAN + 3 meeting,
18 Shuhci Kishimoto. "Ajia kci/aisaisci misshon hokoku no igi to jinzaishicn |the significance 
of the report of the Mission for the Revitalisation of the Asian Economy and Human Resources 
Development],” unpublished paper
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was held for the first time in history during the session.19
It should be noted that a  further shift in Japan’s stance concerning regional cooperation 
was observed during the year between the second and third meetings. This is reflected 
in the MOFA’s account o f Japan’s objectives at the ASEAN + 3 summit. With respect 
to the second meeting in 1998, the MOFA stressed the importance o f the meeting for 
strengthening the dialogues between Japan and ASEAN. However, the Ministry 
evaluated the 1999 meeting, which it called a virtual ‘East Asia Summit’, as a  valuable 
opportunity for the Japanese Prime M inister to build up relations with his counterparts 
in East Asian countries, w ho were important economic as well as political partners for 
Japan In addition, the MOFA formally declared that Japan had the intention to play a 
positive role to advance E ast Asian cooperation in accordance with the Joint Statement, 
and that Japan attached great importance to the ASEAN + 3 summit as a meeting 
designed to enhance a sense o f solidarity among East Asian countries and to advance 
regional cooperation In short, the MOFA’s interest in East Asian cooperation became 
much more explicit at the 1999 summit than the previous year.
This shift in the MOFA’s stance on regional cooperation can also be observed in the 
Blue Book, which is Japan’s official account o f its foreign policy by the MOFA. While 
the 1999 Blue Book, w hich deals with policies implemented during 1998, does not 
even refer to East Asian cooperation or the ASEAN + 3 summit at all, there is an 
independent section titled 'Japan-ASEAN relations and regional cooperation in East 
Asia' in the 2000 Blue Book. The 2000 Book acknowledges that, taking into account 
lessons from the crisis, a  trend to strengthen regional cooperation in East Asia has 
grown among the countries concerned, and that it is important to implement the 
policies proposed in the Joint Statement o f the 1999 ASEAN + 3 summit. These
19 When the Japanese Prime Minister proposed this meeting in the previous year, China was 
reported to take a very cautious attitude, but this time the South Korean President, Kim Dae 
Jung, played a buffer role between the two countries, which led to the realisation of the meeting.
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changes in the stance o f  the MOFA are indeed surprising, considering its indecisive 
attitude towards the EAEC in the early 1990s.
In addition to Japan's increasing interest in East Asian cooperation, Japan has been 
willing to take on a larger role beyond economic assistance. During the ASEAN + 3 
summit in 1999, Prime Minister Obuchi announced ‘a comprehensive plan for 
enhancing human resources development and human resources exchanges in East 
Asia’, which President Estrada of the Philippines, the host o f the meeting, suggested 
calling the Obuchi Plan. The plan was based on the report o f the Okuda Mission, and 
Obuchi explained that, given that the East Asian economies had largely overcome the 
crisis and were on track for recovery, the plan focused on people for the purpose of 
working together to prevent the reoccurrence o f  a future crisis and to  build a 
foundation for medium to long term stable economic development. In addition, Obuchi 
said that Japan was willing to advance the dialogue between Japan and ASEAN, which 
was one o f the major economic and political partners for Japan, while stressing that 
Japan was prepared to enhance and expand its assistance to ASEAN in order to redress 
the economic disparities within ASEAN and enhance its organisational capacity. These 
efforts indicate that, while Japan made substantial financial contributions in order to 
address the crisis, it also committed itself to the region by expressing publicly w hat it 
intended to do for it in the future, as the crisis was dying down.
The Chiang Mai Initiative
In response to the jo in t statement on East Asian cooperation issued in November 1999, 
there was a further move to advance cooperation in the financial area. The third 
Finance Deputies’ meeting o f the ASEAN + 3 countries was held in March 2000, when 
they agreed to consider a more concrete framework for financial cooperation to
1X7
prepare for any possible future financial crisis.2" While thinking that a new permanent 
fund would be a remote possibility,* 21 they looked at expanding the existing currency 
swap arrangements in the immediate future. These arrangements had been set up 
among the five ASEAN founding countries o f  Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand (totalling about US$200 million), but had the potential to 
include China, Japan, South Korea and the o ther ASEAN countries and this extension 
was agreed.22 Subsequently the ASEAN Finance Ministers' meeting endorsed this 
decision o f  the ASEAN + 3 Deputies.23 The ASEAN Ministers also backed the 
Deputies' decision to examine a possible mechanism to facilitate regional surveillance 
in East Asia.
On May 6, the ASEAN + 3 Finance M inisters announced the Joint Ministerial 
Statement after their second meeting in Chiang Mai. backed the decision o f  their 
Deputies, and endorsed efforts to strengthen East Asian financial cooperation. The 
statement reads: "we agreed to strengthen our policy dialogues and regional 
cooperation activities in, among others, the areas o f capital flow monitoring, self-help 
and support mechanisms and international financial reforms.” With respect to self-help 
and support mechanisms, they formally proposed region-wide swap arrangements, 
which was dubbed the Chiang Mai Initiative, "to  supplement the existing international 
facilities” . This fell short o f the establishment o f  a fund as Japan had originally wished
Jl The second meeting was held on 25 November 1999 during the ASEAN + 3 summit, and the 
Deputies agreed to advance a regional cooperation mechanism. On the same day, the ASEAN 
Finance Ministers' meeting issued a joint statement that incorporated the following clause: 
"|w |e arc considering with them |the East Asian dialogue partners! ways of cooperation by 
strengthening the institutional capacity for consultation and collaboration on monetary, fiscal 
and financial issues, including policy dialogue among the East Asian countries.”
21 The Singapore Finance Minister was reported to comment that the idea of a permanent Asian 
monetary fund lias not been entirely forgotten. (Aeence Francc-Pressc. 26 March. 2000) As for 
Japanese MOF officials, they also had the AMF in their minds, as discussed shortly
22 Under the arrangement, a portion of each country's foreign reserves is pooled in a facility to 
prepare for possible short-term cash shortages in the balance of payments of any member.
'  The relevant section of the joint statement of the ASEAN Finance Ministers reads: 
"I recognising the need for the availability of financial resources in times of crisis, they [the 
ASEAN + 3 Finance and Central Bank Deputies] agreed to conduct a study on the modalities 
and mechanisms for a regional financing arrangement to supplement the existing international 
facilities.”
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in 1997. Its main limitations are that it is a  bilateral framework, as against the 
multilateralism o f the AMF, and it cannot be put into effect automatically during a 
crisis: to be activated negotiations have to take place between a recipient and a 
supplier nation.24 Also, it is not large enough as a regional emergency financial 
mechanism.25 Nevertheless, It can be argued that the swap arrangements were indeed a 
significant step forward for financial cooperation in East Asia. Financial Times writes: 
"[the agreement on the swap arrangements] has advanced regional co-operation well 
beyond pre-crisis levels. It cements growing and valuable links between east and 
south-east Asia.”26 Also, the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers decided to meet each other 
twice a year on a regular basis, which reinforced the expectation o f further cooperation 
in East Asia.
Japan, who took the initiative behind the scenes,27 conducted negotiations with the 
countries concerned very cautiously, in order to avoid falling in the same trap as they 
had done with the AMF. In particular, the MOF took great pains not to give the US 
grounds for the suspicion that Japan was trying to exclude the US from East Asian 
matters.25 The Japanese Finance Minister emphasised at the press conference just after 
the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers Meeting that the initiative was not linked to the 
AMF, a gesture that can be regarded as trying to prevent causing concern to  US about 
Japan’s intentions. The ASEAN countries and Korea backed Japan's proposal overall, 
and China also showed a very positive attitude this time, quite different from its stance
24 Interview with Eisuke Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18. 2001.
■' Japan has reached substantial agreements for the bilateral swap arrangement under the 
Chiang Mai Initiative with the follow ing countries, as of June 2002: South Korea (US$2 billion, 
a dollar-won swap arrangement, in addition to US$5 billion under the New Miyazawa 
Initiative). Thailand (US$3 billion, a dollar-baht swap arrangement). The Philippines (US$3 
billion, a dollar-peso swap arrangement). Malaysia (US$1 billion, a dollar-ringgit swap 
arrangement, in addition to US$2.5 billion under the New Miyazawa Initiative) and China 
(US$3 billion, a yen-renminbi swap arrangement).
"6 Financial Times 10 May 2000.
‘ Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau), May 12, 2000.
B Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12. 2000 and Tsutomu Himeno 
(Director, the Second International Economic Affairs Division. Economic Affairs Bureau. 
MOFA), May 17, 2000.
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on the Japanese AMF proposal in 1997. Some finance officials comm ent that the 
success o f the Chiang Mai Initiative was largely due to China's stance.* 29 *Wei notes that 
China is coming to accept that Japan has to play a certain role in the region, as it now 
believes that, without the participation o f Japan, no regional economic organisation 
can be complete, given Japan’s economic power.’"
Among the factors underlying the initiative o f Japan to push the swap agreements in 
the region was MOF officials' feeling that it was necessary to establish some regional 
financial framework in preparation for a future crisis. The previous chapter discussed 
the economic, political and ideological motivations behind MOF officials" interest in 
regional financial cooperation In particular, given that not much was expected to be 
done for crisis prevention at the global level immediately, as it was an issue in which a 
variety o f interests o f a number of countries were involved, it was no wonder that 
Japan wished to have some self-help mechanism at a regional level. Such a framework 
was also likely to be a preventive measure by giving confidence to the markets.
Furthermore, it is particularly important to note the MOF’s deeper motive in proposing 
the swap arrangements. Namely, some key officials were still driven by the initial 
vision of establishing the AMF, albeit in the very long-term, and they thought that such 
arrangements could be a step towards this goal. A senior finance official, who has been 
a central figure in the MOF's effort to advance regional swap arrangements, 
commented that he and other MOF officials wanted to reinforce regional surveillance 
by encouraging regional policy discussion. According to him, it is very difficult to 
establish a surveillance system, and even the IMF does not have a perfect one. but he 
insists that having an effective surveillance system is essential to realising the AMF in
"9 Interview with Eisuke Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18. 2001. and
Masatsugu Asakawa (Director. Office of Regional Financial Co-operation. International Bureau. 
MOF). March 30, 2001.
Wei. "Japan should work with."
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the long-term.31 Furthermore, an official states that by advancing the Chiang Mai 
Initiative, Japan wanted to keep the momentum of regional financial cooperation, 
which had grown since the crisis occurred.32 Vice Finance Minister Kuroda, who has 
suggested that the AMF is Japan's medium-term, not long-term, agenda, is reported to 
have said at a meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir that he would not give 
up the AMF, and the shortest way towards the AMF is to expand the swap 
arrangements and to  establish a surveillance system.33
In short, the MOF is still aiming to establish a regional fund, more specifically the 
AMF. An official states that the MOF has been continuously considering a  multilateral 
framework since the crisis, as it would be more effective than bilateral agreements in 
terms o f  the impact on markets.34 Although MOF officials think that it is difficult to 
push the AMF at this stage and that the Chiang Mai Initiative may not necessarily lead 
to the AMF directly, it can at least keep the discussion on financial cooperation among 
East Asian countries alive. Also, if  such a mechanism begins to w ork well and 
encourages regional surveillance, it will lead to closer financial relations among East 
Asian countries, which can create a more favourable environment for the AMF.
Additionally, behind the M OF’s initiative concerning the East Asian swap 
arrangements, there is increasing support in Japan as well as in East Asia for closer 
regional financial cooperation, and the AMF in particular. It could be argued that such 
a favourable environment, to a certain extent, has helped the MOF push ahead with its 
agenda.
Within Japan, this support includes other Ministries, politicians, the business sector 
and influential academics. The MOFA appears to be more positive about a regional
31 Masatsugu Asakawa (Director. Office of Regional Financial Co-operation. International 
Bureau. MOF), March 30, 2001.
3" Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12, 2000.
33 Mainichi Slnnbun. 16 October 2000.
34 Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). March 28. 2001
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financial mechanism than in the past. It is notable that the Foreign Minister 
inaugurated the Study Group on International Economic and Financial Systems, which 
took the form o f  private study meetings for the Foreign Minister during the period 
between February and December 1999.35 While the MOFA’s interest in this subject 
itself is noteworthy, it is significant that the members o f  the Study Group, which 
consisted o f business leaders and leading academics, recognised the necessity to 
strengthen East Asian cooperation. Takatoshi Ito, Professor o f Hitotsubashi University 
and also Deputy' Vice Minister for International affairs o f the MOF (July 1999 -  July 
2001). stressed that there were two paths that Japan should proceed along in the future, 
namely to increase its voice in the IMF and to actively create a framework for regional 
cooperation in East Asia. He further argued that it was incumbent upon Japan to win 
East Asia's trust not only with its capital but also by systematically and proactively 
producing both human resources and ideas, such as the concept o f  the AMF. Hajime 
Shinohara, who is a long-term advocate o f the AMF, as mentioned before, also 
emphasised the significance o f the AMF, saying that Japan was expected to resubmit 
the AMF in a timely manner with strong resolve. Furthermore, Masaru Yoshitomi, 
Dean o f the Asian Development Bank Institute, said that the East Asian financial crisis 
exposed the systemic problems o f international finance, which highlighted the need for 
a regional fund to complement the IMF.
Some of the Japanese business associations have also become quite favourable to the 
AMF, partly because they have been advocating the necessity o f  the 
internationalisation o f the yen, and consider that a regional financial framework such 
as the AMF would contribute to advancing it. The Japan Association o f Corporate 
Executives (Keizaidoyukai), which consists o f big business leaders, supported the 
AMF in its report titled ‘A Private-Sector Perspective on the Internationalisation o f  the
”  Sec MOFA homepage, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/ccofin99/indcx.htinl
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Yen- A Study on Japanese and Asian Stability and G row th'.36 The president o f the 
Japan Federation o f  Economic Organisation (Keidanreri) , 37 which represents the 
interests o f big business, also sometimes refers to the AMF in his public speeches 38 *It 
is reported that the President o f  the Mitsui Global Strategic Institute stated that Japan 
should re-establish East Asian relations through the A MF”  The AMF or the Chiang 
Mai Initiative, or East Asian regionalism more generally, will not be directly 
concerned w ith business interests at least in the short term, and thus it is unlikely that 
any private firm or organisation will take any direct action to influence government 
policies on these subjects. However, the fact that top business people are positive 
about the AMF perhaps has provided a favourable environment for the MOF initiatives.
As far as the Japanese politicians arc concerned, it is reported that the MOF sought 
support for the AMF from the ruling LDP at a  party sub-committee (the sub-committee 
on international economic and financial affairs) in November 1999, and there were 
quite a few supportive responses from LDP members.4,7 Also, some influential LDP 
politicians seem to support the AMF.41 The least that can be said is that if  the AMF 
proposal has not yet gained a large political base, at least there is no strong opposition 
to it.
In the other East Asian countries, the support for the AMF varies from country to 
country, but on the whole it seems that the number o f people that backs the idea has 
been increasing, and the view that the AMF is necessary to further regional financial 
cooperation has become widely shared. The Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir has
” Sec Keizaidovukai homepage, www.doyukaior.jp/database/teigen/000511e.htm.
Keidanren merged with the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations (Nikkeiren). another 
business association, in May 2002. becoming Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren).
'K Sec. for instance. Nippon Keidanren homepage, www.kcidanrcn.orjp/japancsc/policv/2000/ 
007/shiryol.html.
Sec Just Net homepage (organised by Sony Communication Network Corporation). 
www2.justnet.ne.jp/~asia/infonn/amf.htm.
I Mainichi Shinbun. 18 November 1999.
II For instance, see Hajimc Kato's homepage, www2.justnct.nc.jp/~asia/inform/amfhtm. 
although he resigned his post as a member of the Diet in April 2002.
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been consistently supporting the AMF, while his Deputy suggested at a  symposium on 
ASEAN-Japan relations in Tokyo in September 2000 that the Chiang Mai Initiative 
will not be sufficient to meet the challenges ahead, and that it can and should be 
expanded to become part and parcel o f the AMF 42 It is reported that, at the conference 
the 'Future o f Asia", held in June 2000,43 with the participation o f  East Asian leaders 
and business executives, there were discussions about the AMF.44 For instance, the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs o f  the Philippines stressed that the country was supporting 
the East Asian Swap Arrangements, the AMF and the internationalisation of the yen, 
while Lee Kuan Yew, the Senior Minister o f Singapore, commented that, although he 
was not against the AMF, it had to be subsidiary to the IMF, as it was not possible to 
ignore The way the world is structured’. He also said that bitter medicine has to be 
administered from outside. Also, the ASEAN-Japan Consultation Conference (an 
Eminent Persons Group that the then Prime Minister Obuchi proposed to establish), 
which consists o f 26 members including academics and executives of private 
companies from ASEAN and Japan, recommended in October 2000 that ASEAN and 
Japan should study the establishment o f  the AMF that is consistent with global 
governance at the private level.45
South Korea, who originally supported the AMF in 1997, had kept silent about the idea, 
but it seems that it has recently begun to be more positive. Prime Minister Kim Jong- 
pil surprised many when he proposed the creation o f an Asian version o f the IMF, the 
size o f which would be around US$300 billion, during a meeting with the Japanese 
Prime Minister in November 1998, but the South Korean government failed to endorse 
the Premier's remark at that time, saving that it was not the government's official 
position In the following year Prime Minister Kim was again reported as reiterating
Sec tile Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia homepage, www.kln.gov.my/english/ 
contcnt/id\-spcechcs.htm
The conference was sponsored by Nihon Keizai Shinbun.
Sec Nihon Keizai Shinbun homepage. www.nni.nikkci.co.jp/FR/NIKKEI/inasia/futurc/
Sec the Japan Institute of International Affairs homepage, www.jiia.or.jp
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his call for the creation o f the A M F *  but still there was little support from the country. 
However, it seems that the government has not been entirely negative about the AMF 
recently. A senior finance ministry official said that regional countries would first need 
to establish bilateral guarantees, followed by a multilateral agreement, before the AMF 
could take root.47 Also, an official even said that the launching of a  monetary fund is 
critically important to Korea, as Korea's recovery from financial and economic woes is 
closely inter-linked with its East Asian trading partners.48
With respect to China, as argued before, its increasingly positive attitude towards East 
Asian cooperation is striking. Although China failed to support the AMF proposal in 
1997, there have been more positive responses from C hina to the idea lately. Angang 
Hu, a politically influential Chinese scholar and a member o f  the Chinese Academy o f  
Science, stated at the conference on the ‘Future o f Asia’ mentioned above that the view 
that it was necessary to support the AMF was gaining ground in China. Also, Premier 
Zhu Rongji was reported as saying that he wanted to support an "East Asian Monetary 
Fund' during the meeting with the Malaysian Prime M inister in November 1999 49 In 
fact, with respect to the swap arrangements, China has shown quite a positive attitude. 
China was actively involved in drafting an outline o f the swap arrangements together 
with Japan and South Korea, while, during the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers meeting 
in September 2000 in Prague following the annual W orld Bank/IMF meetings, the 
Chinese Minister repeatedly emphasized that the swap arrangements should be put in 
place as soon as possible.50 A lso, as discussed before, it was China who proposed to 
hold a Finance Deputies meeting among the ASEAN + 3 countries, which eventually 
led to the Chiang Mai Initiative. Yoichi Funabashi argues that without Japan and China 
sharing a similar, or the same, concept about the region, regionalism in East Asia was *18
" The Korea Herald. 3 September 1999.
1 The Korea Herald. 27 September 2000
18 The Korea Herald. 23 November 2000.
4 * Mainichi Shinbun. 18 October 2000.
Mainichi Shinbun. 18 October 2000.
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going to be difficult to develop.51 In this sense, this change in China’s stance is quite 
significant for the development o f East Asian regionalism, and the AMF in particular.
There has been some development in the implementation o f the proposed swap 
arrangements. The third meeting o f the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers was held in 
September 2000 in order to flesh out the plan. In August, before the meeting, officials 
from China. Japan and South Korea drafted the outline of the arrangements together, 
and presented it to the ASEAN partners. However, ASEAN countries expressed their 
disapproval o f it. While China, Japan and South Korea insisted that the acceptance o f 
the IMF program is a condition for receiving assistance through the regional swap 
arrangements, ASEAN requested more flexibility.52 During the Finance Ministers 
meeting in September 2000, ASEAN and the other three countries were in direct 
confrontation with each other on this point. In the event, the outline of the process to 
implement the regional swap arrangements was later agreed on at the ASEAN + 3 
Summit in November 2000. The issue o f the relationship between the regional facility 
and IMF assistance was decided as follows: assistance through the regional swap 
arrangements will be extended when a recipient country has already received an IMF 
loan, or is expecting to get it in the near future; however, when the countries w ho are 
giving credit consider that the recipient country is facing a short-term liquidity 
problem, the recipient country' could obtain assistance through the arrangements o f  up 
to an amount o f 10 percent o f its limit without linkage of the credit with IMF loans. As 
mentioned above, Japan has already concluded the swap arrangements with South 
Korea, Thailand, The Philippines, Malaysia and China.
The expansion of the ASEAN + 3 framework to other areas
In addition to the development o f regionalism in the area o f finance, regional
51 Interview with Yoichi Funabashi (Asahi Shinbun). June 1, 2000.
‘ Mainichi Shinbun. 18 October 2000.
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cooperation in East Asia has expanded to other areas. The Economic Ministers o f  the 
ASEAN + 3 countries held the first meeting in M ay 2000 in Yangon and agreed to 
meet twice a year. They agreed to encourage technical cooperation in information 
technology and e-commerce and to accelerate trade, investment and technology 
transfers. Moreover, following their joint statement in November 1999, the Foreign 
Ministers o f the sam e countries gathered for the first time in July 2000 in Bangkok. 
They also agreed to  meet twice a  year on the regular basis in order to discuss the areas 
o f human resources development, the problems o f  economic disparity, science and 
security.53 It remains to be seen to what extent these meetings o f  the Economic as well 
as Foreign m inisters will produce fruitful outcomes. In particular, there is an obvious 
limitation to discussing security' issues without the US, given the region’s heavy 
security dependence on the US. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that East Asia has now 
additional new bodies to advance regional cooperation. As o f the end of 2000, East 
Asia has an annual summit meeting and three ministerial meetings, o f the Finance, 
Economic and Foreign Ministers, each due to be held twice a year.
The fourth meeting of ASEAN + 3 in November 2000
There was another step towards closer cooperation in East Asia before the turn  o f the 
century. The ASEAN + 3 leaders met in N ovem ber 2000 for their fourth meeting, and 
agreed to set up a  study group to consider two remarkable ideas, namely an East Asian 
summit and an East Asian free trade zone. The form er idea, which was proposed by 
Malaysia, is an attempt to replace the present form o f the ASEAN + 3 meeting, to 
which ASEAN invites the northern three countries, with a forum where each country 
attends as a mem ber o f East Asia although the forum consists o f the same countries. 
Additionally, Thailand proposed the latter idea o f  an East Asian free trade zone, and 
the leaders also agreed that, in addition to the trade area, the study group will 
investigate the possibility o f creating a free investment area as well
53 Nihon Kcizai Shinbun. 27 July 2000.
Despite the difficulties that the two ideas, in all likelihood, will face, particularly given 
that even within ASEAN the advancement o f  the free trade area called the ASEAN 
Free Trade A rea (AFTA) has not been very smooth, it is noteworthy that the 
establishment o f  the study group that will work on these ideas was agreed on by the 
leaders and there was no particular opposition to it, quite contrary to the negative 
reactions to the EAEC proposal in the early 1990s. As for ASEAN, Malaysia and 
Thailand were very positive about the two ideas, while Singapore was more guarded 
and stressed a gradual approach to them.54
As far as Japan's stance is concerned, the then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshio Mori 
suggested, after the meeting, that Japan would like to deepen the discussion about an 
East Asian summit with ASEAN,55 although Japan seems to be more cautious about a 
free trade area. The then Foreign Minister Kono said that the idea o f a free trade area 
would not be easy and would need further investigation among regional officials as 
well as ministers.56 As for South Korea, who proposed more wide-ranging cooperation 
that included cultural issues, it was reportedly supportive about the two ideas. In fact, 
in early November, when the then Japanese MIT1 Minister visited South Korea. 
President Kim Dae-jung told the Minister that he thought East Asia needed a 
framework for regional cooperation that is equivalent to the EU and NAFTA.57 Also, 
the president’s aides were reported to promote his vision for transforming the ASEAN 
+ 3 grouping into an economic community eventually.58
The Chinese officials refrained from expressing China’s stance on the two ideas. It 
seems that China was a  little bit embarrassed by the proposal about an East Asian free 
trade area, as it originally suggested the possibility o f a free trade area among the
54 Tile Bangkok Post. 26 November 2000. and The Straits Times. 25 November 2000.
5 Nihon Keizai Shinbun. 25 November 20(X).
56 Nihon Keizai Shinbun. 24 November 2000.
Nihon Kei/ai Shinbun. 4 November 2000.
'* The Korea Herald. 27 November 2000.
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ASEAN countries and China, not among East Asian countries, before the summit. 
However. China began to accept cooperation that includes Japan and Korea, although, 
at the same time, it continued to  make an effort to form a FTA w ith ASEAN by 
showing plans to liberalise its agricultural market and to support the development o f 
underdeveloped countries, such as Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia ' During the summit 
meeting. Chinese Premier Zhu declared that China would advance cooperation with 
ASEAN together with Japan and South Korea, while China agreed that the leaders of 
the three Northeast Asian countries, China, Japan and South Korea, would meet 
regularly on the occasion o f the ASEAN + 3 summits, despite previous opposition.
It is worth exploring briefly here Japan's present stance on East Asian regionalism in 
the field o f  trade, as, given its economic weight in the region, its intentions in this 
regard will greatly influence the destiny of an East Asian free trade area. In spite o f  its 
fairly cautious attitude about the idea o f a free trade area, as mentioned above, Japan is 
not definitely opposed to it. Japan has actually been thinking about this possibility, 
although it has not elaborated yet a  complete picture o f its medium-term trade policy. 
It is unquestionable that the Japanese government has been shifting its trade policy to 
diversify its options and embrace bilateral as well as regional trade arrangements, 
instead o f relying exclusively on the multilateral framework centred on the WTO. It 
has already signed a  bilateral free trade arrangement with Singapore in January 2002 
and has launched preliminary discussions with South Korea. It is significant that the 
2000 M1TI W hite Paper boldly argues that there are benefits to regional cooperation 
(integration), maintaining that regional integration, which could give Japan an 
economic advantage, should be pursued as a supplement to the multilateral trading 
system. A senior MITI official made the point that contemplating a  free trade area 
between Japan and South Korea or Singapore did not at all suggest that Japan was *
J A year later in November 2001, China and ASEAN agreed to create a FTA with each other 
for the next ten years. In May 2002, senior officials from China and ASEAN agreed to establish 
a negotiation committee so that a framework agreement on the establishment of a FTA could be 
concluded by the end of the year.
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considering a bilateral agreement only with these two countries, although there had not 
been clear consensus in the M1TI about how they would advance regional integration 
in the future.60 He also said there had been a clear shift in the M ITl’s interest from 
APEC to smaller East Asian cooperation.61 Furthermore, Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi, when visiting the ASEAN countries in January 2002, stated in his speech 
that he would like to propose an Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, that the bilateral agreement with Singapore was an example of 
such an economic partnership, and that there was a need to stretch it from trade and 
investment to science technology, human resource development and tourism "
It could be argued that this shift in Japan’s trade policy comes partly from closer 
economic relations with East Asian nations, and partly from a sense o f fear that it 
might be left out, given that most major countries have joined some sort o f trade 
arrangement, regional or bilateral, together with unease about the future o f the WTO. 
Although the prospect o f an East Asian free trade area is yet to materialise, it is 
nonetheless o f  note that Japan, the largest economy in the region, has begun to 
consider the possibility o f East Asian integration seriously.
The stance of the US on East Asian regionalism
It must be noted that, although the East Asian financial crisis has contributed to the 
current advancement o f East Asian regionalism, as argued below, this trend would
Interview with Akira Kawamoto (Director. International Trade and Research Office. 
International Trade Policy Bureau. M1TI). May 26. 2000. In his opinion, it is difficult to think 
about a regional integration that includes China, and Japan should probably start by working 
with ASEAN and South Korea.
61 Interview with Akira Kawamoto (Director. International Trade and Research Office. 
International Trade Policy Bureau, MITI), May 26. 2000.
Later in April/May. 2002. Prime Minister Koizumi, in his speech during his visit to Asia 
Pacific countries, stated that "further strengthening of regional economic partnership by 
focusing on trade and investment is very important." but failed to refer to any concrete plan. 
Instead, he stressed the cautious approach by saying that: “|i]n East Asia, we should give 
consideration to the diversity in the region and the uniqueness of other countries. Furthermore, 
in promoting cooperation and joint regional initiatives, we should respect the existing regional 
cooperation frameworks." (MOFA homepage, www.mofa.go.jp/rcgion/asia-paci/pmv0204/ 
speech.html)
have had difficulty in progressing without a change in the US stance. The US has not 
opposed the development o f regionalism in East Asia, in contrast to its hostile attitude 
towards the EAEG in the early 1990s and the AMF in 1997. The US failed to respond 
to the Joint Statement o f the ASEAN + 3 Summit in November 1999, while its attitude 
was surprisingly positive with respect to the proposal for the East Asian swap 
arrangements in May 2000. The then Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers was 
reported as saying that he would give maximum support to the agreement.63
There appear to be a few reasons for this change in the US stance on East Asian 
cooperation. For one thing, although the US may not like these developments, it finds 
it difficult to find an appropriate way to respond to them. Its strong opposition to the 
AMF proposal in 1997 as well as its policy towards the East Asian financial crisis 
generated the negative reaction o f East Asian countries. This has made the US more 
sensitive in its attitude towards the recent movement in East Asia. It may be argued 
that the US wants to avoid being seen to interfere with what East Asian countries are 
eagerly advancing Also, the fact that even within the US there arc criticisms against 
the government's opposition to the AMF has made the US more cautious about its 
position Furthermore, Sakakibara considers that the East Asian regionalism has not 
been seen as threatening to the US so far, for instance, the swap arrangements are 
linked to IMF policies almost completely (90 %).64
The crisis and the momentum of East Asian regionalism
It has been shown so far that the trend o f  East Asian regionalism in the late 1990s can 
be explained by various long-term factors, such as the deepening o f economic 
interdependence as well as the declining interest in APEC. Japan’s interests in 
supporting the East Asian frameworks, and East Asian financial regionalism in *61
’ Nihon Kci/ai Shinbun. 10 May 2000.
61 Interview with Eisukc Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18, 2001
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particular, have been considered in Chapter 4 and in this chapter. These arguments 
contradict the popular view that it was the East Asian financial crisis that triggered the 
development o f regionalism in East Asia, and that Japan's interest in regional financial 
cooperation has stemmed from the crisis,65 stressing that such changes in East Asia and 
in Japanese policy should be considered in a longer-term and deeper context.
Nevertheless, the impact o f the crisis on East Asian regionalism should not be 
overlooked. In fact the crisis in 1997 and 1998 accelerated this trend greatly. A senior 
Japanese MOFA official, who w as deeply involved in the process o f East Asian 
cooperation, stated that the impact o f the crisis on the East Asian economies, and in 
turn on their policies, was immense, far more than generally recognised. He also said 
that the event intensified the growing trend to strengthen East Asian cooperation for 
peace and prosperity in East Asia.66 This section explores how the crisis has affected 
the trend o f East Asian regionalism
First o f all, the crisis has not only made the regional countries realise more clearly 
their economic interdependence, but it has also given them a considerable shock. It 
revealed to them the fact that they could be vulnerable to the negative effects o f 
globalisation, a process they had thought to be entirely beneficial to them. When the 
currency crisis happened in Thailand in July 1997, no one could expect that the crisis 
would spread to such a large part o f the region so rapidly. This contagion o f currency 
devaluations and the fall o f  stock markets were actually caused by the global 
movement o f capital and speculation, but the economic interdependence o f the 
countries involved, which had been developed by the regional networks o f trade and 
investment, affected the views o f  these markets, and eventually allowed the currency 
crisis to lead to the region-wide economic crisis. In some countries, a lot o f what they
65 For instance, see Saori N. Katada. "Japan and Asian Monetary Regionalism: Cultivating a 
New Regional Leadership after the Asian Financial Crisis." Geopolitics 7. 1 (2002).
66 Interview with Masahiro Kohara (Director. Regional Policy Division. Asian Affairs Bureau. 
MOFA), May 12, 2000.
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had achieved economically in the previous decades, and which had given pride and 
confidence not only to the policymaking elite but also to their people, was lost 
overnight. Also, as argued before, the extent o f the crisis affected C hina’s stance on 
regionalism, and China came to recognise the significance o f  regional cooperation 
This change in China’s position is an essential factor if  East Asian regionalism is to 
advance forward. Thus, it can be argued that ASEAN + 3 was, in a sense, developed 
out o f the need to  overcome this shock o f the crisis. The East Asian countries came to 
be more aware o f  their economic interdependence and the necessity o f  some self-help 
measures to protect their economics against the forces of globalisation In this sense, 
the trend o f  East Asian regionalism in the late 1990s was a w ay to cope with 
globalisation, rather than a response to regionalism in other areas.
In addition, during the course o f the crisis, the disappointment with the US stance on 
East Asia grew significantly, which reinforced the trend for East Asian regionalism. 
The East Asian countries began to feel that East Asia was really too distant for the US, 
and also that the US was less willing to engage in East Asian matters. The US prompt 
policy towards the crises in Russia and Latin America following the East Asian crisis 
presented a  clear contrast to its reluctant attitude towards the Thai crisis, when it failed 
to contribute, and its relations with the East Asian countries subsequently became 
awkward Also, the US did not provide any actual money for bilateral assistance to the 
crisis-hit countries in East Asia, although it contrived to form a second line o f  defence 
in the rescue packages for Indonesia and South Korea and put its name on the list o f 
contributors. A MOF official comments that there is not doubt that the crisis generated 
a sense that the affected countries had to help themselves, and that self-help was the 
only alternative, and this has contributed greatly to the region's interest in further 
financial cooperation/’7
Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). March 28. 2001.
Meanwhile, the IMF policies towards the East Asian financial crisis, which demanded 
radical structural reforms and austerity policies, were not regarded as effective and 
convincing by East Asian countries. Instead, the IMF policies left a bitter taste in the 
region and even resentment.6* The IMF failed to prevent the crisis from spreading, and 
in Indonesia the financial crisis even led to a political crisis. In other countries, too, it 
took quite a long time to get their economies back on track. As discussed before, some 
have even discussed a conspiracy involving the US and the IMF Also, Japan's 
dissatisfaction with the IMF in particular heightened as the crisis deepened, especially 
after the disagreement over the rescue package for Indonesia between the MOF and 
the IMF. Furthermore, as the crisis spread outside East Asia and the grounds the US 
and the IMF had had for blaming the region's crony capitalism in causing the crisis 
weakened. East Asian countries began to criticise the present international financial 
system, which allowed global capitals and specifically hedge funds to destroy their 
financial systems. Considering these factors, there is no wonder that the East Asian 
countries became increasingly discontent with the Washington Consensus, which 
strengthened their sense that self-help was the only alternative
Furthermore, the crisis has created a more favourable environment for Japan's larger 
role in the region It was after all Japan who provided most o f the necessary funds to 
address the crisis. The announcement o f the New Miyazawa Initiative was effective 
and timely, and the regional countries deeply appreciated it. As mentioned before, 
Japan's total assistance during the E ast Asian financial crisis eventually amounted to 
US$80 billion. In addition, a senior M ITI official emphasised that, despite a  decline in 
the number o f new Japanese direct investments in East Asia after the East Asian 
financial crisis, Japanese firms that had already invested locally rarely withdrew, nor 
did they lay off their employees in large numbers, and this convinced the East Asian
’* Higgott, "The International Relations o f the Asian Economic Crisis.”
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leaders and people that Japan was taking its commitments towards them seriously.69 
On the other hand, the crisis revealed the limitation o f the ability o f ASEAN to protect 
its economy by itself This seems to make more countries and more policy makers in 
ASEAN favour the expansion o f  their framework o f cooperation to the Northeast 
Asian countries as a strategy to restore its economic vigour and to have a  larger voice 
in the world. Even South Korea, who has been historically suspicious o f Japan’s 
dominance in the region, has become very interested in a regional framework, largely 
due to its humiliating experience during the crisis and a sense o f the vulnerability o f its 
economy in the world. In short, an East Asian mechanism, in which it is essential for 
Japan to assume a  m ajor role, has become more accepted in the region.
The crisis also increased the opportunities for policymakers in the region to work 
together. The Thai rescue package was the first significant event in which East Asian 
countries showed their commitment to resolve together a regional issue, feeling a 
sense o f community. As the crisis spread to a large part o f the region, the regional 
officials were deeply involved in various meetings throughout 1997 and 1998 in a 
search for ways to cope with the problems. For instance, there were various intensive 
discussions concerning the AMF in 1997 among regional policymakers, and Japan sent 
some missions to East Asian countries, including the missions for implementing the 
New Miyazawa Initiative and later the Okuda Mission, to discuss with the countries 
involved how to reconstruct their economics and how Japan could help them. Some 
new bodies for regional dialogue, such as the Manila Framework and the ASEAN- 
Japan Finance M inisters’ as well as Finance Deputies’ meetings, which began to be 
held after the crisis happened, obviously increased the opportunity for top-level 
interactions among East Asian countries. In order to deal with the increasing level o f  
communication am ong East Asian officials, the Japanese MOF set up a new office
Interview with Akira Kawamoto (Director. International Trade and Research Office. 
International Trade Policy Bureau, MITI), May 26, 2000.
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named the Asian Currency Office under the International Bureau o f the Ministry in 
July 1998™ An official working in the Office comm ented that the number of meetings 
related to the East Asian issues increased dramatically since the crisis, and there was 
always somebody from the Office on an official trip to  some regional country71 It can 
be argued that these opportunities afforded by the crisis for the proliferation of 
communications among East Asian countries has further expanded their collective 
activities in the region, and has fed into a further intense and extensive efforts to build 
the East Asian networks o f  cooperation, particularly in the financial area. All o f  these 
activities have contributed to the recent momentum fo r regionalism in East Asia.
Some implications for the study of regionalism
Finally, it is worth discussing the implications o f  the empirical case of East Asian 
regionalism for the study o f  regionalism more generally. The development o f East 
Asian regionalism in the late 1990s has emphasised the importance o f interaction and 
learning for economic cooperation While several factors, such as the deepening 
economic interdependence, have provided a background against which East Asian 
regionalism could develop, some changes in the mind-set of East Asian policymaking 
officials, largely as a consequence of the financial crisis, have actually accelerated the 
process As argued above, the crisis gave East Asian countries a common lesson 
concerning the risks and defects o f the global capital markets as well as the existing 
international economic system. They also learned the necessity o f self-help, 
particularly in the financial area. Furthermore, the crisis definitely increased 
communication among regional countries. Masayuki Tadokoro points out that "the 
common bitter experiences and shared memories o f  working together to overcome the 
crisis among central bankers and financial officials in the region undoubtedly
The name has been changed lo the Office of Regional Financial Co-operation 
1 Interview with a MOF official (International Bureau). May 12, 20(H).
enhanced the sense that Asians are all on the same boat."72 This awareness has been an 
essential clement in advancing the recent development o f regionalism in East Asia.
These changes in the mind-set o f the East Asian policymakers are significant enough 
to be characterised as cognitive learning as opposed to tactical learning,7' although 
how East Asian regionalism will develop in the future remains to be seen. Before the 
crisis, no country in East Asia doubted that the global capital markets and the 
deregulation o f financial systems would give them economic benefits. The crisis 
disproved this belief. As the recent trend o f  East Asian regionalism is based on a new 
awareness that the crisis brought about, and the impact o f the crisis is very' deep, it is 
not likely that East Asian countries will forget these lessons easily. In addition, for 
Japan, who has consistently wished for the US involvement in East Asia, the decision 
to advance a regional framework where the US is not included is very significant. In 
particular, the idea o f  East Asian cooperation, especially financial cooperation, has 
become more entrenched in Japan. As discussed before, the support came not only 
from the MOF, but also other ministries such as the MOFA and the MIT1, some 
politicians, academics and the private sector. As a senior MOF official said,
it is inevitable that the American commitment to  Asia will decrease in the 
future in terms of both security' and economic issues, considering the change 
in the international system resulting mainly from the end o f  the Cold War. 
Therefore. Asia has to prepare for the US’s gradual withdrawal from the 
region by starting to work for a  regional framework, and this sort o f 
consideration seems to be shared by a quite large number of high-ranked *3
" Tadokoro. "Asian Monetary Crisis.” p. 18.
3 According to Richard Higgott. in tactical learning the behaviour of regional states changes in 
order to respond to domestically generated needs and interests, while cognitive learning is 
accompanied by value change, namely the change in "regional values and aims, or more 
specifically the values of the individual regional states towards questions of economic 
autonomy, sovereignty and economic policymaking." (Richard Higgott. “Economic 
Cooperation,” pp 103-117.)
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officials across key ministries.74
In short, Japan's positive stance on East Asian regionalism is based on the strong belief 
of a wide range o f Japanese policymakers that East Asia should have some self-help 
mechanism to ensure the stability and prosperity o f the region and that o f  Japan.
Given all this, it is reasonable to argue that the current momentum o f East Asian 
regionalism is not merely a short-lived fad. It is based on significant changes in the 
beliefs o f the East Asian as well as the Japanese policymakers, brought about by the 
East Asian crisis. Therefore, it can be expected that they will continue to  work for this 
new project in the foreseeable future, although it may be a gradual process.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown how East Asian regionalism has developed since the late 
1990s and the role Japan played in that development. East Asian regionalism has 
grown out o f  ASEAN's invitation o f the three Northeast Asian countries to its annual 
meeting, and thus ASEAN has assumed a prominent role. However, Japan has played 
an important role behind the scenes before and after this invitation was made, and 
these efforts contributed greatly to the advancement o f East Asian regionalism While 
Japan’s economic resources themselves are essential for the East Asian regional 
frameworks, particularly for the financial frameworks, Japan has not been passive 
diplomatically and politically, but has been engaged actively in the development o f 
such frameworks. It dispatched the Okuda Mission, which led to  the Obuchi plan 
announced in November 1999, when Japan pledged its contribution to the regional 
process. Japan also made some important proposals, such as holding the ASEAN + 3 
Foreign Ministers meeting. Furthermore, the chapter has documented Japan's behind 
the scenes role in advancing the Chiang Mai Initiative by negotiating with the
1 Interview with Shuhci Kishunoto (Director. Asian Currency Office, International Bureau, 
MOF). May 18. 2000 (author's translation).
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countries concerned as well as the US very cautiously. These behind the scenes 
initiatives of Japan, together with its economic resources, have greatly encouraged the 
development o f  East Asian regionalism, although, as discussed above, there are 
various other factors that facilitated this development. This low-profile style o f 
Japanese policy is the subject o f the next chapter, where it will be examined more 
comprehensively in the longer-term context o f  postwar Japanese foreign policy.
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CHAPTER 6
The Style of Japanese Foreign Policy:
A Low-profile and Incremental Approach
While looking at what Japan actually did in dealing with the East Asian crisis and 
towards East Asian regionalism and considering the factors that led to these policies, 
the previous two chapters noted how Japanese policymakers have successfully tried to 
promote their policy agendas, namely East Asian cooperation in general and East 
Asian financial regionalism in particular, by taking into account the long-term 
perspective. This chapter reconsiders these issues, placing them in the context o f the 
style o f  Japanese foreign policy in the postw ar period.
The style of Japanese foreign policy in the postwar period
Among the various policies Japan implemented during the East Asian financial crisis, 
the AMF proposal in September 1997 deserves special attention. The proposal was, as 
Altbach points out, indeed atypical o f  traditional Japanese foreign policy in the sense 
that Japan assertively articulated a policy and tried to take an independent initiative to 
realise the idea. He is correct to argue ‘'the [AMF] plan represented one o f the most 
ambitious foreign economic policy proposals to come out o f Tokyo in the postwar 
period.” 1 As this thesis has argued so far, Japan has gradually begun to show its 
willingness to take more initiative in the region as well as in the wider international 
society, and in fact, the AMF proposal can be seen as evidence o f this change in the 
nature o f Japanese foreign policy. However, what gives this proposal particular 
significance is the way Japan proposed the idea: it tried to take an overt and assertive 
initiative in the region, which looks like a departure from the usual way that Japan has 
pursued its aims.
1 Eric Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Fund Proposal." p.2.
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As touched on in previous chapters, it can be argued that Japan has avoided taking an 
obvious and dominant leadership role throughout the postwar period, even in the 
region, where its economic superiority is overwhelming. This has often led to the 
criticism that it is reluctant to play a role, or to assume the leadership, that reflects its 
economic ability in the region, let alone in wider international circles, and that may 
have contributed to the im age o f Japanese foreign policy as immobilism or Japan as a 
reactive state. This may be correct if leadership is taken to mean merely ‘hegemony’ or 
dominant actions by one or more countries to compel others to go along with their 
preferred agendas 2 However, this thesis argues that Japan has carried out its policies in 
a different style from what the dominant international relations circles usually expect. 
Japan has preferred to keep a low-profile approach while quietly and incrementally 
carrying out its policies to  pursue policy objectives, and that style o f Japanese foreign 
policy has been quite effective, given the domestic, regional and international 
constraints imposed on it. Japan has tried to avoid being regarded as taking the lead 
dominantly, but has taken some initiatives behind the scenes, gradually steering the 
situation in a direction favourable to Japan’s national interests.
This style o f  Japanese policy has been already referred to in several places in the thesis, 
with some references to various academic works. The following section summarises 
these discussions on the low-profile and incremental nature o f  Japanese policy.
The Yoshida Doctrine and its implications for the style o f  Japanese foreign policy
To begin with, Japan's basic policy stance after the Second World War. based on the 
Yoshida Doctrine, namely the separation o f economic matters and political matters, the
2 This understanding of the concept of leadership is close to what Oran Young calls structural 
leadership’, namely the form of leadership derived from the possession of material resources, 
which is translated into bargaining leverage in negotiations in an effort to bring pressure to bear 
on others. On the other hand, the argument on the style of Japanese policy in this thesis is 
probably related to Young's 'entrepreneurial leadership’, which is the use of negotiating skill to 
frame mutually acceptable deals and to persuade others to support them (Oran R. Young. 
"Political Leadership and Regime Formation: on the Development of Institutions in 
International Society.” International Organization 45, 3 (1991). pp.281-308.)
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concentration on economic development and minimalist diplomatic as well as security 
policy, can be considered in the context o f this discussion on the style o f  Japanese 
policy. It is true that this policy has come at a large political cost. Japan’s heavy 
economic as well as security dependence on the US has greatly constrained Japanese 
policy, and at times has forced Japanese policy makers to conduct diplomacy cautiously 
and to compromise quite often w ith US requests, as discussed before. However, in a 
long-term perspective the Yoshida line has undoubtedly favoured the postwar Japanese 
economy and has greatly affected Japan's later political economy, laying the 
foundation for the current international and regional position o f  Japan In fact, its one­
sided dependence on the US was actually what Japan chose, as discussed in Chapter 2 
It was Japanese policy makers' clever way o f pursuing national interests under the 
peculiar international situation o f  Cold War bipolarity and given its devastated 
economy. In particular, the conclusion o f the US-Japan Security Treaty after the 
Second World War. to which Japan's dependence can be largely attributed, was the 
result o f Prime Minister Y oshidas skilful strategy. Indeed, it was a bold decision to 
entrust a  country''s military fate to  another country, even though it constrained Japan's 
policy options and gave the US leverage over Japan. However, it is fair to say that this 
policy o f  Yoshida, accompanied by generous access to US markets (which Japan also 
obtained by choosing to support US Cold War strategies), greatly contributed to 
Japan's quick recovery from the postwar economic ruin and led to  remarkable 
development thereafter throughout the 1960s and 1970s by allowing it to concentrate 
on economic issues. Also, this security relationship based on the treaty between the US 
and Japan was significant domestically as well, as it accommodated the Japanese 
people’s pacifism and anti-militarism after the war. In short, it could be argued that 
Japan’s minimalist diplomacy has established quietly and effectively its international 
position in the long-term perspective.
This policy has also contributed to the development o f  Japan's postwar regional
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relations, in the sense that the US-Japan Security Treaty has helped to weaken the fear 
o f the neighbouring countries that Japan might re-emerge as a dominant military power. 
The US engagement in East Asia through the security treaty has been regarded as a 
deterrent to Japan's militarism by East Asian countries, and thus has given them 
reassurance. This guarantee o f Japan’s good conduct through the security treaty and 
US engagement in East Asia has laid the foundation for allowing Japan to conduct a 
regional policy, albeit in a low-profile way, which has gradually and significantly 
contributed to recovering relations with its neighbours, so that Japan has been able to 
successfully expand its role in the region throughout the postwar period mainly by 
using its economic resources.
To sum up, it can be argued that the Yoshida line as hoshu honryu has affected quite 
favourably and gradually the postwar development o f  Japan's foreign policy. It 
enabled Japan to achieve its current status o f  economic power, while contributing to 
the gradual improvement o f its regional relations. ’
In addition to  what the US-Japan Security Treaty has contributed to Japan’s regional 
relations, as discussed in Chapter 2, Japan's economic power has gradually affected 
neighbouring countries throughout the postwar period and has helped Japan to build 
closer relations w ith them. This has led to the consolidation o f  Japan's economic and 
political position, and has eventually begun to allow Japan to take more initiative 
regionally. Although its regional policy was very limited in the 1950s and 1960s, Japan 
started a low-profile diplomacy with the region through aid, which developed into one 
o f Japan's core policy tools towards East Asia, while making the region increasingly 3
3 There are also several criticisms against the Yoshida Doctrine. For instance. Masatoshi Ota. 
former MOFA official, stresses that, although the Yoshida Doctrine was probably a clever 
stance at the time, given the situation in which Japan was put. it had a lasting influence on the 
Japanese public. It was the source of a sense of dependence on other countries, w hich led to the 
adoption of the principle of conceding anything to avoid trouble, and thus constrained Japanese 
foreign policy. (Tadae Takubo. Masatoshi Ota and Shigeo Hiramatsu. cds.. Nihongaiko no 
Saitenken Ire-examination of Japanese diplomacvl (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin sha. 2000), pp. 3-46.)
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reliant on Japan. Also, successive Japanese leaders have tried to address East Asian 
relations, and it has become almost a custom that they make official visits to Southeast 
Asian countries and make policy speeches, usually pledging new economic assistance. 
In particular, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Fukuda Doctrine adopted in 1977 
contributed greatly to the subsequent development o f Japan-ASEAN relations. With 
respect to its China relations, even before the normalisation o f diplomatic relations in 
1972, Japan maintained economic channels with China under the seikei burnt policy. 
After the normalisation, Japan has dealt with China very cautiously through formal 
and informal networks, or "politics behind politics’,4 and has been the largest aid donor 
to China Furthermore, particularly since the 1980s, Japan's private and public capital 
has flown into the East Asian economy, which has not only triggered the 
régionalisation o f the East Asian economy and has moulded a new regional economic 
order, but has also raised Japan’s profile in the region, leading to ever closer relations 
between Japan and East Asian countries. This has gradually created Japan’s long-term 
influence, initially economically but increasingly more politically, and a regional 
climate that allows its larger, albeit limited, role there. Hook et al. note, ‘"Japan, 
through a policy o f  careful re-engagement and quiet diplomacy with East Asian states 
in the post-war era. has undoubtedly succeeded in manoeuvring itself into a position 
w hereby it has regained the ability to construct and lead a  latent East Asian region.”5
Japan has used its economic resources for diplomatic purpose not only in its bilateral
relations: by contributing to international organisations Japan has tried to enhance its
international position in the long-term, and indirectly to increase its regional
influence.6 Despite the ideological difference between Japan and the Washington
Consensus, as discussed in Chapter 3, Japan has never neglected its role in
international organisations. On the contrary, contributing to international organisations
4 Quanshcng Zhao. Japanese Policy Making: the Politics behind Politics (Westport: Praeger 
Publishers. 1993).
s Hook ct al.. Japan's International Relations, p 227.
6 Yasutomo, The New Multilateralism. p.62-63.
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has become one o f  the mainstays of Japanese foreign policy. Japan is now the second 
largest contributor to many international organisations, including the UN and the 
World Bank, and the largest to the ADB, together with the US. Drifte points out that 
■international organisations provide an environment where Japan can take on certain 
leadership functions without being perceived as an obvious leader and without 
sacrificing too much political capital.”7 He goes further on this point and notes the 
‘catalytic’ nature o f  Japanese foreign policy, where Japan chooses to cooperate and 
make coalitions with other states, transnational institutions and private sector groups to 
achieve its goals rather than taking on the traditional type o f  leadership. Drifte calls 
this incremental and low-profile type o f leadership Japan’s 'leadership by stealth’ .8
It can be argued that this incremental and low-profile style o f  Japanese policy has built 
an environment that has allowed Japan to play a larger role even in the security area 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there has been a shift in Japan’s attitude towards the 
country’s security policy since the early 1990s due to the end of the Cold War, and 
specifically because o f the severe international criticism o f  Japan's failure to make a 
military contribution to  the UN operation during the G ulf War. It was argued that some 
politicians and bureaucrats arc quite positive about allowing the SDF to conduct more 
extensive military' activities. Although the majority o f  politicians, bureaucrats, 
influential academics and business leaders still wish strongly for a US military 
presence in Japan and East Asia, an increasing number o f people now accept the wider, 
albeit limited, role o f  the SDF. as the poll presented in Chapter 2 shows Japan also 
began to voice its views on regional security matters, being more positive about 
regional security dialogues, an attitude which could not have been imagined a few 
decades ago This new move of Japan since the early 1990s has become possible and 
less controversial domestically and regionally as a  result o f  the incremental and low-
Driftc. Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 134.
8 Ibid., pp. 171-173.
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profile approach throughout the postwar period that built up regional relations based 
on economic resources under the US-Japan Security Treaty. Although not all the 
regional countries are supportive o f  Japan’s larger security role, the fear that Japan will 
resort to military means again as it did more than half a century ago has gradually 
abated, if  not completely disappeared. Also, as Hook et al. point out, Japan has 
successfully strengthened its military by taking careful account o f  both internal and 
external pressures. That is, while Japanese policymakers have avoided taking a bold 
and visible decision about its security policy, and relied on the US hegemony, Japan 
has incrementally and quietly reinforced its SDF force, which has now become an 
ultra-modem fighting force.9
The shift in Japan's stance on security issues since the early 1990s has actually been a 
very incremental development Japan's ability to take relatively quick action after the 
terrorist incidents on September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington and the fairly 
w ide domestic consensus about the possible dispatch o f the SDF on limited logistical 
missions in wartime for the first time, which can be seen as a major development in 
Japan's security policy considering the government's past hesitant attitude towards 
dispatching the SDF overseas even for PKO, were possible against the background o f  
this step-by-step process o f  gradually shifting Japan's security stance since the early 
1990s. Japanese policymaking agents and intellectuals as well as the public have gone
through various stages o f  extensive discussion about Japan's security framework
/
throughout the 1990s, starting in 1990 during the G ulf War through the passage o f  the 
PKO Bill in June 1992 and the deliberation over the revised Japan-US defence 
cooperation guidelines from September 1997 to September 1999. In addition, as 
argued in Chapter 2, even the discussion about revising the constitution has been 
gaining momentum since the early 1990s. Based on these developments in the 1990s, 
Japan finally was able to dispatch the SDF during the actual military actions in
Hook cl al.. Japan's International Relations, p 72.
216
Afghanistan following the September 11 incident, although it was limited to providing 
logistical and non-combat support. Stockwin points out that in 1960 the revision o f the 
Security Treaty, which forced the Prime M inister out o f office, eventually passed 
through Diet, and despite the political crisis subsequent to the government's failing to 
deal with the G ulf War, the debate over the G u lf War crisis led to the passage o f the 
PKO Bill a  year and a  h a lf later. All this is proof that
immobilist politics does not, in the Japanese case, mean a total inability to  
effect political change, rather that a  cumbersome process o f consensus­
building and o f  exhausting all possibilities has to be gone through for change 
to eventuate.10
Similarly, Hook and McCormack argue:
Unlike the dramatic and sudden changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union symbolized by the collapse o f  the Berlin Wall and the break-up o f  the 
West’s nuclear antagonist throughout the Cold War period, in Japan change 
only began to gather momentum after a  prolonged period o f  unravelling, 
fatigue and uncertainty, during which the framework and direction imposed by 
Cold War politics and the growth economy dissolved slowly. The call on Japan 
to make a military' contribution to the resolution o f  the G ulf War made the 
search for a new way forward all the more imperative, but it was only when it 
was clear that old ways no longer worked that the national debate slowly 
turned to focus on the options available for Japan in the emerging new world 
order.11
To sum up, Japan has gradually improved its regional relations over the last few 
decades by acting in a  very cautious way. Some difficulties still remain, particularly in 
its relations with China and the Korean Peninsula, but it is noteworthy that there is
Stockwin. Governing Japan, p.215.
1 Hook and McCormack. Japan s Contested Constitution, pp.3-4.
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now a much better climate in which Japan’s greater initiatives, not only economically 
but also politically and even on security issues, are better received than before. There 
arc various factors behind this change, as discussed before, such as the end o f  the Cold 
War and more recently the East Asian financial crisis. However, it can be argued that 
Japan’s incremental and cautious policies towards the region throughout the postwar 
period and the use o f  its economic resources under the Yoshida Doctrine have greatly 
contributed to this situation.
Asia Pacific Regionalism and Japan's behind the scenes initiatives
In addition to the policies that enabled Japan to improve and strengthen its regional 
relations throughout the postwar period, since the 1960s, Japan has also embarked on a 
project to establish a  regional framework. However, Japan has not led from the front 
and instead has tried to advance this agenda behind the scenes, and this series o f its 
policies towards A sia Pacific regional cooperation also illustrate well the argument on 
the style o f Japanese policy made above. As discussed in Chapter 2, Japan, in fact, 
tried to take some initiative for the construction o f regional multilateral frameworks in 
the 1960s, for instance in the case o f  the ADB as well as MEDSEA, but these 
initiatives were not very successful. Japanese policymaking agents learned from these 
experiences that the countries o f the region did not welcome their high-profile 
initiatives, and that Japan had to show its neighbours that it was not trying to dominate 
them. Thereafter, Japan began to take more cautious and low-profile approaches and 
tried to avoid overt initiatives in advancing regional frameworks.
This dc facto failure o f Japan in promoting an independent regional initiative in the 
1960s made it turn to the idea o f  Asia Pacific cooperation. Although originally 
nurtured among academics, this concept received increasingly more attention from 
Japanese policymaking agents since the 1960s, as they considered that this was 
actually a very convenient concept to  Japan. Namely, in this larger framework, Japan
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could not only incorporate both its relationships with the US and East Asia, which it 
had tried to coordinate throughout the postwar period, but could also appear to dilute 
its influence and could advance regional cooperation without provoking open hostility.
The then Foreign Minister Miki espoused the concept o f Asia Pacific cooperation at 
the official level for the first time in 1967. This, as argued in Chapter 2, laid the 
foundation for the future development o f Asia Pacific regionalism based on the longer- 
term perspective. With little enthusiasm from other countries, government level 
interest in the concept became dormant, and instead it lived on mainly in academic 
circles, such as the PAFTAD and the PBEC, until the end o f the 1970s. Flowever, these 
private organisations became an important vehicle for the later development o f the 
idea o f Asia Pacific cooperation It seems that Miki was aware that it was necessary to 
take a long-term approach to advance Asia Pacific cooperation by first creating a mood 
favourable to this cooperation, as discussed in Chapter 2.
After Prime Minister Ohira expressed his support publicly for the idea o f Pacific Basin 
cooperation in the late 1970s, official level involvement in the regional process of 
cooperation increased greatly. However, again Japan’s policy was very cautious. For 
one thing, Japanese policymakers preferred the quasi-private framework o f PECC, as 
Ohira"s study group as well as MOFA officials considered that it was essential to take a 
cautious and gradual approach for advancing Pacific cooperation because o f the 
complicated regional situation. Furthermore, Japan hesitated to promote this agenda 
openly on its own, and instead proposed it jointly w ith Australia and let Australia take 
a major public role. Japan wanted to avoid being regarded by its East Asian neighbours 
as controlling the region or creating a second Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, 
and also to avert the US concern that Japan was building an exclusive East Asian block.
The Asia Pacific cooperation process eventually culminated in the establishment of
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APEC in 1989. As discussed in Chapter 2, even in the initiation o f  APEC, Japan kept a 
low-profile presence. The MITI played a more than supportive role in the process o f 
launching APEC, although Australia also took a crucial lead. However, the MITI 
persuaded Australia to assume the public role, while sticking to a  behind-the-scenes 
role, partly because o f its domestic rivalry with the MOFA, and partly because o f  the 
concern that there could be an unfavourable reaction from East Asian countries against 
Japan's leadership.
In short, as far as Japan's approach towards Asia Pacific cooperation is concerned, 
there has been a quite consistent pattern of long-term and behind the scenes 
policymaking. Japanese policymakers have been very cautious to advance this agenda, 
and until the formation o f  APEC they preferred to use private mechanisms, trying to 
nurture the idea o f Asia Pacific cooperation by taking into account the long-term 
perspective. Also, it has tried to  avoid taking the lead from the front so that it could 
appear to dilute its influence in the region. The recent policy o f  Japan concerning East 
Asian financial cooperation has also been following the same way, as argued below.
Factors in the low-profile and incremental style of Japanese policy
If this is the case, why has Japan exhibited such a style o f policy particularly in its 
regional relations? How effective is this style o f policy for Japan in advancing its 
policy agendas, and how does it compare in effectiveness with the alternative style, i.e. 
taking the lead openly? Some points have been already mentioned above, and here 
they will be recapitulated from international, regional and domestic angles.
Internationally, Japan's relationship with the US is an important reason for the low- 
profilc and incremental nature o f  Japanese foreign policy. As discussed before, this 
thesis docs not agree that Japan is merely reacting to US policies, but it is true that 
sometimes Japan has had to compromise with US requests because of Japan's heavy
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dependence on the US in economic as well as security matters. In addition, other East 
Asian countries are closely linked with the US as well, and do not want to  risk their 
relations with the US. Thus, it is quite unlikely that they would support a  Japanese 
policy o f strong opposition to the US. Such a situation has made it difficult for Japan 
to take a position independent o f the US, and has made Japan show sensitivity to the 
US position, and conduct regional policies very cautiously This has made Japan's 
dynamic, as opposed to incremental, policymaking quite unlikely and difficult. In fact, 
although the US does not oppose Japan's economic engagement in the region, it does 
not want Japan to dominate the region, as the case o f  the AMF proposal, presented in 
Chapter 4, suggests. Krauss rightly points out that, although the US at times requests 
Japan to take more responsibility for international affairs and to take a leadership role 
commensurate with its economic power, the US "would like Japan to play a 
‘leadership’ role when it accords with American interests and strategy,” and the 
"American definition o f ‘leadership' for Japan. . . sometimes has tended to  be rather a 
form o f followership to accomplish American goals with Japanese resources.”1'  In this 
sense, the incremental and cautious style of Japanese policy has been effective for 
Japan as it allowed it to pursue its objectives without giving the US grounds to suspect 
that that it was trying to dominate the region, or perhaps to challenge the US in terms 
of hegemony in East Asia
Japan's regional relations have been the most important factor that influenced the 
choice for a  low-profile foreign policy style. Due to the legacy of Japanese 
colonisation o f  its neighbouring countries, Japan's attempts to take any leadership in 
the region tended to be disliked by East Asian countries as any such attempt arose the 
suspicion that Japan intended to move towards the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity 
Sphere again. Although the regional countries have become, in time, less worried 
about a repeat o f what happened in the early twentieth century, some arc still wary o f 12
12 Krauss. "Japan, (he US. and the Emergence of Multilateralism in Asia.” p 485.
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Japan's intentions, and, even recently, Japan's overt leadership has not been entirely 
welcome in the region. China, in particular, is highly sensitive to  Japan's activism in 
East Asia partly due to its rivalry with Japan over regional leadership, in addition to 
historical reasons, as was evident in the opposition to Japan's AMF proposal, although 
it seems that even China has come to accept that Japan has to play a certain role in the 
region since the crisis, as argued in Chapter 5. In fact, a  number o f Japanese 
policymakers admit that the relationship with China is currently the biggest factor that 
constrains Japan's regional initiative and that they must always give careful 
consideration to Chinese actions.13 South Korea and the ASEAN countries may be 
increasingly ready to accept Japan's regional initiatives, and policymakers in these 
countries have begun to acknowledge the necessity and importance of the Japanese 
regional initiatives, as discussed before. However, they still do not want to see Japan’s 
dominant leadership, and welcome more its low-profile initiatives. This is partly 
because it is difficult for Japanese initiatives to be accepted by the general public in 
these countries, which is particularly true in South Korea. Sakakibara comments that 
Japan is in a very' delicate position in East Asia and Japanese policymakers must 
handle this regional situation very cautiously .14 15
Finally, there are some domestic reasons for this style o f the Japanese foreign policy. 
For one thing, some cultural" factors, such as the consensus-based system o f  Japanese 
society, might contribute to this style. In Japanese society people generally do not 
criticise others publicly, and negotiating behind the scenes, without causing others to 
lose, is the acceptable way o f pursuing self-interest. This thesis cannot provide clear 
evidence o f any causal relationship between culture and Japanese policy, as such an
13 Interview with Masatsugu Asakawa (Director, Office of Regional Financial Co-operatioa 
International Bureau, MOF), March 30. 2001. Also, interview with Eisuke Sakakibara (Fonncr 
MOF Vice Minister), September 18. 2001.
14 Interview w ith Eisukc Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18. 2001.
15 By culture, this thesis means, following the definition of Stockwin, those aspects of current 
practice which arc influenced by relatively long-standing patterns of social interaction and by 
expectations about the behaviour of others conditioned by the norms and values of the society 
in which individuals operate. (Stockwin. Governing Japan, pp.220-221)
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analysis lies outside the scope o f the thesis, nor does it argue that cultural factors can 
explain a  major part o f the Japanese foreign policy. As discussed in the Introduction, 
this thesis adopts the stance that policymakers’ considerations about various interests 
(national, organisational, domestic and personal) are important Also, it seems that 
such cultural factors fail to explain, for instance, why the prewar Japan, who 
presumably had the same society and culture, took a more proactive approach 
Nevertheless, cultural factors are not so trivial that they can be excluded from the 
analysis o f the thesis completely, as some scholars who embrace rational choice theory 
claim. 16 Without overemphasising the peculiarity o f the Japanese society, it is 
reasonable to assume that cultural factors have some effect on the behaviour of 
Japanese policymakers.
In addition to cultural factors, as discussed in the case o f  the formation o f APEC, 
domestic politics such as bureaucratic tu rf battles have sometimes prevented Japan 
from taking decisive actions. In fact, it is interesting to note that, in the case of the 
AMF, when the actors involved were limited to MOF officials and who was in charge 
was quite clear, Japan took a quite different approach from the usual style o f its policy, 
although this is not to suggest that bureaucratic politics alone explains Japan’s policy.
The implication of Japan’s policies towards the East Asian crisis and East Asian 
regionalism for the style of Japanese foreign policy
Considering the style o f  Japanese foreign policy presented so far, the proposal for the 
formation o f  the AMF, which can be regarded as Japan’s attempt to take an 
independent and explicit initiative for a regional financial mechanism, is a major 
innovation. This raises the question o f why Japan proposed the AMF in such an 
extraordinarily bold manner. For one thing, the dramatic success o f  the Thai rescue
16 J. Mark Rainscyer and Frances McCall Roscnblulh. Japan's Political Marketplace 
(Cambridge. Massachuscls: Harvard University Press. 1993).
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package encouraged Japan to go beyond its usual style and voice its policy more 
assertively. MOF officials sensed an unusual atmosphere in the Thai meeting, as 
argued in Chapter 4, which made them  think that they should take advantage of this 
impetus and show Japan's will to take the lead in the region whenever necessary .17 In 
fact, Japan's initiative was not completely disliked by regional countries, which was a 
very different reaction from what had occurred a  few decades ago. Also, MOF officials 
were frustrated with the response o f  the IMF and the US to the crisis,18 which was 
probably compounded by the M O F’s decade-long ideological disagreement with 
Washington. In fact, as mentioned in  Chapter 4, to some MOF officials the AMF 
proposal meant a challenge to the Washington-based international system, and this 
strong feeling made them respond to  the excitement created by the success in regional 
cooperation that lay behind the Thai rescue package. Also, the strong character o f 
Sakakibara, who was quite distinctive among the MOF and the Japanese bureaucracy 
more generally, also affected greatly the behaviour o f the Japanese officials .19 *
It remains to be seen whether this policy style exhibited in Japan's proposing the AMF 
implies the possibility o f a shift in th e  nature o f  Japanese foreign policy. In fact, Japan 
did not press the proposal further after the Hong Kong meeting in September 1997, 
and resigned itself to forming the Manila Framework, which was a compromise for 
both Japan and the US (and the IM F). Interestingly, Sakakibara later reflected that the 
way Japan proposed the AMF was a  more American-style approach, the style in which 
the US advances and realises its foreign policy goals. He continued, however, that he 
should have been more aware o f  the fact that Japan was under different conditions 
compared to the US (and, it would be difficult for Japan to adopt the same style as the
1 Sakakibara, Nihon to Sekai. pp. 182-183. Also, interview with Eisukc Sakakibara (Former 
MOF Vice Minister), September 18, 2001.
18 Interview with Eisuke Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18, 2001.
19 Green also notes the character of Sakakibara in Japan's proposing the AMF. (Green. Japan's
Reluctant Realism, pp.246-247.)
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US).20
However, there are some factors that might cause, or are causing, some change in the 
style o f Japanese foreign policy. It seems that the current quiet diplomacy has become 
less accepted domestically. Because o f the tight budgetary situation o f Japan under the 
prolonged stagnation o f  the economy, Japan cannot afford to maintain or increase the 
budget for ODA, which has been its main diplomatic tool for decades.21 At the same 
time, how effectively ODA is used diplomatically has come under closer public 
scrutiny. A MOFA official comments that the government has been urged to show the 
public how ODA has enhanced Japan's national interests, although that will possibly 
appal recipient countries.22 An editorial o f the Nihon Keizai Shinbun reads: Japan has 
provided China with a  total o f 3 trillion yen of ODA in the last twenty years, which is 
more than half o f  what China has received bilaterally, but such a fact is hardly known 
by the Chinese public and the relations between the two countries have actually 
deteriorated.23 This perspective probably reflects the views o f an increasing number o f  
Japanese intellectuals and the public. In this sense, it is noteworthy that when it 
announced the New Miyazawa Initiative, the Japanese government overtly publicized 
its policies specifically through the East Asian media, rather than keeping a low-profile. 
Also, it was more positively involved in the implementation process o f the assistance 
measures under the New Miyazawa Initiative, in contrast to the passivity of the past 
aid policy based on the yosei shugi, as discussed in Chapter 4. In short, the image o f 
Japan as the party whose role was reduced to merely writing a cheque is losing 
domestic support, and the government increasingly has to show more explicitly how 
the country's resources are effectively used for its national interests. This might 
become incompatible with the quiet style o f policy.
" Sakakibara, Nihon to Sekai. p. 186.
^  It has been decided to cut the ODA budget by 10 percent in the 2002 fiscal year.
22 Interview with Kinichi Romano (Director, Research and Programming Division. Economic 
Cooperation Bureau. MOFA), May 19, 2000.
2' Nihon Keizai Shinbun. October 25. 2001
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Also, as discussed in Chapter 2, Japan has increasingly tried to obtain a voice in the 
international society and to re-establish its international status particularly after the end 
of the Cold War, which sometimes has persuaded Japan to articulate its policy more 
assertively. In fact, it has been argued so far that Japan has been more willing to take 
political initiative, and this may lead to its more visible roles. Take a look at a  recent 
example. It may be possible to  consider Japan’s positive policy o f hosting a ministerial 
conference for Afghanistan reconstruction in January 2002 as a sign that Japan has 
taken on a more high-profile role. With respect to  the hosting o f  this international 
conference, Financial Times said that Japan is “hoping to persuade the world that it has 
outgrown its customary role as the globe's cheque-book diplomat.’’24 This might be 
affecting the style o f  Japanese policy in the near future.
Nevertheless, this thesis considers that Japan's style o f foreign policy and its initiative­
taking are not necessarily incompatible. The way in which Japan takes initiatives still 
exhibits the above-discussed style o f policy, although in a sense it may be less low- 
profile than before. More recent Japanese initiatives, such as the New Miyazawa 
Initiative and the hosting o f  the international conference for Afghanistan, are still very 
cautious, rather than dominant or intrusive, despite being a bit more high-profile than 
usual. Japan has made every effort to create a consensus with East Asian countries as 
well as with the US behind the scenes. It does not have any intention to defy the US, or 
to influence regional countries forcefully through the deployment o f its economic 
resources. In this sense, it probably does not necessarily follow from these recent 
initiatives that Japan has been going beyond the usual style o f its foreign policy, and its 
relationships with the US as well as East Asian countries have still greatly constrained 
Japanese foreign policy. Furthermore, even the pursuit o f the AMF proposal is not 
entirely contradictory to the typical style o f  Japan’s foreign policy, despite its apparent 
uniqueness, nor was it a complete failure for Japanese officials in the sense that Japan
24 Financial Times. January 18, 2002.
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is realising its policy goals from the long-term perspective, and so is the New 
Miyazawa Initiative. It is now discussed below how the AMF proposal and the 
subsequent Japanese policies towards the crisis and financial cooperation still exhibit 
some elements o f the quiet and gradual policy style.
As far as the AMF proposal is concerned, although the AMF was not realised, it seems 
that Japanese officials do not necessarily regret having proposed the idea. In fact, when 
Japan put forward the idea, they did not intend to establish the AMF coercively.25 
Sakakibara states that by proposing the AMF Japan could show East Asian countries 
that it is ready to  take on regional responsibilities and to contribute to regional issues 
positively. This, he and the other officials considered, could become a  starting point for 
a deeper relationship between Japan and its neighbours in the long term. In hindsight, 
this was also an opportunity for Japan to lcam how China would react to Japan's 
initiative in the financial area.26
More significantly, the AMF proposal and the process in which it was discussed during 
the latter half o f  1997 became a springboard for regional discussions concerning 
regional financial cooperation. In other words, by proposing the AMF, Japan, as a 
consequence, w as able to initiate regional dialogues about what some Japanese 
officials had been thinking for some time to be necessary. Chapter 4 discussed their 
recognition of the necessity to strengthen financial cooperation for the sake o f  the 
region's financial stability and their interest in a regional financial framework even 
before the crisis, although this had not been considered very pressing at that time. 
Japan could advance this agenda by proposing the AMF. The interest o f East Asian 
countries in the AMF looked to have diminished and the idea was regarded as spent 
after Japan dropped it in 1997, but. on the contrary, the idea o f  the AMF and the 
discussions about a regional financial framework survived. An increasing number of
s Interview with MOF official (International Bureau). May 12. 2000.
' 6 Interview with Eisukc Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18. 2001.
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East Asian leaders and officials arc currently supporting the idea o f the AMF, as 
discussed before. Also, the increasing regional discussions on that subject have led to 
the current momentum o f regional financial cooperation, specifically the swap 
arrangements. In short, the AMF proposal has contributed to a lasting discussion on 
East Asian financial regionalism among regional leaders and intellectuals
In addition, the formation of the Manila Framework was not, contrary to what some 
argue, simply a  face-saving attempt by Japan after abandoning its original idea. 
Although the M anila Framework falls short o f the AMF, it at least provides more 
opportunity for regional leaders to meet and discuss with each other, which Japanese 
officials thought to  be important in order to keep alive the regional dialogues for 
further regional cooperation triggered by the AMF proposal. In fact, Sakakibara argues 
that Japan's motivation in advancing the formation o f the Manila Framework was that 
it did not want to lose the momentum that had been generated by the AMF proposal 
and wanted to prevent the proposal from being buried completely.27
The New Miyazawa Initiative can also be discussed in the same context. Despite its 
bilateral character, there was an implicit message in the New M iyazawa Initiative that 
Japan still desired to create some form o f regional financial framework or the AMF, 
and it actually contained some multilateral elements, such as the ACCSF, which, 
Japanese officials hoped, could develop into a regional mechanism in the future 
beyond bilateral assistance, as argued in detail in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the New 
Miyazawa Initiative contributed greatly to relieving the economies of the crisis-hit 
countries, and strongly impressed East Asian countries, particularly as Japan was beset 
by its own difficult economic problems. This could help to restore Japan’s reputation 
and the confidence of the regional countries in Japan after their disappointment over 
Japan’s withdrawal o f the AMF proposal in 1997. In fact, this policy o f Japan seems to
Sakakibara, Nihon to Sekai. p 189.
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have dramatically improved its relations with ASEAN countries and South Korea not 
only for the moment but even from the middle and long-term perspective.2K It has 
possibly made Japan more welcome as a  regional power and has created a more 
favourable environment for Japan to advance the agenda o f forming a regional 
financial framework. In addition, as argued in Chapter 5, Japan’s positive attitude and 
commitment to resolve the crisis has made ASEAN countries recognise anew the 
necessity to deepen their relations with Japan, and the other Northeast Asian countries, 
China and South Korea. It has also given them some confidence that it is worth 
considering the formation of a regional framework in East Asia. This understanding o f 
ASEAN policymakers has led to their more positive attitude towards cooperation with 
the north even beyond the financial area, and has contributed to the current momentum 
in East Asian regionalism.
Furthermore, Japan's initiative in establishing the currency swap arrangements in East 
Asia can be regarded as another step towards realising the AMF in the future, although 
the swap arrangements themselves are a collection o f bilateral arrangements, in fact 
the expansion of existing agreements, and should be distinguished from the AMF. 
While the support for the AMF within Japan has increased, Japanese officials have 
thought that it is not the right moment to put forward the AMF proposal again and that 
they need more time to create a  consensus among East Asian countries, the US and the 
IMF before proposing it. For the time being, by proposing the swap arrangements they 
wanted to show that Japan was still working towards closer regional financial 
cooperation in order to maintain the momentum and to keep regional countries 
interested in it,* 29 while expecting these arrangements to develop into a multilateral
'* Makoto Iokibe. in a statement made at the Toshiba International Foundation Symposium held 
at the British Museum on September 17, 2001. He also commented that, although Japan-South 
Korea relations seemed to have become difficult again due to disputes over a controversial 
history textbook and the Prime Minister's visit to the Yasukuni shrine, the attitude of South 
Korean officials and leaders was different from the past strong antagonism towards Japan, and 
they wished Japan to make some sensible gesture in order to calm the public down.
29 Interview with MOF official (International Bureau), May 12, 2000.
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framework in the future. Also, the member countries agreed that a recipient country 
can receive only 10 percent o f the limit through the swap arrangements without 
linkage to the IMF loans. This was the result o f taking into account the US interests as 
argued in the previous chapter. Japanese officials, particularly Vice M inister Kuroda, 
thought that some compromise with the US had to be made as the priority was to 
establish a regional mechanism and not to lose the current impetus for regional 
financial cooperation.3"
In addition, the establishment o f the region-wide swap arrangements in itself would be 
a significant step towards closer financial cooperation in East Asia. The new swap 
arrangements may actually have only limited significance economically, as they are 
not large enough in size to  work as a regional emergency financial mechanism, and 
cannot be activated automatically. However, given that there are few financial 
frameworks in the region, such a new framework could play a  certain, albeit limited, 
role in preventing and preparing for a future crisis, practically as well as by giving 
assurance to the markets. Furthermore, it may also make it easier for Japan to advance 
the idea o f the AMF in the future, in that an East Asian financial framework can be 
seen as a more natural idea, or as a fait accompli to some extent, rather than something 
completely new.
It is also worth noting the way Japan proposed and pushed forward the regional swap 
arrangements. As discussed earlier, the MOF took the lead behind the scenes to 
advance the idea, but it did so very cautiously and not in a dominant way in order to 
avoid receiving the same reaction as it had done when proposing the AMF. Prior to 
making the plan to establish the swap arrangements public, Japanese officials 
conducted a number o f negotiations with China and South Korea at the deputy, as well *
311 Interv iew with Eisukc Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18. 2001.
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as lower, levels.31 The outcome o f  these negotiations was discussed further with 
ASEAN countries and, after the consensus among the ASEAN plus three countries 
was created, the Chiang Mai Initiative was announced for the first time as a statement 
o f  the ASEAN plus three Finance Ministers in May 2000. Importantly, this time it was 
China who took a  quite important and visible initiative for this mechanism. Also, the 
MOF did not neglect to assure the US that Japan was not trying to dominate the region 
and to exclude the US from East Asia
To sum up, despite the failure o f the AMF proposal in 1997, Japan has continued to 
advance the agenda o f regional financial cooperation. It is not leadership from the 
front, nor has Japan overtly articulated what it wants to do. Yet a series o f its policies 
after the crisis have gradually moved the region towards deeper financial cooperation, 
although this is still limited. They have also contributed to a revival o f the discussions 
about the AMF among East Asian officials and have increased support for the idea in 
Japan and other East Asian countries. Japan's policies during and after the crisis are 
quite consistent with the argument that Japan has effectively advanced its agendas 
slowly but surely in a low-profile way.
How unique is the style of Japanese policy?
Japan’s policy style particularly in regional matters can be considered as exhibiting a 
somewhat different character from that o f other major countries. But how unique is 
this style compared with that o f  others?
As suggested above, Japan's policy style seems to  be quite different from the way in 
which the US advances its agenda internationally or regionally. Both countries possess 
a certain amount o f material resources, although in the case o f Japan such resources 
are predominantly economic. However, they clearly differ in the way they transform
31 Interview with Masatsugu Asakawa (Director. Office of Regional Financial Co-operation. 
International Bureau. MOF). March 30. 2001.
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their resources into bargaining leverage. The US tends to use them more directly, and 
often unilaterally and coercively, through threats and promises, overtly articulating 
what it wants to advance On the other hand, Japan uses its economic resources more 
indirectly, as discussed above. Japan may not explicitly insist on what it wants to do. 
but tries to achieve its goals in a more low-profile way.
It is not difficult to find cases that illustrate the way the US implements its policy. For 
instance, the US relations with Latin America, a region o f  great significance to its 
national interest, arc considerably different from the relations Japan has with its East 
Asian neighbours. Consider the US initiative to expand the NAFTA to the Western 
Hemisphere as a whole Although this agenda has not necessarily been going smoothly, 
the US way o f advancing it, starting with President Bush's announcement o f the 
Enterprise o f the Americas Initiative in 1990 and later through some important 
initiatives, notably hosting the first Summit o f the Americas in Miami in 1994, makes 
a sharp contrast with Japan’s behind the scenes initiatives in APEC or the recent East 
Asian regionalism. Indeed, historically the US strong foreign policy actions “condition 
the patterns o f interaction not only in the [Latin American] system as a whole but also 
inside individual countries.” 32 Also, the US forceful position, directly or through 
international organisations, can be often observed in East Asia as well A recent 
example is the US strong attack against the AMF proposal in order to  make Japan drop 
it, or its severe demands made through the IMF for a wide range of economic 
liberalisation measures in the crisis hit countries as a  condition for the IMF bailout, as 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. This hard line of US policy may not always work well 
in East Asia For instance, despite its strong wish to propagate its liberal economic 
norms into East Asia, it is not easy for the US to impose them on the region.31 Also, *1
32 J. Ncf. "The Political Economy of Intcr-Amcrican Relations: a Structural and Historical 
Overview,” in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R D. Underhill cds.. Political Economy and the 
Changing Global Order (London: Macmillan. 1994), p 404
11 For instance. Ncsadurai questions tliat the US has the capacity to impose its economic agenda 
on the region by examining the process of APEC. (Helen E. S. Nesadurai, "APEC: a Tool for
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with respect to the human rights issue, even though the US made tough and forceful 
demands on China and used the diplomatic cards o f WTO membership to that effect, it 
is by no means accurate to say that the Chinese government has made a full 
compromise so far. although it is very reasonable to suppose that East Asian countries’ 
heavy dependence on US economic and security power has allowed, and will continue 
to allow, the US to adopt such a powerful and intrusive stance towards East Asia on a 
variety o f  issues.
Germany's policy style also contrasts with that o f  Japan's, particularly in the area of 
regional policy . Germany has a regional position akin to that o f Japan in terms of its 
historical background as well as economic dominance, namely it failed to  create an 
empire in Europe and was defeated in the war as was Japan and now is a prominent 
regional economic power as is Japan. However, it has taken a quite different regional 
approach to Japan since the end o f the war, having taken explicit political initiatives in 
Europe much more than Japan has done in East Asia. Specifically it has taken the lead, 
together with France, in the development o f a more unified Europe, and has played a 
conspicuous and visible role in the region. Katzenstein and Shiraishi contrast 
Germany 's strong political commitment to the creation o f an integrated European 
polity through influencing Brussels with Japan's economic engagement 'from  behind' 
in market integration in East Asia.14
Furthermore, Japan's policy style seems to be quiet even when compared w ith ‘middle 
pow er' countries like Australia. It could be argued that Japan’s policy shares some 
common characteristics with that o f these countries in the sense that they rely more on *34
US Regional Domination?” The Pacific Review 9, 1 (1996)) Also, despite the harsh position of 
tile IMF during the crisis, it is questionable that the liberal norms have really taken root in the 
region.
34 Peter J. Katz.cnstcin and Takashi Shiraishi. "Conclusion: Regions in World Politics: Japan 
and Asia -  Germany in Europe." in Katzenstein and Shiraishi. eds.. Network Power, pp.341- 
381.
negotiating skill or consensus-making in advancing their agenda." rather than taking 
dominant initiatives. However, Japan probably prefers to be more low-profile. In fact, 
it was shown above that Japan wanted Australia to take visible initiatives in advancing 
regional projects, most notably APEC, while supporting the ideas behind the scenes. 
The Australian policy style is different from the US unilateral approach, but probably 
it is more visible than Japan’s.
As far as the long-term and incremental nature o f  Japan’s policy is concerned, some 
may argue that this point should not be overemphasised as being specifically unique to 
Japan. In general, policy in Western democratic countries tends to be incremental, and 
"does no t move in leaps and bounds.”35 6 However, there are reasons to believe that 
Japan’s political economy tends to operate in a longer time framework than it is the 
case in other countries because o f domestic, regional and international factors, as 
argued above. Glenn Hook ct al. refer to the long-term developmentalist goal o f  the 
Mciji leaders, who successfully led the country' to become a major industrial power 
within a century.37 Over the last fifty years, Japan's postwar policies have also shown a 
remarkable degree o f consistency and thus testify’ to the long-term nature o f Japanese 
foreign policy.
How deliberate is the style of Japanese foreign policy?
Despite the apparently minimalist or reactive character o f Japanese foreign policy, 
Japan has quietly but effectively pursued its policy objectives. However, a few caveats 
are in order. This argument seems to assume the strategic and rational nature of 
Japanese foreign policy for the pursuit o f national interest. As discussed in the
35 Higgott cl al. argue this in the analysis of the formation of the Cairns Group. (Ricliard 
Higgott. Andrew Fenton Cooper and Jcncllc Bonnor. "Cooperation-Building in the Asia-Pacific 
Region: APEC and the New Institutionalism," Pacific Economic Paper no. 199, September 1991, 
Australia-Japan Research Centre, and Richard Higgott and Andrew Fenton Cooper, “Middle 
Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round 
ofTrade." International Organization 44.4 (1990). pp.589-632.)
36 Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through." pp.84-85.
’ Hook ct al., Japan's International relations, p.72.
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Introduction, insisting on the rationality o f Japanese foreign policy does not 
necessarily lead to the assumption that the Japanese state is a unitary actor; rather this 
thesis stresses that the policymakers' considerations on national interests matter. 
However, it is necessary to consider whether this style o f  Japanese policy is the result 
o f the deliberate calculations of Japanese policymakers being fully aware of various 
constraints on Japan, or whether Japanese policy just tends to take that style due to the 
domestic constraints discussed above and happens to achieve some results only due to 
luck. In other words, it is important to ask if  the style o f  Japanese policy is a result o f 
Japanese policymakers' strategy or merely o f domestic politics or cultural factors such 
as a consensus-based society.
Japan's policies towards the crisis and East Asian regional financial cooperation could 
be regarded, from this point o f view, as the result o f a  process o f trial and error in the 
elaboration o f domestic and international politics. It was argued that the AMF became 
the springboard for regional discussions. However, this was probably not what 
Japanese policymakers carefully planned when they originally proposed the idea. In 
fact, Chapter 4 discussed various factors, economic as well as political, that led to the 
AMF proposal, other than their grand strategies on the future regional monetary 
architecture. In facing the failure o f the AMF proposal and the prolonged crisis in late 
1997, it is doubtful that MOF officials had a very clear vision about what the ministry 
had to do, although it seems that they shared a  sense o f emergency. Under these 
circumstances, they conceived the New' Miyazawa Initiative, which, in a sense, was an 
extension of past aid policies and involved the MOFA in the implementation process, 
and would cause less controversy to get the support o f  the MOFA and other domestic 
agents as well as the US. It was also argued that this New Miyazawa Initiative 
reflected various motivations, such as Japanese policymakers’ concern over Japan's 
own economy and East Asian countries’ scepticism about Japan's commitment to the 
region, other than a plan for a future multilateral framework. While the AMF proposal
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was not completely buried and there has been consistent support for it, it has 
eventually led to the establishment o f the regional swap arrangements, and the 
momentum for regional monetary cooperation has been sustained so far. However, this 
cannot be entirely credited to Japanese policies, although they were indeed responsible 
for this outcome to a certain extent. This outcome was also the result o f  the growing 
worry o f East Asian countries about the current international financial system, given 
the spread o f the crisis globally, as well as the change in China's stance on regional 
cooperation. In this sense, the development o f the process o f regional monetary 
cooperation in East Asia is not entirely attributable to Japan's strategic policy based on 
Japanese policymakers’ careful and long-term calculations.
Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the Japanese policies towards the crisis 
and regional financial cooperation certainly involved strategic thinking on the part o f 
Japanese policymakers, specifically MOF officials, on Japan’s future role in East Asia 
as well as its national interest. They were aware o f  how Japan should advance its 
policy agenda under its international and regional constraints and opportunities. 
Adachi and Shiroyama point out that MOF officials, in particular, are educated within 
the ministry to serve for the national interest after they start their career in the ministry 
as new graduates, which has greatly contributed to their stronger commitment to the 
national interest than bureaucrats in other ministries, although this should not be over­
exaggerated.38 It is noteworthy that some senior ex-MOF officials have recognised 
how Japan should advance its agenda in the relations with East Asian countries as well 
as the US. For instance, Sakakibara comments that Japan should take regional 
initiatives in terms o f offering ideas and money, but should do this cautiously and not 
in a dominant way.39 Likewise, Isamu Kubota states that Japan does not have to take a
38 Nobil Adachi and Hidcaki Shiroyama. "Okurasho no scisaku keisei katei | policymaking 
process in the Japanese MOF]," in Hideaki Shiroyama. Hiroshi Su/uki and Sukehiro Hosono, 
cds.. Chuo Shocho no Scisaku Keisci Katci Ipolicvmaking process in die central eovemmenl 
ministries! (Tokyo: Chuo Daigaku Shuppanbu. 1999). p.247-248.
39 Interview with Eisuke Sakakibara (Former MOF Vice Minister). September 18. 2001.
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visible leadership role like the US, and that it is more than satisfactory for Japan to 
realise its goals eventually.40 In fact, it was discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 that key 
MOF officials, such as Sakakibara, Kuroda and Kishimoto. have considered that any 
regional monetary' framework, specifically the AMF, should be pursued, and they were 
fully aware o f the necessity o f longer-term strategies to achieve that goal. For instance. 
Vice Minister Kuroda, in promoting the swap arrangements, considered that the 
establishment o f  the AMF should be Japan's middle-term policy objective, w hich was 
to be advanced step by step, and that extending the regional swap arrangements, which 
was far short o f the AMF, would be a significant move towards it. In short, the 
Japanese policies towards closer financial and monetary' cooperation in the E ast Asian 
region have, to a  significant extent, reflected the ideas o f  some key decision-makers in 
the MOF about what are necessary and desirable for Japan and how' Japan can achieve 
its goals in the international environment where the country finds itself.
It was also discussed that the Japanese policy towards the development o f  A sia Pacific 
cooperation was based on policymakers’ strategic considerations about how Japan 
would be able to promote this concept. It is true that Japan’s low-profile approach is 
not entirely a  reflection o f their strategic thinking. For instance, the rivalry o f  the MITI 
and the MOFA in the process o f establishing APEC was referred to  before, which 
could be interpreted as a case w here Japan merely failed to take the lead due to  a result 
o f pragmatism and a  fragmented domestic policymaking process. Also, the academic- 
centred development o f Asia Pacific cooperation until the late 1970s was not 
necessarily what the Japanese government initiated or positively promoted. However, 
it is also true that subsequent policymakers, including Miki, Ohira and the MITI and 
MOFA officials who worked for APEC, shared the view' that a regional framework that 
includes the US and Australia would contribute to Japan's national interests, and thus it 
should be seriously considered It was also discussed that, despite this positive stance
40 Interview with Isamu Kubota (former Director-General. MOF). May 20. 2000.
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of Japanese policymakers on the Asia Pacific cooperation, they had strong reservations 
about Japan's visible role, which made them take a very cautious and long-term 
approach. On the w hole, the ideas o f these policymakers about what would be the best 
way to achieve their goal o f establishing an A sia Pacific framework, to a large extent, 
could explain their low-profile and incremental approach towards Asia Pacific 
cooperation.
Finally, it is necessary' to qualify to a certain extent the argument that Japan’s low- 
profile diplomacy based on the deployment o f  its economic resources has gradually 
achieved not only economic, but also political, influence o f the country on the region 
throughout the postwar period, as it is fundamentally the private sector and its 
economic needs that have triggered the changing economic order in East Asia, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Thus, this change in the regional economic order was not 
solely the result o f Japan’s deliberate and calculated strategies to create a sphere of 
influence for itself, contradicting the remark o f  Chalmers Johnson that the Japanese 
government, specifically bureaucrats, are guiding the nation in the direction o f a new 
‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’, w hich was referred to in the Introduction. 
Perhaps the above argument overemphasises the ability o f the Japanese state To w hat 
extent the Japanese state has been intentionally 'leading from behind', and to what 
extent merely following market forces is an open question.
Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked w hat the Japanese government has done, 
either. The Japanese government and the private sector, without doubt, have a much 
more intimate relationship than is usually seen in Western economies, and government 
"has penetrated business, and business has penetrated government '41 For instance, in 
spite o f  the fact that the ratio o f aid tied or partially tied in the total Japanese aid has 
been significantly reduced and is now substantially lower than the OECD average, in
41 Hatch and Yamamura, Asia in Japan's Embrace, pp. 116-117.
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reality Japanese firms have won forty or fifty percent o f contracts for projects paid 
with Japanese untied aid 42 Weiss stresses that ‘"relocation to the region [of certain 
parts o f the Japanese production system] was much more a publicly coordinated effort 
than an ad hoc response by individual firms acting alone.”43 Furthermore, Japan's aid 
itself has great significance in this process, as discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, while 
it would be an exaggeration to say that what has been happening in the East Asian 
economy in the last few decades is solely the result o f the strategics o f the Japanese 
government, it can be said with fair certainty that at least their policies have 
contributed to the changes in the East Asian economy to a significant extent.
In short, although the style o f Japanese foreign policy is not entirely the result o f 
strategic thinking on the part o f Japanese policymakers, it reflects to a great extent 
their considerations on Japan's national interests under the external constrains on 
Japan. As argued in the Introduction, Japanese policy is the product o f a number of 
various interests o f the policymakers in charge, which were divided into four 
categories: national, organisational, domestic and personal. Thus, the strategic 
calculations o f  policymakers do not explain every aspect o f  Japanese policy. 
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the Japanese policymaking agents certainly 
have recognised w hat is necessary for Japan and how its interests should be promoted; 
ultimately this recognition has led them to  take the above style o f  policy.
Conclusion
It is reasonable to conclude, from what has been discussed so far. that Japanese 
policymakers have conducted foreign policy in a way that is different from other major 
countries, and that can be characterised as a low-profile and incremental style. 
Domestic factors, such as a consensus-based society, may have contributed to this style
Juichi Inada. "Taigai enjo." p.200.
43 Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p.206.
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to some extent, but it is also certain that Japanese policymakers have recognised 
Japan's international and regional constraints, which has made them adopt this style of 
policy as a strategy to realise specific policy goals. This style o f  policy may have led to 
the appearance that the Japanese foreign policy was reactive in nature, but it is 
important to note that, behind that picture o f apparent reactivity, there are strategies 
with which Japanese policymakers have tried to advance the country’s national 
interests.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined two hypotheses regarding Japanese foreign policy, 
specifically regional policy: (1) there has been a shift in the nature o f Japanese policy, 
namely Japan showed more interest in taking greater initiative independent o f US 
policy, not only economically but increasingly politically, particularly in its East Asian 
relations; and (2) Japanese foreign policy has been characterised by a low-profile and 
incremental style, which makes for far greater effectiveness than often realised. As far 
as the latter hypothesis is concerned, the last chapter summarised comprehensively the 
evidence presented in this thesis, and concluded that Japan has been quietly pursuing 
definite strategies, and that Japanese policymakers have acknowledged that this style 
suits Japan in realising its policy objectives given the international and regional 
circumstances under which Japan has been placed. Thus, this concluding chapter will 
review the results o f the investigation o f  the former hypothesis.
The thesis has been driven by the puzzle o f why there is a wide divergence o f opinion
on Japanese foreign policy. The two main points o f disagreement are: (1) whether
Japanese foreign policy can be characterised as reactive and opportunistic, or strategic
and effective; and (2) whether its foreign policy priority is accommodating the US and
its East Asia policy is decided according to US relations, or whether East Asia has
occupied a definite position in Japanese foreign policy. It is true that in the early
postwar period Japan adopted a  minimalist policy in terms o f  foreign affairs. Also, few
would dispute that Japan's policy has been greatly constrained by its US relations.
However, this thesis opposes the idea that Japan is just reacting to external pressures,
and that its US relations decide its foreign policy. The empirical evidence in Chapter 2
showed that even in the early postwar period Japan's policy reflected the thinking of
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Japanese policymakers about Japan's political and economic interests, other than US 
pressures. Even though Japan's regional policy was quite strongly influenced by the 
US Cold War strategies, Japanese policymakers also had their own agenda in regard to 
Japan’s relations with the region. In fact, as Chapter 2 showed, even in the early 
postwar period Japan showed its willingness to take some regional initiative, although 
it was not very successful at that time. Furthermore, although it is true that US policy 
greatly influenced, if  not determined, Japanese policy, that was the cost that Japan had 
to pay in exchange for pursuing its postwar principle o f  the Yoshida Doctrine. In other 
words, as discussed in the previous chapter, Japan’s economic and security dependence 
on the US after the war is what Japanese leaders chose for realising their long-term 
policy objectives. Thus, the resultant apparent reactivity o f Japan can be regarded as a 
strategy for that purpose. In fact, it was discussed in Chapter 6 that the low-profile and 
incremental sty le o f Japanese policy reflects the conception of Japanese policymakers 
about the country's national interest, and Japan has successfully achieved its policy 
goals with that style. Moreover, as seen throughout the thesis, the nature o f Japanese 
foreign policy has been changing from a political minimalist stance to more initiative 
taking. Thus, the negative thesis on the nature of Japanese foreign policy has been 
increasingly inadequate. In short, the view o f  Japan as a reactive state or the 
interpretation of.Japanese policy merely as an extension o f its US policy is not only 
contradictory to the empirical evidence discussed in the thesis, but also neglects what 
was stressed in Chapter 6. namely the way Japan has conducted its policy.
On the other hand, the positive thesis reviewed in the Introduction is not sufficient 
either, particularly when considering Japan's more recent policy after the end of the 
Cold War. This literature tends to stress the very positive nature o f Japan's foreign 
policy in the economic sphere, but fails to discuss fully its increasing political 
initiatives independent o f the US. This thesis has contributed to this literature by 
providing more evidence, including three case studies, and has considered the factors
that led to this change. Chapter 2 discussed how Japan's postwar regional policy 
developed and how it came to assume significant roles in East Asia in a historical 
context. The chapter argued that the adoption o f the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977 was a 
turning point in Japan's regional policy, but that it has changed more significantly 
since the late 1980s. This argument is supported by Japan’s direct involvement in the 
Cambodian peace process from the late 1980s as well as its positive engagement in 
some regional frameworks such as APEC and ARF in the 1990s. Chapter 3 discussed 
Japan's ideological initiatives, looking at its consistent assertiveness over the 
development philosophy in the 1990s. In Chapters 4 and 5, the thesis focused on 
specific issues, namely Japan's policies towards the East Asian financial crisis and 
East Asian regionalism, and discussed how and why Japan took independent initiatives 
on these issues. From the evidence discussed in the thesis, it is fair to conclude that 
Japanese foreign policy has been changing throughout the postwar period in the 
direction outlined above.
At the beginning o f the twenty first century, the picture o f Japanese foreign policy is 
completely different to  that o f half a  century ago. Nevertheless, little attention has been 
given to this point so far. Even the recent studies conducted during the last decade tend 
to neglect this im portant change in Japanese foreign policy, and the majority o f the 
literature still focuses on Japan's economic power, although that is still o f great 
significance. Even J. A. A. Stockwin, a  prominent scholar in the study o f Japanese 
politics, underestimates this important change in Japanese foreign policy by stating:
It is often said that Japanese foreign policy in the 1990s is in a state o f 
transition from one governed by considerations o f the Cold War and Japan’s 
overwhelmingly important relationship with the United States, to something 
more appropriate for the post-Cold War world. On the other hand, the changes 
that had taken place by 1997 were hardly spectacular.. there is little sense o f 
any breakthrough in the Government’s willingness to chance its arm in
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international affairs, and despite o f much talk o f forging a  distinctive identity 
in international affairs, it remains unclear what this is supposed to  be.1
This thesis aims to alter these views on Japanese foreign policy, which seem to be still 
quite entrenched.
In short, one major contribution o f  this thesis is that it complements the literature on 
both the negative and the positive theses on Japanese foreign policy discussed in the 
Introduction, by demonstrating the occurrence o f significant changes in Japanese 
foreign policy and by explaining the impact o f a number o f factors on this changes, 
with sufficient empirical evidence. Strictly speaking, it is not argued that Japanese 
foreign policy has been moving in a completely opposite direction, and in fact, the 
fundamental part o f the postwar Japanese policy, namely the importance o f US 
relations, has been still present. Nevertheless, the changes that have been observed are 
not trivial at all, and deserve to receive more attention in the future research on 
Japanese foreign policy. The arguments o f the thesis are recapitulated below.
The continuing importance o f US relations
The fact that Japan has increasingly taken more initiative in East Asia does not mean 
that Japan is ready to act against US interests or wishes. Japan is neither willing nor 
able to push through any agendas in defiance o f the US. which was evidenced in 
Japan’s attitude towards the EAEC and the AMF proposals. In fact, Japan’s recent 
initiatives are not fundamentally against US interests. In most circumstances, Japan 
consulted with the US beforehand, trying to make it understand what Japan was going 
to do. In this sense, it may be argued that Japan's independent initiatives do not mean 
complete independence, and that "Japan is conducting foreign policy with one eye
Stockwin. Governine Japan, p.202.
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carefully on Washington” still.“
This is because, in addition to Japan's strong economic dependence on the US, even 
after the common enemy that the communist bloc had been ceased to exist, the 
majority o f Japanese policymakers and intellectuals consider that the Japanesc-US 
relations based on the security treaty are still the core o f Japan's security strategy. It 
seems that there has never been wider consensus about this issue than in the 1990s, 
when the Social Democratic Party of Japan, the main opponent o f the treaty and the 
SDF during the Cold War Period, accepted the legitimacy o f the treaty and the SDF for 
the first time. In fact, the security relations between the two countries were not diluted 
in the post Cold War era. The security treaty was reconfirmed by President Clinton and 
Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1996, and subsequently the new' Guidelines were agreed 
by the two governments in June 1997; the related legislation was passed by the 
Japanese Diet in May 1999. Although Japan has become more interested in 
multilateral security' frameworks, such as the ARF, these are considered as 
supplements rather than substitutes to the existing bilateral frameworks Thus, it is still 
strongly recognised among the majority o f Japanese policymakers and intellectuals 
that the US security engagement in the region is indispensable not only for preparing 
to counter potential aggressions, but also as a deterrent to such incidents, and the US- 
Japan security' treaty is a significant means for keeping the US military' presence in 
East Asia. No country' has a military' capability that equals that o f the US in terms not 
only o f technology but also adequate exercise and experience.3 Akihiko Tanaka argues 
that it is important to keep the US military presence in the region at least for some time, 
as it is too dangerous to deal with an issue such as the North Korean nuclear 
programme only among East Asian countries; the US may not really take an active part 
in a possible dispute in the South C hina Sea, but the presence of US forces itself w ill *1
: Green. Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p.3.
1 Kitaoka. "Nichibei teikei,” p.232.
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prevent such an incident from occurring.4 Also, the security treaty between the US and 
Japan has had. and still has, a  symbolic meaning: it guarantees that Japan will not 
threaten its neighbours and consequently its neighbours are reassured.
Considering all this, the centrality o f the US in Japanese foreign policy has not 
changed, and will not change in the foreseeable future. Under the current relationship, 
it is the US that controls the security fate o f Japan, and Japan is, after all, a junior 
partner to the US, even when Japan’s economic influence over the US is taken into 
account. This situation has always made Japan pay attention to the US position when 
considering its policy, and sometimes Japan has had to compromise with the US. 
Furthermore, probably the US’s structural power over international affairs, as 
suggested by Susan Strange, should also be considered. Even Eisuke Sakakibara, who 
is a strong advocate o f a more independent Japanese foreign policy, notes that Japan 
will not be able to adopt any policy that could antagonise the US even in a  few 
decades time.5
The loosening o f  the framew ork o f the Yoshida Doctrine
Nevertheless, despite this fundamental continuity, this thesis has stressed the 
occurrence o f  an important shift in Japanese foreign policy, which can be characterised 
as the loosening o f the framew ork of the Yoshida Doctrine. The international, regional 
and domestic conditions under which Japan conducts its diplomacy have dramatically 
changed in the last decades, and this has significantly affected its relations with 
regional countries as well as the US. it has had a great effect on the framework o f 
Japanese foreign policy as a whole, and it has been increasingly difficult for Japan to 
keep the Yoshida Doctrine as the main guiding principle for maintaining and 
enhancing the national interest.
4 Tanaka. "Higashi ajia no anzen hosho." p. 139.
5 Comment in a panel discussion featured in Kokusai Mondai 490 (2001). p 16.
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Increasing political initiatives
What the thesis has repeatedly emphasised are Japan's increasing political initiatives, 
which represent a  significant change in Japanese foreign policy in the sense that they 
show' Japan’s intention to implement its own policies that are not the extension of, or a 
derivation from US policies. It was argued that until recently the bulk of Japan's 
foreign policies were attributed to US-Japan relations, unless its economic interests 
were directly concerned. This does not mean that Japan's policy w as merely a  reaction 
to US pressures, as stated above. However, on many occasions. Japan has been quite 
reluctant to take positive action and avoided adopting political initiatives unless there 
were strong US pressures or direct economic interests involved. In this sense, it is 
particularly noteworthy that Japan has increasingly shown much more interest in 
assuming responsibility for independent political initiatives in the last one or two 
decades. It is also important to note that Japan has been more willing to participate 
actively in forging new international and regional frameworks, in marked contrast to 
its past passive stance as a  taker o f the existing orders.
A more positive security policy
In addition to this increasing interest in political initiatives, Japanese policy has shown 
some signs o f change in the security area as well. Japan has gradually expanded the 
role o f  the SDF throughout the 1990s since the G ulf War. The recent decision, in 
response to the September 11 incident, to dispatch the SDF overseas during actual 
military actions to give logistical support to the operations o f  the US and other 
countries would not have been thought possible a decade ago. In addition, as 
mentioned above, Japan has been more positive about regional security dialogues. It is 
noticeable that in January' 1993, Prime Minister Miyazawa announced the Miyazawa 
Doctrine, which declared Japan's intention to participate actively in creating a  regional 
political and security framework. These changes are particularly noteworthy, given
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Japan's past silence in this area, and are in contrast with the past stance of trying to 
avoid any military involvement by using economic means instead. Furthermore, even 
debates on a revision o f the Constitution have arisen among intellectuals, the media 
and the public, although there has not been any agreed idea about it yet. It seems that 
there have been an increasing number o f voices not only among policymakers but also 
the Japanese public that Japan should cease to be a junior partner o f the US. 
Considering the persistent pacifism o f  the Japanese public, it cannot be expected that 
any dramatic change in Japan's security policy in the foreseeable future will occur. It is 
quite unlikely that Japan will resort to military power as a  major diplomatic tool. 
However, it is highly significant that there has been a gradual shift in its security 
stance since the early 1990s, accompanied by an expansion in the role o f the SDF.
G reater emphasis on East Asian relations
In addition to Japan's increasing political and security initiatives in the region, the 
thesis has also discussed another important change in Japanese foreign policy; namely 
the rise in significance o f the position that the East Asian relations occupy in Japanese 
foreign policy in the last few decades. Asia has always been important to Japan. In the 
prewar days Japan's interest in Asia was manifested in the attempts to create the 
Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. However, for a couple o f decades after the 
end o f the war, Japan's regional policy was quite limited, and relatively little attention 
was paid to  its regional relations. That was the era when Japan concentrated on its own 
economic development under the hegemony of the US. Since the 1970s, in accordance 
with various changes in the international environment, such as the growing economic 
interdependence in the region and the remarkable economic growth o f  many East 
Asian countries, Japan's emphasis on East Asia in its foreign policy has gradually been 
increasing. Economically, East Asian countries have become far more important 
partners for Japan rather than the mere suppliers o f  natural resources and importers of 
Japanese manufactured products that they used to be. In addition, as discussed below,
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East Asia has increased its importance for Japan’s overall political strategy in the post 
Cold War era.
With this growing importance o f East Asia, the positions taken by East Asian countries 
have increasingly influenced Japanese foreign policy, despite the fact that some 
believe that the US pressures have largely dominated Japan's postwar policy. In fact, 
Japan’s ambiguous attitude towards the EAEG as well as the dropping o f the AM F 
proposal were greatly influenced by the lack o f  consensus on these ideas among East 
Asian countries. Yamakage stresses that it is necessary for Japan to obtain the support 
o f the ASEAN in order to realise its ideas,6 and so it is with respect to other East Asian 
countries, notably China and South Korea. Japan has been very cautious about its 
regional relations throughout the postwar period, and despite the recent improvement 
in the relations between Japan and its neighbours, Japanese policy has been greatly 
constrained by them.
Japanese foreign policy at present and in the future
What then do these discussions about the changes in the nature o f Japanese foreign 
policy mean for the present and future Japanese foreign policy? W hat is Japan trying 
to do and what are the current strategies o f Japanese policymakers?
Japan’s foreign policy goals have not changed throughout the postwar period. They 
are: (1) short-term and long-term economic prosperity; (2) the political and security 
stability o f  its territory; and (3) higher political status in the world. However, the ways 
o f pursuing these three goals have been changing. For a few decades after the war 
Japan pursued these objectives following the Yoshida Doctrine, but due to  the 
transformation o f the international system since the 1970s and more obviously since
6 Susumu Yamakage. "Japan-ASEAN Relations during and after the 1997-1998 Crisis, paper 
presented at CSGR 3rd Annual Conference, University of Warwick. September 16-18. 1999.
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the late 1980s. the conditions that allowed Japan to implement its policy following the 
Yoshida Doctrine have begun to change significantly. Accordingly, Japan has changed 
its strategies for achieving these goals, and the changes in the nature o f Japanese 
foreign policy outlined above should be understood in this context.
First, these changes in the nature o f Japanese foreign policy, namely the adoption of 
more positive approaches to political and security issues and the growing importance 
of East Asian relations, can be discussed in the context o f the effort o f Japanese 
policymakers, specifically MOF and MOFA officials as well as some politicians, to 
maintain and enhance Japan's political status in the world. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the end o f the Cold War and the resultant changes in the international system have 
raised an identity question for Japan and have made its status in the world politics 
more uncertain, while its traditional ways o f contributing its economic resources, 
instead o f  political and military involvement, to international affairs have become 
criticised as chequebook diplomacy. The G ulf War. in particular, had a considerable 
impact on the thinking of Japanese policymaking agents as well as the public While 
Japan’s huge economic contributions were not appreciated, the Japanese people 
learned that its pacifism was not necessarily praised by the international society. Also, 
the decline o f  the Japanese economy since the 1990s has revealed the limitation of 
relying solely on economic resources. For maintaining and enhancing its international 
status, Japanese policymakers believe that Japan has to show the world that it is 
willing to take a more active political role in the international system, other than 
contributing money, and for historical and geographical reasons East Asia has become 
the main venue where Japan can take certain political initiatives. This, in turn, has 
made it an urgent issue for Japan to establish firmer regional ties, and the increasing 
interaction o f  Japanese policymakers with their counterparts in East Asian countries 
since the early 1990s greatly reflects this point. This is also shown in Japan's current 
enthusiasm fo r East Asian regionalism in that East Asia can provide Japan with great
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opportunities to take a leadership role.
Second, these changes in the nature o f  Japan’s foreign policy are also a reflection of 
concerns about the stability o f  its territory. As discussed in Chapter 2, the end o f  the 
Cold War has made it likely that the US forces will have to withdraw from East Asia to 
a certain extent, and this will be accompanied by the reduction o f  its political presence. 
This is not what Japanese policymakers wish, nor are they trying to exclude the US 
from the region, but, as stated earlier, the US clearly has shown its intention to cease to 
be the world policeman. The gradual withdrawal o f the US from the East Asian region 
is highly likely in the long-term in the post Cold War era, although the US has shown 
its determination to maintain around 100,000 troops in East A sia for the moment. As 
argued earlier, Japanese high-ranked officials particularly in the MOF, the MOFA and 
the MITI have shared the view that East Asia has to prepare for this eventuality. This, 
together with the belief o f many Japanese policymakers that in the post Cold War 
period Japan must participate in establishing new international and regional orders 
instead o f simply trying to utilise existing ones for securing its national interests, has 
given Japanese policymakers enough motivations to promote Japan's greater political 
and security commitment to regional affairs so as to compensate for the possible 
decline in the US presence. This is because political and security instability anywhere 
in the East Asian region would threaten Japan's stability. Under these circumstances, 
some regional frameworks have been seriously considered am ong Japanese officials, 
as they represent an important strategy for securing the political and security stability 
o f  Japan.
Third, this concern of Japanese policymakers about the uncertain security situation in 
the region in the future due to the probable US withdrawal in the long-term is also 
related to their thinking on economic issues as well, in the sense that any future 
political and security disturbance in the region would severely affect the regional
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economy, and in turn the Japanese economy. Due to  the deepening economic 
interdependence of the regional economy, a large number o f Japanese firms and banks 
have huge stakes in the region, and thus the economic instability o f the regional 
countries would directly threaten Japan’s economic interests. Furthermore, the East 
Asian financial crisis reminded Japanese policymakers o f the closeness between East 
Asian economies, and has m ade them recognise the importance o f  economic, 
specifically financial, stability in East Asia for the Japanese economy. Japanese 
policymakers have become keenly interested in the health o f  the East Asian economy, 
and thus regional political stability. This has enhanced the importance o f  regional 
matters in Japan’s foreign policy to such an extent that the agenda for regional 
cooperation has become the focus o f  the policy.
In short, all the vectors concerned with Japan's policy goals have pointed in the 
direction o f the changes in Japanese foreign policy discussed here, namely the interest 
in establishing closer relations with regional countries as well as some regional 
frameworks, accompanied by m ore political and security initiatives particularly for 
regional matters. They are the new  ways in which Japan is enhancing its international 
status in the post Cold War period, a time when Japan needs to show more explicitly 
its political will. They are essential to maintain the stability o f  the region as well, given 
the probable withdrawal o f the US from East Asia in the long-term, if  not in the 
foreseeable future. Political and security stability, and in turn economic stability, in the 
region have an impact on Japan 's economic interests, considering the growing 
interdependence o f the regional economy since the 1980s, and particularly the severe 
experience o f  the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. In other words, they are 
the new ways, replacing the Yoshida Doctrine, o f  pursuing the political goals o f Japan 
under the changing international order since the 1970s and particularly since the late 
1980s.
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Finally, another important question that remains to be answered in this concluding 
chapter is why Japan's main interest in regionalism has shifted from Asia Pacific to 
East Asia, specifically to the framework of ASEAN + 3, since the late 1990s. It has 
been shown that Japanese policymakers have been increasingly thinking that East Asia 
should have some frameworks for cooperation independent o f the US. As stated 
repeatedly, this is not an attempt to exclude the US from East Asia, or to discard the 
frameworks o f Asia Pacific cooperation, but it reflects the belief that East Asian 
countries should have their own frameworks as an alternative option, under the 
increasingly uncertain situation in the post Cold War period, in addition to the existing 
international, regional and bilateral frameworks. This change is highly interesting, as 
Japan has been consistently promoting some form o f Asian Pacific regionalism since 
the 1960s. As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6, the concept o f Asia Pacific is 
actually a very' convenient one as it can help Japan manage its long lasting diplomatic 
issue of how to balance the relationship with the US and that with East Asia. The idea 
o f  Asia Pacific is also effective in that it appears to decrease the Japanese influence 
and therefore reduces the concerns o f  its neighbours It is necessary to think about 
what this shift in Japan's stance on regionalism means and what Japan is trying to do 
w ith the new framework o f East Asian regionalism.
The thesis has already addressed this question. It has argued that East Asian 
regionalism can be a good opportunity for Japan to take a leadership role in the region 
and to show its willingness to assume more positive political roles. Also, East Asian 
regionalism reflects the key conception o f Japanese policymakers that East Asia has to 
reinforce its own frameworks to prepare for probable US withdrawal from the region 
in the long-term. The deepening economic interdependence o f the regional economy 
has also made Japanese as well as East Asian officials recognise the need to cooperate 
more closely with each other to prevent serious disturbance from occurring. In 
addition, East Asian countries' greater acceptance o f Japan’s larger role in dealing with
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regional matters, a  more benign relationship between Japan and regional countries and 
the increasing number o f  ‘ Asianist" policymakers in Japan are also factors that explain 
the shift in the Japanese priorities in East Asia .
However, these explanations still seem to leave one question unanswered, namely, why 
the choice for East Asia and not Asia Pacific. The thesis has discussed various reasons 
for this in previous chapters, and the answer to the question depends on the area of 
discussion.
MOF officials, whose main interest is the stability o f  the Japanese financial markets, 
have been strengthening their belief since the early 1990s, that East Asia should have 
some self-help mechanisms instead o f relying solely on the assistance o f the US and 
the international organisations. To MOF officials, the existing international 
organisations are limited in their ability to deal with East Asian issues in terms of the 
available resources and information. The financial crises in the late 1990s gave further 
credence to this interpretation, as not only was the IMF assistance not enough to case 
the crisis situation, but also the crises revealed to Japanese (and East Asian) 
policymaking agents and intellectuals the US double standards, in the sense that the 
US showed a different degree o f commitment to the resolution o f the East Asian crisis 
compared with the Latin America and Russian crises. This has made M OF officials 
believe that it is important to establish some self-help mechanisms in East Asia to 
supplement the existing system for preventing and preparing for any future financial 
disturbance.
Furthermore, a decade-long ideological disagreement between Washington and the 
MOF concerning the relevance o f different models o f economic management, as well 
as the dissatisfaction with the limited roles o f the Japanese staff in the existing 
international organisations together with Japan's small voice there despite Japan's
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huge financial contributions have probably added momentum to the attempt o f  MOF 
officials to advance East Asian financial regionalism In particular, these ideological 
differences became even clearer during the crisis, which increasingly frustrated MOF 
officials and made them articulate their views more assertively. In this sense, it could 
be argued that MOF officials wish to have some regional framework that will not be 
influenced by Washingon's policy. This does not mean that MOF officials want to 
exclude the US from the region, rather that they wish to have a framework that can 
reflect their ideas more.
MOFA officials, who have a stronger interest in the country’s political and security 
issues than other ministries, have slightly different motivations to advance East Asian 
cooperation. They share the view of MOF officials that East Asia has to prepare for the 
probable withdrawal of the US from the region in the long-term by establishing some 
additional regional frameworks. Also, they have strongly felt that Japan has to show to 
the world its will to take political initiative. Furthermore, the stalemate of the APEC 
processes encourages them to look for an alternative East Asian option. However, it is 
highly unlikely that Japanese (as well as East Asian) officials will pursue any self-help 
mechanism in the region in the foreseeable future particularly in the security area, as 
they still think that the US should be a key player in the political and security issues in 
the region. W hat MOFA officials have currently proposed is to have multiple options. 
The ARF, which includes the US, is one, the political E ast Asian framework is another, 
and both could complement the traditional framework in East Asia.
This many-sided regional approach can be also effective in dealing with Japan’s China 
relations, which have been, and will be. increasingly important and difficult for the 
Japanese diplomacy, given the perceived rise o f C hina as an economic and military 
power as well as the persistent mistrust o f  each other. That is, this multifaceted policy 
of Japan on regionalism is in part the result o f an awareness o f the issues involved in
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its engagement policy towards China and aims to encourage China's integration into 
the regional and international society. Such a policy could contribute to  the smoother 
relationship between the two countries as they understand each other more, 
particularly since China is highly sensitive to Japan’s dominance in the region and its 
intent in taking more political initiatives. In addition, drawing China into multifaceted 
regional and international frameworks could be an effective way to hedge against the 
future Chinese power, particularly military power, which might threaten and disrupt 
the international system.
Probably MOFA officials do not know exactly where the new East Asian framework is 
going, nor do they have a very clear view about how to utilise it in the future. In this 
sense, the MOFA’s policy may be regarded as pragmatic, rather than strategic. 
Nevertheless, it should also be noted that they certainly recognise the significance o f  
East Asian regionalism in establishing Japan's political status and in complementing 
the existing political and security orders in East Asia, given the probable US 
withdrawal from the region in the long-term, the perceived rise o f China, and the belief 
that such a new framework can greatly contribute to stronger regional ties for Japan.
Finally, MIT1 officials' motivation to support the East Asian framework is obviously 
economic. While the US is still the most important economic partner for Japanese 
industries. East Asia has become another pillar as a trading and investing area. In this 
sense, APEC looked like a perfect mechanism for strengthening both relationships, and, 
in fact, the MITI played an important role in establishing APEC. However, the 
stalemate o f the APEC processes as well as the US establishment o f  NAFTA has 
gradually made MITI officials look to bilateral as well as East Asian approaches 
because o f the fear that Japan might be left out o f any framework, when other major 
countries have joined their own regional and bilateral economic arrangements. Under 
the circumstances, they have been thinking that it may be wise to  have several
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approaches, including bilateral and East Asian approaches, in addition to its 
continuous support for APEC and the W TO, so as to secure Japan's economic interests.
Therefore, the thesis has. to a degree, a different stance from the mainstream argument 
that it was the East Asian financial crisis that triggered the regional move towards East 
Asian regionalism. It agrees that the crisis has increased the momentum behind this 
project, as discussed in Chapter 5. However, what the discussions o f  this thesis suggest 
is that various Japanese policymakers have their own motivations for advancing East 
Asian regionalism, w hich depends on the area of discussion, and thus on the ministry 
to which they belong, reflecting specific reactions to the transformation o f  the 
international system particularly since the late 1980s. In fact, the idea o f East Asian 
cooperation did not come out suddenly during the crisis, rather it had been developing 
gradually throughout the 1990s. as discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. Thus, the 
development o f East Asian regionalism, for which Japan's strong support is essential, 
should be discussed against the background o f this shift in the orientation o f the 
Japanese foreign policy, in addition to the crisis.
Where then is Japanese foreign policy going in the future? Are the changes that the 
thesis has discussed sustainable? Because these changes in the nature of Japanese 
foreign policy have reflected the international and regional conditions that have been 
transforming significantly, it can be expected that Japan will have to continue to move 
in the same direction in order to maintain and enhance its national interests and to 
realise its policy goals. Japan will probably try to take more and more economic, 
political and security initiatives in the region, with East Asia becoming another pillar 
o f its foreign policy together with the relationship with the US. However, these new 
initiatives will probably have to  be taken in the current style o f Japanese policy, 
namely a  low-profile and incremental approach, as Japanese policymakers still believe 
that Japan should not, and cannot, take a  dominant approach, as discussed in Chapter 6.
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As the thesis has demonstrated, more independent initiatives and the present style o f 
Japanese foreign policy are not incompatible in the foreseeable future.
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